Pfeifer v. Pfeifer, 96-108
| Citation | 282 Mont. 461,938 P.2d 684 |
| Decision Date | 26 June 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-108,96-108 |
| Parties | Susan J. PFEIFER, Petitioner, Respondent and Cross-Appellant, v. Philip Christopher Meredith PFEIFER, Respondent, Appellant and Cross-Respondent. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court of Montana |
Philip J. O'Connell, Missoula, for Respondent and Appellant.
Evonne Smith Wells, Colleen E. Ambrose, Laurence J. Ginnings, Missoula, for Petitioner and Respondent.
The marriage of Appellant Philip Christopher Meredith Pfeifer (Chris) and Respondent and Cross-Appellant Susan J. Pfeifer (Sue) was dissolved pursuant to the findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of dissolution entered by the Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County. Chris appeals the court's attorney fee award, and Sue cross-appeals the court's division of the marital estate and the court's failure to award her maintenance.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.
Chris's single issue on appeal is whether the District Court erred in awarding Sue attorney fees.
Sue raises five issues in her cross-appeal. Those issues are as follows:
1. Were the District Court's findings concerning Sue's contribution to the marital estate clearly erroneous?
2. Did the District Court erroneously value Sue's possessory interest in the family home?
3. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in distributing the marital estate by failing to award Sue sufficient income-producing property?
4. Did the District Court err in charging against the marital estate debt owed to trusts from which Chris receives income?
5. Did the District Court err when it failed to award Sue maintenance?
Chris and Sue were married in Arizona in 1988. They have one child together, Barbara, who was born in 1988. A short time before marrying Chris, Sue was involved as a party in divorce and related bankruptcy proceedings. Sue entered into the marriage with Chris with two minor children from her prior marriage, a 1985 Toyota Cressida, and some $10,000 in cash. Sue has earned a high school education and an Associate of Arts degree from Scottsdale Community College in Arizona, and prior to her marriage with Chris had been employed both as a nurse's aide and a restaurant hostess.
Chris, too, was married and divorced once before entering into the marriage with Sue. Chris has a minor daughter, Michelle, from his first marriage who now lives in Arizona with her mother. Chris receives a monthly disbursement of approximately $50,000 from a number of trusts created for him by his parents and other relatives. Chris has earned a GED high school equivalency degree.
In 1989, Chris, Sue, Barbara and Sue's two sons from her prior marriage moved from Arizona to a Pfeifer family home in St. Ignatius, Montana. The home and 160 acres surrounding it were purchased from Chris's father. Chris and Sue attempted to operate the property as a ranch. They purchased cattle and horses, and hired ranch hands to assist in the ranching duties. The parties claim that the purpose of starting up the ranch was to generate a loss to off-set income from the sale of stock that Chris inherited. The ranch has not been profitable.
While married, Chris and Sue enjoyed an expansive lifestyle. They traveled extensively, and purchased many material goods, including Arabian horses, boats, and automobiles. In addition, they purchased two more tracts of land in the St. Ignatius area, although the family continued to live in the home purchased from Chris's father. The parties also purchased homes in Scottsdale, Arizona and Missoula, Montana. To assist in the care of the children, Chris and Sue hired nannies and housekeepers.
In the early 1990s the marriage began to deteriorate, the parties separated, and in 1994 Sue filed a petition for dissolution. After a hearing, the court on December 15, 1995, entered its findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree of dissolution dividing the $2,560,644.00 marital estate. The court declared Sue the primary residential custodian of Barbara and ordered Chris to pay $6,977 per month for Barbara's support, but declined to award Sue maintenance. The court ordered Chris to pay Sue's attorney fees as well as his own. Chris appeals, and Sue cross-appeals, from this decree.
Did the District Court err in awarding Sue attorney fees?
We review a district court's award of attorney fees in a dissolution action to determine whether the court abused its discretion. In re the Marriage of Roullier (1987), 229 Mont. 348, 360, 746 P.2d 1081, 1088 (citations omitted). A district court has abused its discretion if its award of attorney fees is not supported by substantial evidence. In re the Marriage of Hall (1990), 244 Mont. 428, 436, 798 P.2d 117, 122.
