Phelps v. Perez, 1:21-cv-01108 BAM (PC)

• Decision Date: 05 November 2021
• Docket Number: 1:21-cv-01108 BAM (PC)
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: PAUL PHELPS, Plaintiff, v. MANUEL PEREZ, WARDEN, et al., Defendants.

PAUL PHELPS, Plaintiff,
v.
MANUEL PEREZ, WARDEN, et al., Defendants.

No. 1:21-cv-01108 BAM (PC)

United States District Court, E.D. California

November 5, 2021

ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO ACTION

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN CLAIMS

(ECF NO. 9)

FOURTEEN-DAY DEADLINE

BARBARA A. MCAULIFFE, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Paul Phelps (“Plaintiff”) is a county jail inmate proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff's complaint, filed on July 22, 2021, was screened, and Plaintiff was granted leave to amend. Plaintiff first amended complaint, filed on October 20, 2021, is currently before the court for screening. (Doc. 9.)

I. Screening Requirement and Standard

The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Plaintiff's complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A(b).

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A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief . . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff's allegations are taken as true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

To survive screening, Plaintiff's claims must be facially plausible, which requires sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

II. Plaintiff's Allegations

Plaintiff is currently housed at Madera County Department of Corrections, where the allegations in the complaint occurred. Plaintiff alleges he was a pretrial at the time of the events. Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1) Manual Perez, Chief/Warden, (2) Sgt. Townsend, Correctional Officer and watch commander, (3) Bettes, Correctional Officer, and (4) County of Madera.

On December 21, 2019, Plaintiff was booked into Madera County Department of Corrections (MCDC) and medically assisted by the medical staff. Soon after, Sgt Townsend and Officer Bettes both approached the holding cell and advised Plaintiff that he had to be double celled for housing. Plaintiff refused to be double celled due to safety reasons and out of fear for his safety. Plaintiff asked Sgt. Townsend to provide Plaintiff with lockdown housing for his protection. Sgt. Townsend became angry and ordered Officer Bettes to handcuff Plaintiff and move him to another holding cell. After being handcuffed in the holding cell, both officers again approached the holding cell and advised the Plaintiff of what they were going to Plaintiff's request. Plaintiff repeated his safety concerns to Sgt. Townsend, refused to be housed in the

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double man cell and asked to be housed in lockdown. Out of anger, Defendant Townsend ordered and assisted Officer Bettes to exercise undue force against the Plaintiff, who was handcuffed, by slamming the Plaintiff face first into the ground and causing his teeth to lodge through his upper lip. Both engaged in this action, and Plaintiff was injured.

The RN who first assisted Plaintiff was called back to give immediate medical care. The RN photographed the injuries. Plaintiff alleges Sgt. Townsend retaliated against Plaintiff “when he criminally charged the Plaintiff of resisting arrest, for exercising his right to seek redress from the jail through use of the grievance system.”

Plaintiff alleges that Sgt. Townsend and Officer Bettes were under the command of Chief Manuel Perez and were employees of the County of Madera. Plaintiff alleges that Madera County is a municipal corporation had authority as the employer of the defendants and that the “unspoken custom relied on by Defendants” was inaction to change the ongoing abuse in the Madera County Department of Corrections. Plaintiff alleges that the inaction to change by Madera County, Department of Corrections' treatment of its prisoners was a moving force that gave Chief Manual Perez, Sgt. Townsend and Officer Bettes the authority to keep performing duties in a “business as usual” manner and violating constitutional rights.

Plaintiff alleges that MCDC has a long history of abusing its prisoners that span decades and founded practices that have become a traditional method of carrying out the custom. Plaintiff alleges a lack of care to protect Plaintiff from violence and it falls on Madera County to protect him. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Chief Manual Perez knowingly failed in his responsibility to take reasonable measures to protect Plaintiff from violence; he has known of violence at the hands of officers for years. Plaintiff was attempting to be single celled due to safety concerns and that the officer with authority to ensure safety attacked Plaintiff. Chief Manual Perez knew of previous acts by officers under his authority and disregarded taking any measure to ensure safety. He is liable for the assault and for not housing Plaintiff in segregation. Plaintiff states his assault reflects on the history of training and the culture of the jail. MCDC has a history of abusing/assaulting its prisoners and not rules have been put in place to further protect prisoners from physical harm. Supervisory liability exists because Chief Manuel Perez helped created the

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culture of officers abusing their authority and prisoners' rights which was so prevalent that defendants Sgt. Townsend and Officer Betts assaulted Plaintiff in plain view of facility cameras.

In addition to constitutional violations, Plaintiff asserts claims under state law for violation of MCDC rules and regulations, California Penal Code, California civil codes.

Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and punitive damages and other applicable damages.

III. Discussion

A. Excessive Force

Plaintiff alleges he was a pretrial detainee at the time of the incident. Constitutional questions regarding the conditions and circumstances of Plaintiff's confinement are properly raised under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 77 (1983); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); Oregon Advocacy Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d 1101, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003). The due process rights of pretrial detainees are “at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available to a convicted prisoner” Revere, 463 U.S. at 244. Thus, while the Eighth Amendment provides a minimum standard of care for detainees, plaintiff's rights while detained in custody are determined under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment rather than the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Gibson v. County of Washoe, 290 F.3d 1175, 1197 (2001) (overruled on other grounds by Castro v. County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060 (2016)).

The Constitution does not prohibit the use of reasonable force by officers. Tatum v. City & County of San Francisco, 441 F.3d 1090, 1095 (9th Cir.2006). Whether force used was excessive depends on “whether the officers' actions [were] ‘objectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or motivation.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989); Tatum, 441 F.3d at 1095; Lolli v. County of Orange, 351 F.3d 410, 415 (9th Cir. 2003). The proper inquiry balances the nature and quality of the intrusion against the countervailing governmental interests at stake. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396; Lolli, 351 F.3d at 415. The “reasonableness” of a particular use of force must be

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judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. “Not every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers, ” violates the Fourth Amendment. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted).

Liberally construing the allegations, Plaintiff states a cognizable claim under the Fourteenth Amendment against Sgt. Townsend and Officer Bettes for excessive force. Plaintiff alleges both defendants slammed Plaintiff head first to the ground while Plaintiff was handcuffed, causing injuries.

B. Failure to Protect

If the inmate was a pretrial detainee at the relevant time, his claim would arise under the

Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Jail officials may be liable under the Fourteenth

Amendment for failure to protect a pretrial detainee from a risk of harm by others. To state a claim that an individual officer failed to protect a pretrial detainee, a plaintiff must allege facts showing these elements:

(1)The defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined; (2) Those conditions put the plaintiff at substantial risk of suffering serious harm; (3) The defendant did not take reasonable available measures to abate that risk, even though a reasonable officer in the

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