Pfeifer v. State
Decision Date | 08 June 1972 |
Docket Number | No. 3,No. 172A27,172A27,3 |
Citation | 152 Ind.App. 315,283 N.E.2d 567 |
Parties | Joseph Nathan PFEIFER, Appellant (Defendant-Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff-Below) |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Anthony V. Luber, South Bend, for appellant.
Theo. L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., A. Frank Gleaves, III, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.
Joseph Nathan Pfeifer was charged with second degree burglary and safe burglary. He was tried before a jury and convicted on both charges. His appeal to this court is based upon two contentions of error:
(1) The verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence.
(2) State's instruction no. 7 was repetitive and therefore error.
In the opinion that follows, we hold that the evidence was sufficient to convict and instruction no. 7 was not so repetitive that it amounted to an argument by the court. 1
Considering the facts of this case with those presented in Smith v. State (1970), Ind., 260 N.E.2d 558, and Walker v. State (1968), 250 Ind. 649, 653, 238 N.E.2d 466, we feel that the evidence considered in the light most favorable to the State supports the guilty verdict of the jury.
State's instruction no. 7 reads as follows: 2
'While it is the law that every person charged with the commission of a crime is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established beyond a reasonable doubt, yet, if the evidence is so strong and conclusive as to overcome the presumption of innocence, under the law this presumption of innocence will avail nothing to the Defendant, and under such circumstances you should convict.'
A different error is urged in the appellant's brief at page 15. This error is:
'State's Instruction 7 was a repetition of the law contained in Court Instruction 5 and State's Instruction 1.'
The above objection made to the trial court makes no reference to State's instruction no. 1. We further note that what appellant purports to be Court's instruction no. 5 is, according to the transcript filed with this court, Court's instruction no. 6.
We are fully aware of the rule that restricts the appellant's error on appeal to the specific reasons stated in his objection to the trial court. Allman v. Malsbury (1946), 224 Ind. 177, 65 N.E.2d 106. Nevertheless, we will decide this contention upon the merits.
Court's instruction no. 6 reads as follows:
The Court's instruction no. 6 is an attempt by the court to define the term reasonable doubt to the jury. It expresses the idea that a reasonable doubt must be more than mere speculation or whim. Such an interpretation is supported by the cases of Rhodes v. State (1890), 128 Ind. 189, 27 N.E. 866; Lindley v. State (1929), 201 Ind. 165, 166 N.E. 661; Chambers v. State (1953), 232 Ind. 349, 111 N.E.2d 816; and Cravens v. State (1971), Ind., 275 N.E.2d 4.
Instruction no. 7 states that if the evidence is strong enough and convincing enough to overcome the presumption of innocence, the jury may convict the defendant. Instruction no. 7, therefore, in no was attempts to define reasonable doubt and is not repetive of Court's instruction no. 6.
State's instruction no. 1 reads as follows:
'A reasonable doubt may arise from the evidence as well as from a lack of evidence and may be thus defined:
'The rule of law touching reasonable doubt is a fair, reasonable and practical rule for the guidance of practical men, when engaged in the solemn and important duty of assisting in a fair, honest and impartial enforcement of the criminal laws of our State.
'It is not, therefore, a rule about which there is anything whimsical or chimerical; it is not a mere possibility of error or mistake that constitutes a reasonable doubt; it does not mean that the jury must be convinced to an absolute and demonstrative...
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Coleman v. State
...of one particular phase of the case. See Parker v. State, (1978) 267 Ind. 660, 663, 372 N.E.2d 1178, 1180 and Pfeifer v. State, (1972) 152 Ind.App. 315, 320, 283 N.E.2d 567, 570. As Chief Justice Givan observed in Johnson v. State, (1972) 258 Ind. 683, 687, 284 N.E.2d 517, 519, on rehearing......
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Ernst v. Sparacino
...is reversible error only when it amounts to an argument by the court of one particular phase of the case. Pfeifer v. State (1972), 152 Ind.App. 315, 283 N.E.2d 567. Since focusing upon Sparacino's duty to look out ahead of him should not have prejudiced Ernst (and we have been shown no prej......
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...the trial court was correct. A reasonable doubt is not a fanciful doubt--it must be more than speculation or whim. Pfeifer v. State (1972), 152 Ind.App. 315, 283 N.E.2d 567. And it is a doubt which arises from the evidence, the lack of evidence, or a conflict in the evidence. Harris v. Stat......
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