The attorney fees at issue here were awarded pursuant to § 40-4-110, MCA, which states:
The court from time to time, after considering the financial resources of both parties, may order a party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost to the other party of maintaining or defending any proceeding under chapters 1 and 4 of this title and for attorney's fees, including sums for legal services rendered and costs incurred prior to the commencement of the proceeding or after entry of judgment. The court may order that the amount be paid directly to the attorney, who may enforce the order in his name.
This Court has held that an appropriate attorney fee awarded pursuant to § 40-4-110, MCA, is one which is: (1) based on necessity; (2) reasonable; and (3) based on competent evidence. In re the Marriage of Barnard (1994), 264 Mont. 103, 109, 870 P.2d 91, 95 (citing In re the Marriage of Zander (1993) In its findings of fact the court found:
262 Mont. 215, 227, 864 P.2d 1225, 1233). Moreover, the district court must conduct a separate hearing after trial in order to determine the reasonableness of the attorney fees. In re the Marriage of Davies (1994), 266 Mont. 466, 479-80, 880 P.2d 1368, 1377. Chris contends that the District Court's attorney fee award did not comply with any of these requirements. We agree
[t]hat after considering the financial resources of both parties pursuant to Sec. 40-4-110, MCA, [Chris] should be responsible for paying [Sue's] attorney fees and costs incurred in the this [sic] action, as well as his own.
In its conclusions of law, the court stated:
[t]hat [Chris] should pay [Sue's] reasonable attorney fees and costs of suit as well as his own.
Sue contends that "this Court has repeatedly affirmed an award of attorney's fees where the record shows that the District Court considered the financial resources of both parties," citing Roullier, 746 P.2d at 1088; In re the Marriage of Manus (1987), 225 Mont. 457, 465, 733 P.2d 1275, 1279-80; and, In re the Marriage of Carr v. Carr (1983), 205 Mont. 269, 273, 667 P.2d 425, 427. However, there is nothing in Sue's contention, or in the cases she cites, that requires us to affirm the court's award here. The court's statement that it considered the parties' financial resources, without more, is an insufficient basis upon which to determine that an attorney fee award is necessary. The court made no other findings that would indicate how a consideration of the parties' respective financial resources dictated an award to Sue. Moreover, our review of the record does not reveal any evidence which would clarify how the parties' respective financial resources leads to, and supports, the court's conclusion. We reverse the award of attorney fees.
Were the District Court's findings concerning Sue's contribution to the marital estate clearly erroneous?
We review a district court's findings regarding the distribution of the marital estate to determine if those findings are clearly erroneous. In re the Marriage of Eklund (1989), 236 Mont. 77, 80, 768 P.2d 340, 343. We employ the following three-part test in determining whether a district court's findings are clearly erroneous:
(1) the Court will review the record to see if the findings are supported by substantial evidence; (2) if the findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court determines if the trial court has misapprehended the effect of the evidence; and (3) if substantial evidence exists and the effect of the evidence has not been misapprehended, the Court may still find that "a finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, a review of the record leaves the court with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed."
In re the Marriage of Schmitz v. Schmitz (1992), 255 Mont. 159, 165, 841 P.2d 496, 500 (citing Interstate Production Credit Ass'n v. DeSaye (1991), 250 Mont. 320, 323, 820 P.2d 1285, 1287).
In distributing the marital estate, a district court is required to consider, among other things, a spouse's contribution as a homemaker. Section 40-4-202(1), MCA. The District Court found that Sue
was a homemaker during the parties' marriage and made minor contributions to the parties' ranching operation. The income [Chris] received from his trusts allowed the employment of others to perform most housekeeping and child rearing duties during the marriage. Most of [Sue]'s contribution to the maintenance of the marital estate consisted of spending funds provided by [Chris].
Sue contends that these findings are clearly erroneous because they are not supported by substantial evidence. We disagree.
Our review of the record reveals substantial evidence that Sue was not employed outside the home, but was a homemaker. Further, there is substantial evidence supporting the court's finding that Chris and Sue employed housekeepers, nannies, and ranch hands to assist with household and ranch duties. There is testimony in the record However, Sue argues that the court was presented with evidence that established her substantial, rather than minor, contributions to the child rearing and...
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