Pflanz v. Foster
Decision Date | 19 June 2008 |
Docket Number | No. 36S01-0710-CV-425.,36S01-0710-CV-425. |
Parties | Richard U. PFLANZ and Delores J. Pflanz, Appellants (Plaintiffs Below), v. Merrill FOSTER, Individually, Merrill Foster, d/b/a Friendly Foster's Service, and Sunoco, Inc. (R & M), Appellees (Defendants Below). |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Donn H. Wray, Justin W. Leverton, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellants.
Rodney E. Farrow, Seymour, IN, Attorney for Appellees.
George M. Plews, Christopher J. Braun, Jeffrey D. Featherstun, John D. Moriarty, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae The Indiana Petroleum Marketers and Convenience Store Association.
John C. Trimble, Richard K. Shoultz, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Insurance Institute of Indiana, Inc. and National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies.
Donald M. Snemis, Brent H. Huber, Freedom S.N. Smith, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Amici Curiae Indiana Association of Cities and Towns and Indiana Municipal Lawyers' Association.
On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals, No. 36A01-0612-CV-548.
The question here is whether a property owner's claim for contribution toward environmental cleanup costs is barred by the statute of limitation if the owner should have known about the contamination more than ten years before the complaint was filed. We hold that the statute of limitation does not begin to run until the owner is ordered to cleanup the property, regardless of whether an owner earlier knew or should have known about the need for cleanup.
Taking all the allegations in the complaint to be true, the facts are as follows. In 1976, Merrill Foster purchased a service station from Sunoco, Inc. and began operating it as Friendly Foster's Service. In 1978, he closed the petroleum dispensing activities and stopped using the underground storage tanks. In April 1984, Richard and Delores Pflanz bought the property from Foster. Prior to the sale, Foster advised the Pflanzes about the presence of the underground tanks, but told them that the tanks were not in use and had been closed. In reality, the tanks remained open and contained some petroleum. The Pflanzes operated a tire store on the property for two years, at which time they sold their business and began leasing the property to a third party.
In 2001, the Pflanzes learned for the first time that there were environmental issues with the property. The Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM) inspected the property and discovered that the underground tanks were leaking. Thereafter, the Pflanzes incurred over $100,000 in cleanup costs, including costs for closing or removing the underground tanks and removing contaminated soil and water.
On December 30, 2004, the Pflanzes filed a complaint against Foster and Sunoco seeking a determination of liability relating to the environmental contamination, damages under theories of waste, negligence, and stigma, contribution for cleanup costs pursuant to the Underground Storage Tanks Act (USTA), and declaratory relief for future anticipated cleanup costs. See Ind.Code Ann. ch. 13-23-13 (West 2007). Foster moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, arguing that the complaint was barred by the statute of limitation. The trial court agreed and dismissed.
On March 2, 2006, the Pflanzes filed a second complaint under the same cause number, containing allegations substantially similar to those in the first complaint. On Foster's motion, the court dismissed the second complaint.
The Pflanzes appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, reasoning that when Indiana enacted the USTA's contribution statute in 1987 and amended it in 1991, the Pflanzes, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, should have tested the property for contamination such that the statute of limitation began to run no later than 1991. Pflanz v. Foster, 871 N.E.2d 971 (Ind.Ct. App.2007), vacated. We granted transfer.
The parties agree that the general ten-year statute of limitation applies to the Pflanzes' contribution claim. See Ind.Code Ann. § 34-11-1-2(a) (West 2007). Cf., Comm'r, Ind. Dep't of Envtl. Mgmt. v. Bourbon Mini-Mart, Inc., 741 N.E.2d 361 (Ind.Ct.App.2000) ( ), summarily aff'd by 783 N.E.2d 253 (Ind.2003). The resolution of this case turns on when the ten-year limitation began to run.
In the American legal system, demonstrated harm is an indispensable element of virtually every type of civil claim. In cases ranging from contract to tort to medical malpractice, a claimant cannot recover a monetary judgment unless he has suffered actual damage. The law does not usually permit monetary recovery for claims solely involving future damages; rather, some damage must have already begun to occur. This notion that the statute of limitation begins to run when all the elements of a cause of action can be shown (including whether some damages have been felt) is part of how we determine when a cause "accrues." See Doe v. United Methodist Church, 673 N.E.2d 839, 842 (Ind.Ct.App.1996) ()
Under Indiana's discovery rule, a cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitation begins to run, when a claimant knows or in exercise of ordinary diligence should have known of the injury. Wehling v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 586 N.E.2d 840, 843 (Ind.1992).
Foster contends that the statute of limitation began running when the Pflanzes knew or should have known about the contamination. The Pflanzes' contribution claim, however, is not a claim for damage to the property itself. Rather, they seek to recover for the cleanup costs IDEM required, which resulted from Foster's use of the land.
In contribution or indemnification cases, the damage that occurs is the incurrence of a monetary obligation that is attributable to the actions of another party. That is why, generally, parties bringing contribution and indemnification claims must wait until after the obligation to pay is incurred, for otherwise the claim would lack the essential damage element. See Bourbon Mini-Mart, 741 N.E.2d at 372 n. 9 (); TLB Plastics Corp., Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Paper Products Co., 542 N.E.2d 1373, 1376 (Ind.Ct.App.1989) ( ); Estate of Leinbach v. Leinbach, 486 N.E.2d 2, 5 (Ind.Ct.App.1985) (); McLochlin v. Miller, 139 Ind.App. 443, 448, 217 N.E.2d 50, 53 (Ind. Ct.App.1966) ().
Because the damage at issue in the Pflanzes' contribution claim is the cleanup obligation assessed by IDEM that resulted from Foster's use of the land, the statute of limitation did not begin to accrue until after the Pflanzes were ordered to clean up the property.
Accordingly, because IDEM ordered the Pflanzes to pay for the environmental cleanup costs in 2001, the Pflanzes filed their contribution claim well within the ten-year statute of limitation.
Indiana law permits recovery of "stigma damages" for losses in the fair market value of property after remediation of environmental contamination. Terra-Products, Inc. v. Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc., 653 N.E.2d 89 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). Stigma damages are warranted where the claimant can demonstrate that an imperfect market...
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