Pfeil v. Intecom Telecommunications

• Decision Date: 20 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 3:97-CV-1440L.,CIV.A. 3:97-CV-1440L.
• Citation: 90 F.Supp.2d 742
• Parties: Antoinette PFEIL, Plaintiff, v. INTECOM TELECOMMUNICATIONS, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas

90 F.Supp.2d 742

Antoinette PFEIL, Plaintiff, v. INTECOM TELECOMMUNICATIONS, et al., Defendants.

No. CIV.A. 3:97-CV-1440L.

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

March 20, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William C. Isbell, Law Office of William C. Isbell, Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.

Robert E. Sheeder, Vincent S. Carver, Jenkens & Gilchrist, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

LINDSAY, District Judge.

Before the court are Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed May 8, 1998; Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, filed June 1, 1998; and Defendants' Reply in Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment, filed June 16, 1998. After careful consideration of the motion, response, reply, summary judgment record, and the applicable law, the court, for the reasons that follow, grants in part and denies in part Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Procedural and Factual Background

Plaintiff Antoinette Pfeil ("Plaintiff" or "Pfeil") filed this action on June 16, 1997. Pfeil contends that Defendants Intecom, Inc. ("Intecom"), Intecom Acquisition, Inc. ("Intecom Acquisition"), and Samuel Stuckey ("Stuckey") (collectively referred to as "Defendants") caused her to be the victim of sexual harassment and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. Plaintiff also contends that Intecom and Intecom Acquisition failed to supervise and train Stuckey and brings a claim of negligent supervision against these two Defendants. Defendants deny that Plaintiff was sexually harassed or retaliated against while she was employed. Defendants contend that a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason existed for Plaintiff's termination. In summary, Defendants contend that they are not liable to Plaintiff under Title VII or to her on her claim of negligent supervision.

The court now sets forth the facts it relies on to decide the motion. Some facts are disputed; others are not in dispute. Where the facts presented are in dispute or there are different versions of the facts, they are presented and viewed in the light most favorable to Pfeil as the nonmovant. The court only states those facts which are relevant and material to the disposition of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Pfeil was originally hired by Intecom, a Dallas-based telecommunications company, in March 1995 as a temporary secretarial employee who worked in the Customer Service Department. On June 15, 1995, Pfeil was hired on a permanent basis as a Secretary II in the Customer Service Department. Stuckey was employed as the Director of Customer Service at Intecom during 1995 and 1996. Pfeil was primarily assigned to work for Stuckey; however, she was also assigned to perform certain duties for the Manager of Customer Service and the Customer Service Field Managers.

Plaintiff was terminated on June 4, 1996. As expected, the parties dispute the reason Pfeil was terminated. Intecom contends that Pfeil was terminated because of her poor work performance. Pfeil contends that she was terminated in retaliation "for vocalizing discomfort with [a] sexual (sic) toned comment" made to her by Stuckey.

In documents filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on May 23, 1996, Plaintiff cited one specific example of alleged sexual harassment by Stuckey. She states that Stuckey asked her to a "personal, private" lunch and that the request was made with a "sexual undertone." See EEOC Intake Questionnaire and EEOC Sexual Harassment Affidavit of Plaintiff. In reference to the alleged sexual harassment, Plaintiff made statements that it had occurred "on and off since hiring" and that there were "indirect comments since [the] beginning of employment." No specifics are given regarding any of these alleged comments or incidents in her EEOC filings.

With respect to the "personal and private" lunch statement, Plaintiff avers that it was made during a conversation between her and Stuckey in which he informed her that he had just read an article on sexual harassment in USA Today. According to Pfeil, Stuckey laughed about the article. Pfeil states that the "personal and private" lunch comment came after the statement about the article on sexual harassment.

Plaintiff also lists nine other instances of alleged sexual harassment. These incidents allegedly occurred during the first few months of 1996 and prior to the alleged request for the "personal and private lunch," and are as follows:

a. On one occasion, when she failed to shave her legs, Stuckey (who is an African-American) looked at Pfeil's legs and said, "Black men don't like it when their women don't shave";

b. On another occasion, Stuckey told Pfeil that she was a "really pretty girl" and she should wear makeup or would look better with makeup;

c. On another occasion, Stuckey told Pfeil "you know, you really look nice in that [tailored suit]" and that she would probably look "really good in miniskirts";

d. On another occasion, Stuckey asked Pfeil whether she had ever considered or would ever consider dating a Black man;

e. On another occasion, Stuckey told Pfeil that she had nice long legs and asked her whether she had ever considered being a model;

f. On an occasion when a group of Field Managers (male) came to Dallas and Pfeil was dressed up for the occasion, Stuckey told her she should not dress so nicely, because he could not keep them "away from her" or "off her";

g. On several (two to four) occasions, Stuckey made a "grunting" noise, one that Pfeil described as a "um-um-um" noise, when she entered the room. Plaintiff further described this noise as "the kind of noise made by construction workers when pretty women walk by";

h. On many occasions (more than 50% of the time), when Pfeil would enter a room, Stuckey would state at her and "check her from head to toe," which made her "feel like he was undressing [her]"; and

i. On occasion, Stuckey asked Pfeil whether she really wanted to get married and whether her fiancé was right for her.¹

II. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment shall be rendered when the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir.1998). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all inferences drawn from the factual record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio, 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986); Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458.

Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine fact issue. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348. Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir.1996). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Forsyth v. Barr, 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 871, 115 S.Ct. 195, 130 L.Ed.2d 127 (1994). The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his claim. Ragas, 136 F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in search of evidence" to support Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants' motion. Id., Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 & n. 7 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832, 113 S.Ct. 98, 121 L.Ed.2d 59 (1992). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Disputed fact issues which are "irrelevant and unnecessary" will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

III. Analysis

A. Plaintiff's Claims Against Defendants Stuckey and Intecom Acquisition

Plaintiff, in her Second Amended Complaint, made claims against Stuckey and Intecom Acquisition. In her response to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Pfeil did not brief or address her theory of liability regarding either of these Defendants or cite any summary judgment evidence supporting her claims against them. Pfeil has therefore abandoned the claims against Stuckey and Intecom Acquisition, and the court will therefore grant summary judgment in their favor. See Scales v. Slater, 181 F.3d 703, 709 n. 5 (5th Cir.1999).

Even if Plaintiff did not abandon her claims against Stuckey, he is not liable to Plaintiff regarding her Title VII claims. Title VII liability extends only to employers and defendants in their official capacities. Huckabay v. Moore, 142 F.3d 233, 241 (5th Cir.1998); Caro v. City of Dallas, 17 F.Supp.2d 618, 624 (N.D.Tex.1998). "A supervisor is considered an `employer' under [T]itle VII if he...