Phelps v. Sybinsky
| Decision Date | 20 October 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 49A05-9912-CV-554.,49A05-9912-CV-554. |
| Citation | 736 N.E.2d 809 |
| Parties | Robert and Teresa PHELPS and Bobby Phelps, et al., Appellants-Plaintiffs, v. Peter SYBINSKY, et al., Appellees-Defendants. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Jacquelyn E. Bowie, Kenneth J. Falk, Indiana Civil Liberties Union, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellants.
Karen M. Freeman-Wilson, Attorney General of Indiana, Jon Laramore, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana, Attorneys for Appellees.
This case involves a 1998 statute that requires the filing of a petition to terminate parental rights when a child in need of services ("CHINS") "has been removed from a parent and has been under the supervision of a county office of family and children for not less than fifteen (15) months of the most recent twenty-two (22) months...." Ind.Code § 31-35-2-4.5 (1998). The Phelpses brought a class action challenging the statute on several grounds, and the trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The Class raises the following issues on appeal:
I. Whether the Indiana statute violates federal law;
II. Whether the Indiana statute violates the separation of powers provision of Article III, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution; and
III. Whether the Indiana statute violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.
We affirm the trial court.
The facts are not in dispute. Bobby Phelps, an autistic child with behavioral problems, was removed from his parents' home in November 1993 and placed in foster care. His parents love him, continue to visit him and maintain a close relationship with him, despite this out-of-home placement. A permanency plan created by the Marion County Office of Family and Children ("MCOFC") has recommended long term foster care or institutional care with regular parental visitation to be in Bobby's best interest.
MCOFC notified the Phelpses that pursuant to Indiana Code § 31-35-2-4.5 it would be filing a motion to terminate parental rights because Bobby had been placed out of their home for at least fifteen of the past twenty-two months. MCOFC also informed the Phelps that it would be filing a motion to dismiss the petition because it did not believe that termination was in Bobby's best interest.
On the day before the statute at issue was to take effect, counsel for the Phelpses filed a Class Action Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, alleging that the statute violated federal law and provisions of both the state and federal constitutions. On August 31, the trial court enjoined MCOFC from filing a petition to terminate parental rights and certified the class action. The defendants moved to dismiss pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(6) and the parties also filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law granting the defendants' motion to dismiss.
A motion to dismiss under Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a claim, not the facts that support it. Collard v. Enyeart, 718 N.E.2d 1156, 1158 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), trans. denied. We look at the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, with every inference drawn in their favor, to determine if there is any set of allegations under which the plaintiffs could be granted relief. Ratliff v. Cohn, 693 N.E.2d 530, 534 (Ind.1998)
In 1980, Congress enacted the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-628b, 670-679b. The federal Act ("the Act") authorized federal subsidies to the States for the operation of their child welfare programs but conditioned that funding on certain requirements.
This case arises from requirements placed in the 1997 amendments to the Act, which sought to ensure that children did not spend long periods of their childhoods in foster care or other settings designed to be temporary. The 1997 amendment included a provision designed to make adoption of these children more feasible. The Act provides in relevant part:
42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E) (Supp. III 1997).
Prior to 1998, Indiana's termination statute allowed the county OFC attorney or prosecuting attorney1 to seek termination of parental rights by filing a petition that was required to allege four things:
(i) the conditions that resulted in the child's removal or the reasons for placement outside the home of the parents will not be remedied; or
(ii) the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of the child;
Ind.Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2) (Supp.1997). If the court found all of these allegations to be true by clear and convincing evidence, it was required to terminate the parent-child relationship. Id. § 31-35-2-8; Tipton v. Marion County Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 629 N.E.2d 1262, 1265 (Ind.Ct. App.1994). In response to the 1997 amendments to the federal Act, the General Assembly enacted Public Law No. 35-1998, effective July 1, 1999, which significantly changed existing law by requiring the attorney for the county office of family and children or the prosecuting attorney to file a petition to terminate parental rights for a CHINS who has been removed from a parent and placed under the supervision of a county office of family and children for not less than fifteen of the most recent twenty-two months. See Ind.Code § 31-35-2-4.5(a)(2) (Supp.1999). Although the statute provides no exceptions to the requirement that a petition be filed, it does require that the petition "[i]ndicate whether at least one (1) factor ... that would apply as the basis for filing a motion to dismiss" exists. Id. § 31-35-2-4(b)(3). One of these factors is "[t]hat the current case plan prepared by or under the supervision of the county office of family and children under IC 31-34-15 has documented a compelling reason based on facts and circumstances stated in the petition or motion, for concluding that filing, or proceeding to a final determination of, a petition to terminate the parent-child relationship is not in the best interests of the child." Id. § 31-35-2-4.5(d)(1). If this or any other ground for dismissal applies, the Indiana statute requires the filing of a motion to dismiss. Id. § 31-35-2-4.5(d). The 1998 Indiana statute also added the requirement that a hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights be held within ninety days of its filing. See Ind.Code § 31-35-2-6 (1998).
The Class first contends that the Indiana statute violates federal law because the federal Act requires the filing of a petition to terminate "unless" it is not in the best interest of the child, but the Indiana statute requires the filing of a petition even when it is not in the best interest of the child. The State responds that "[t]he two statutes accomplish the same end, although they take slightly different approaches to do so." Brief of Appellee at 12. We agree with the State.2
Under the federal statute, after a child has been placed out of the parental home for fifteen of the last twenty-two months, a county attorney makes an assessment of the "best interests of the child" and, based on that assessment, either files or does not file a petition to terminate parental rights. Under the Indiana statute, a county attorney must make the same assessment about the child's best interests, but must file the petition even if he or she believes that termination is not in the child's best interests. In such circumstances, however, the county attorney must note in the petition to terminate that the case plan contains a compelling reason why termination is not in the child's best interests. See Ind.Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(3) (Supp.1999). The county attorney is further required to follow the petition with a motion to dismiss. Id. § 31-35-2-4.5(d). Within ninety days of the filing of the petition to terminate, the trial court must hold a hearing on the matter and determine whether termination is in the best interests of the child. If the child's case plan has documented a compelling reason why termination is not in the child's best interests, and the court finds this to be true by a preponderance of the evidence, then it must dismiss the petition to terminate. Id. Even if the petition is not dismissed pursuant to section 4.5, termination under section 4 will occur only if the State proves by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child's best interests pursuant to section 4(b)(2)(C).
In sum, the only difference between the federal and state statutes is the involvement of the trial court in determining the child's best interests. Under the federal statute, a county attorney's review and determination will prevent some petitions from ever being filed, while under the Indiana statute petitions in all cases must be filed and the trial court is required to make the determination of the child's best interests. We agree with the State that the Indiana procedure ...
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