Pfeiffer v. Department of Transp., A01A0219.
Decision Date | 01 June 2001 |
Docket Number | No. A01A0219.,A01A0219. |
Citation | 250 Ga. App. 643,551 S.E.2d 58 |
Parties | PFEIFFER v. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION. |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
James L. Ford, Sr., Atlanta, for appellant.
Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Whelchel, Brown, Readdick & Bumgartner, J. Thomas Whelchel, Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore, Frank M. Lowrey IV, for appellee.
This appeal stems from a tragic highway construction accident which caused the death of Robert Allen Pfeiffer. Pfeiffer's surviving spouse ("Pfeiffer") sued the Georgia Department of Transportation ("DOT"), alleging that the accident was caused by DOT's negligence. The trial court granted DOT's motion for summary judgment, and Pfeiffer appeals. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the evidence of record "show[s] that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." 1 On appeal, we review a trial court's grant of summary judgment de novo.2
During the bridge project, Rosiek employed Mr. Pfeiffer as a construction worker. Mr. Pfeiffer was killed when a large concrete form, which was braced on only one side, fell on him. It is undisputed that, although DOT employed engineers and inspectors at the project site to monitor and supervise various aspects of the construction, including a traffic control plan, these workers and the DOT did not assume any responsibility for the construction workers' safety. This is because, as stated by a DOT representative,
Pfeiffer's complaint alleged that, under DOT's contract with Rosiek, "DOT undertook and assumed the responsibility to insure that proper safety devices and practices were utilized in the construction." Pfeiffer further alleged that "DOT breached its duty of care to Robert Allen Pfeiffer by failing to take proper steps to insure that proper safety devices and practices were utilized." DOT denied these allegations and moved for summary judgment on the ground that, under the contract, DOT delegated the responsibility for administering on-site construction safety procedures to Rosiek.
Pfeiffer responded to DOT's motion, arguing that because the bridge project was a federal aid construction project, 23 CFR § 630.1010(b) imposed a nondelegable duty on DOT to make certain that the safety aspects of the contract were effectively administered by the contractor. The cited regulation requires, in part, that "[t]he highway agency [DOT] shall designate a qualified person at the project level who will have the primary responsibility and sufficient authority for assuring that the TCP [traffic control plan] and other safety aspects of the contract are effectively administered."4 Pfeiffer argued that the reference to "other safety aspects" required the DOT to assure Rosiek's compliance with the safety/accident prevention provisions in the contract.
Pfeiffer challenges this ruling on appeal.
1. We note initially that the trial court properly construed, as a matter of law, the contract between DOT and Rosiek. Under Georgia law, trial courts are required to construe unambiguous and unequivocal contracts, and "[t]he cardinal rule of construction is to ascertain the intent of the parties."6 If the parties' intent is clear from the contract terms, then a court should look to the contract alone.7 If the contract is ambiguous, a court may consider the attendant circumstances and the contracting parties' explanations to determine their intent.8 In addition, a court should construe a contract in its entirety and "not merely by examining isolated clauses and provisions thereof."9
In the contract at issue, DOT and Rosiek unequivocally agreed that DOT would have a general duty to directly supervise the construction. However, the parties also specifically agreed that it was Rosiek's duty to comply with all safety laws and, more importantly, that Rosiek had the responsibility of ensuring that its employees and any subcontractors' employees were not working under hazardous or dangerous conditions.10
We do not believe that the parties' delegation of this responsibility to Rosiek is ambiguous. Furthermore, even if the contract were ambiguous, DOT's representatives stated their understanding that Rosiek was responsible for implementing its own safety program, and Pfeiffer did not point to any conflicting evidence of the parties' intent. In addition, considering the magnitude of the project, it makes sense that the parties would place ultimate responsibility for worker safety on Rosiek. While Rosiek, through its employees, was likely present wherever construction was being performed along the one-mile bridge and the detour, it would be unreasonable to expect a DOT employee to monitor every action of every contractor and subcontractor employee to ensure his or her safety. We therefore conclude that the trial court correctly found that the parties intended to delegate to Rosiek the responsibility for maintaining worker safety.
2. We must still consider, however, Pfeiffer's assertion that § 630.1010(b) precluded delegation of this responsibility. In construing § 630.1010(b), we employ the basic rules of statutory construction.11 Under these rules, we must look to the plain language of the regulation to determine its meaning.12 However, even if words are apparently plain in meaning, they 13
Reading § 630.1010(b) in the context of the other subsections within that regulation, it is clear that the reference to "other safety aspects" refers to other traffic safety aspects. As pointed out by the court below, each of these subsections provides requirements relating exclusively to moving traffic safely through the road construction site.14 Indeed, § 630.1010 is part of a larger set of regulations titled "Traffic Safety in Highway and Street Work Zones."15 Although these regulations contemplate construction worker safety,16 such consideration is exclusively within the context of traffic safety.17 Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that § 630.1010(b) did not impose a nondelegable duty on DOT to make certain that the non-traffic safety aspects of the contract were effectively administered by Rosiek.
3. Pfeiffer also argues that other regulations and a federal statute imposed a nondelegable duty on DOT to administer construction safety. Pfeiffer, however, never raised these...
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