Phegley v. Steamboat David Tatum

• Decision Date: 31 March 1863
• Citation: 33 Mo. 461
• Parties: GEORGE PHEGLEY et al., Respondents, v. STEAMBOAT DAVID TATUM, Appellant. JOHN WILLIAMS, Respondent, v. STEAMBOAT DAVID TATUM, Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

33 Mo. 461

GEORGE PHEGLEY et al., Respondents,

v.STEAMBOAT DAVID TATUM, Appellant.

JOHN WILLIAMS, Respondent,

v.STEAMBOAT DAVID TATUM, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March Term, 1863.

Appeal from St. Louis Court of Common Pleas.

J. K. Knight, for respondents.

Sharp and Hayden, for appellant.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court.

Sharp and Hayden, for appellant.

It is not contended that the records of the justice's court were “records or judicial proceedings,” under the act of Congress of 26th May, 1790, though some courts have held this doctrine, (3 Mon. Ky. 62;5 Day, 363,) but that they were competent evidence in connection with the testimony of the witness Saxton as sworn office copies.

All the authorities agree that no informalities, mistakes or errors can render void the judgment of a court having jurisdiction, where that judgment is collaterally put in evidence.And the effect is the same, provided the court had jurisdiction, whether it were a court of general or limited powers, of record or not of record.

Two elements are essential to give jurisdiction.That both of these elements existed in the present case, appeared from the evidence offered by defendant.

That the justice had jurisdiction of the cause of action, appears from the statutes of Illinois.

That the justice had jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, appears from the seizure of the defendant by the constable, as shown by his return and by the subsequent proceedings.The actions were in substance actions in rem; being such, the res(not any person whatever) was the defendant.If the res was seized in the suit, the court had complete jurisdiction of the defendant.

In considering the effect of the sale, it should be kept in mind that McAllister, who now defends, has, as against the plaintiff, all the priorities.The demand in the first judgment under which he purchased was, 1st, prior in its prosecution, for the suits were commenced before the plaintiffs'; 2d, prior in respect to its class of lien, for it was a mariner's demand, while the plaintiffs' was a material-man's, and, 3d, the demand of the plaintiff in the judgment arose before that of the present plaintiff.

Two other material facts should also be borne in mind on this point.

I.That the demand of the plaintiff in this suit fully accrued before the suits in Illinois were commenced.

II.That the laws of Illinois (as mentioned above) allow foreign creditors (i. e. those whose demands originate out of that State, or while the boat is not navigating the waters of that State) to sue under its “boat law,” as if they were domestic creditors.

These facts render clearer and more imperative the application to the present suit of the doctrine laid down in the cases cited below, that a judicial sale under the “boat act” of Illinois divests such a lien as that of the plaintiff, and gives the purchaser a clear title.(Finney v. Steamboat Fayette, 10 Mo. 612;Steamboat Raritan v. J. G. Smith, 10 Mo. 527;Ritter v. Steamboat Jamestown, 23 Mo. 352.)

The same doctrine has expressly been held to be the law in the courts of the United States; indeed, they have gone further than this, as appears from a decision made by Mr. Justice Nelson of the Supreme Court of the United States, while sitting on his circuit.(2 Blatch. C. C. 427.)

Rankin with Gray, for respondents.

If all the proceedings in the suits mentioned in the transcripts were formal and entirely regular, yet the sale of the vessel under the laws of Illinois, under which said proceedings were had, did not divest the lien of the plaintiffs' demand.The Illinois statutes afford the remedy by attachment only to those having demands against a vessel which are liens thereon, and a sale thereunder divests only the title of the owner and certain liens conferred by the statute of Illinois.(1 Pur. St. 107.)

It is contended here that the sale under the statutes of Illinois divested the plaintiffs' lien conferred by the laws of Missouri.If this be true, then the effect of such sale has all the force and effect of an admiralty proceeding under the maritime law, where all parties interested are regarded as parties, and all parties interested are allowed to intervene for their respective interests.This proposition cannot be maintained.(Germain v. Steam-tug Indiana, 11 Ill. 536.)In the last case cited, the Supreme Court of Illinois construe their statutes relating to steamboats; they also, in this case, refer to the case of Smith v. Steamboat Raritan, (10 Mo. 527,) and deny the doctrine as applicable to a sale under the Illinois statutes.

In the cases of Smith v. The Raritan, and Finney and others v. The Steamboat Fayette, the court determines that a judicial sale will divest liens, &c but the court nowhere in those cases defines what is meant by a judicial sale, or what kind of judicial sale would divest all liens, &c.However, the Supreme Court, in the case of The Steamboat Sea Bird v. Beehler(12 Mo. 570), reverse those cases, and agree with the decisions of the Supreme Court of Illinois in the case previously cited.(Germain v. Steam-tug Indiana, 11 Ill. 536;Clarion v. Moran, 18 Ill. 501.)

Hence the respondents' lien could not be divested by a sale under such proceedings.In the language of the Supreme Court of Illinois, in the case cited of Germain v. Steam-tug Indiana,“it is contrary to all notions of justice and equity to divest a man of his rights by a proceeding to which he is not a party, and in which he cannot appear and defend them.”

BATES, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court.

These cases were argued and submitted to the court together.They were suits to enforce liens under the act concerning boats and vessels.The only questions for consideration arise upon the defence made, which was similar in each case.

Roger C. McAllister, the owner of the boat, set up as a defence that he had bought the boat at a time which was after the liens in these cases had accrued, and before the boat was seized in these cases; that his purchase was made at a constable's sale, in the State of Illinois, authorized by a proceeding against the boat under the boat law of that State, and that the liens in this State were thereby discharged.

The court below did not sustain the defense, but gave judgment against the boat.

Several questions were presented and argued in this court as to the regularity of the proceedings under which the boat was sold in Illinois; but in the view which we take of the case, it is not necessary to pass upon these questions.This case was argued, upon the part of the appellant, upon the assumption that the liens created by the statute of this State were “maritime liens.”We do not understand them to be such in the strict meaning of that term.The statute of Missouri has no extraterritorial operation.It was designed to afford a speedy and convenient remedy to our citizens, and to such others only as are engaged in trade within our jurisdiction at the time of their contract.It does not conflict with the general maritime law, nor is it in aid of that law, but is a separate, distinct and peculiar provision for local...