Phaneuf v. Commissioner of Motor Vehicles

• Decision Date: 11 June 1974
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Kenneth C. PHANEUF v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES.

Page 291

352 A.2d 291

166 Conn. 449

Kenneth C. PHANEUF v. COMMISSIONER OF MOTOR VEHICLES.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

June 11, 1974.

Charles J. Popple, Coventry, with whom were Walter J. Ogozalek, Willimantic, and, on the brief, Harold E. Dorwart, Willimantic, for appellant (plaintiff).

John F. Gill, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom, on the brief, was Robert K. Killian, Atty. Gen., for appellee (defendant).

Before HOUSE, C.J., and SHAPIRO, LOISELLE, MacDONALD and BOGDANSKI, JJ.

LOISELLE, Associate Justice.

In his appeal to the Court of Common Pleas the plaintiff, Kenneth C. Phaneuf, alleged that his motor vehicle operator's license was wrongfully suspended by the defendant, the commissioner of motor vehicles. The defendant answered and pleaded three special defenses. Thereafter, the plaintiff moved to amend his complaint. The defendant filed a pleading entitled 'Motion to Dismiss' on the ground of mootness, to which the plaintiff filed a motion to expunge. The court denied the plaintiff's motions to amend and expunge and granted the defendant's 'Motion to Dismiss.' The plaintiff has appealed from the judgment rendered in favor of the defendant.

After filing an answer, it was improper for the defendant to file any motion addressed to the complaint without seeking the permission of the court. Practice Book §§ 74, 75; Glens Falls Ins. Co. v. Somers, 146 Conn. 708, 711, 156 A.2d 146. Furthermore, a motion to dismiss is not a proper vehicle to obtain a dismissal on the ground of mootness. If an appeal or action is to be declared moot, evidence of that fact must be given, or acknowledgment by the opposing party must be shown before the court can act. The record reveals only an allegation by the defendant that the plaintiff's license was returned to him. Based on this allegation alone, the court was in error in dismissing the appeal. In view, however, of the plaintiff's acknowledgment in his appellate brief that his motor vehicle license was returned to him as stated by the defendant, the rulings on the plaintiff's motion to amend and on the issue of mootness are reviewed.

The complaint alleged, in part, as follows: On December 22, 1970, the plaintiff was involved in an accident which resulted in a fatality. The defendant held a hearing on the plaintiff's right to retain his motor vehicle license in view of the fatal accident. On November 30, 1971, the plaintiff was found not guilty of all criminal charges stemming from the fatal accident of December 22, 1970. On February 22, 1972, the defendant ruled that the operator's license of the plaintiff be suspended as of March 27, 1972. The plaintiff's request for a rehearing was refused by the defendant. On March 23, 1973, the plaintiff reapplied for his license. The plaintiff filed his appeal on April 5, 1973.

The defendant claims that the plaintiff's action is moot in that no practical relief can follow from a determination of the questions raised by the appeal because the operator's license of the plaintiff has been returned. The plaintiff responds that his complaint also requested reversal of the decision of suspension made by the defendant, and 'such other and further relief to which Plaintiff in equity may be entitled.' 'It is a well-settled general rule that the existence of an actual controversy is requisite to appellate jurisdiction; it is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow.' Reynolds v. Vroom, 130 Conn. 512, 515, 36 A.2d 22, 24; Harkins v. Driscoll, Conn., 334 A.2d 901; Roy v. Mulcahy, 161 Conn. 324, 328, 288 A.2d 64; see Tracy v. Johnson, 156 Conn. 630, 239 A.2d 477. This statement of the law leads to the question of what, if any, practical relief could follow from a determination of the plaintiff's appeal or what actual relief could be granted by this court. Factual similarities suggest examining the facts of this case in light of the principles developed for criminal cases in which an appellant has fully served his sentence. Briefly stated, where collateral legal consequences are imposed by law as a result of a conviction, a case will not be declared moot, even where the sentence has been fully served. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 53-55, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917; see generally, Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 462. Where collateral legal disabilities have arisen, actual relief can be granted by way of a reinstatement of the appellant's prior legal status. It is necessary to examine the facts of this case to see if any such relief can be granted to the plaintiff.

Although the period of suspension was still in effect when the plaintiff filed his complaint, it subsequently terminated. The plaintiff has not indicated any possibility that the suspension will be reinstated. Compare In re Appeal of Bailey, 158 Conn. 439, 444, 262 A.2d 177. The only present, direct effect on the plaintiff is the record of the suspension in the files of the department of motor vehicles. The question at hand,...