Phetteplace v. Town of Lyme

• Decision Date: 31 January 2000
• Docket Number: No. 97–845.,97–845.
• Citation: 144 N.H. 621,744 A.2d 630
• Court: New Hampshire Supreme Court
• Parties: Gary E. and Karen C. PHETTEPLACE v. TOWN OF LYME.

144 N.H. 621

744 A.2d 630

Gary E. and Karen C. PHETTEPLACE

v.TOWN OF LYME.

No. 97–845.

Supreme Court of New Hampshire.

Jan. 31, 2000.

Loftus & Borgstrom, of Lebanon (Karen Creighton Borgstrom on the brief and orally), for the plaintiffs.

Baldwin, Hogan & Kidd, P.L.L.C., of Concord (Carolyn W. Baldwin on the brief and orally), for the defendant.

THAYER, J.

The plaintiffs, Gary E. and Karen C. Phetteplace, appeal a decision of the Superior Court (Fitzgerald, J.) dismissing as untimely their appeal for an abatement of taxes. See RSA 76:17 (Supp.1999). We affirm.

The facts underlying this appeal are not disputed. In February 1997, the plaintiffs filed an application with the defendant, Town of Lyme, to abate their property taxes. The defendant denied the application on June 27, 1997. The plaintiffs elected to appeal to the superior court and mailed their appeal documents on Saturday, August 30, 1997. See RSA 76:17. The following Monday, September 1, the superior court was closed in observance of Labor Day. The superior court received the plaintiffs' appeal documents on September 2. The defendant moved to dismiss the appeal because it was not filed on or before September 1 as required by RSA 76:17. The superior court granted the motion, and this appeal followed.

The plaintiffs contend that the trial court erred because: (1) the defendant was estopped from filing a motion to dismiss for untimeliness; (2) RSA 76:17 is ambiguous and the court construed it incorrectly; (3) the court failed to apply Superior Court Rule 12; and (4) the dismissal violated the plaintiffs' due process rights.

The plaintiffs first contend that the defendant should be estopped from asserting that the appeal is untimely because the instructions on how to appeal a refusal to abate taxes from the board of tax and land appeals (BTLA) conflicted with the requirements of RSA 76:17. The plaintiffs assert that the BTLA's instructions led them to believe that their appeal to the superior court would be accepted after September 1.

The plaintiffs, as the party asserting estoppel, bear the burden of proving that: (1) a representation or concealment

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material facts was made by the defendant with knowledge of those facts; (2) they were unaware of the truth of the matter; (3) the representation was made with the intention of inducing the plaintiffs to rely upon it; and (4) they reasonably relied upon the representation to their detriment. See City of Concord v. Tompkins, 124 N.H. 463, 467–68, 471 A.2d 1152, 1154 (1984).

The plaintiffs allege that the following language on page four of the instruction form from the BTLA misrepresented material facts as to when an appeal is considered filed: "Note: The date of filing is the date this form is either hand delivered to the board, postmarked by the post office, or receipted by an overnight delivery service." Even assuming that the defendant's distribution of a form prepared by the BTLA constitutes a representation by the defendant of the form's contents, we hold that the defendant is not estopped from filing a motion to dismiss.

Page one of the instruction form is entitled, in large, bolded, underlined type, "TAXPAYER'S RSA 76:16–a PROPERTY–TAX APPEAL TO THE BOARD OF TAX AND LAND APPEALS." Following the title is a note stating that "[t]his appeal document pertains only to RSA 76:16–a property-tax appeals," which are appeals to the BTLA. See RSA 76:16–a, I (Supp.1999). Also on the first page is a section entitled "DEADLINES ," which informs the appealing party that the "taxpayer must file appeal to the BTLA ( RSA 76:16–a ) or the superior court ( RSA 76:17 ) but not both: ... no later than September 1, following notice of tax." Finally, in the filing instructions section on page four, directly above the note that the plaintiffs rely upon, are instructions that the appeal should be addressed to the BTLA. Thus, by its language, the form provides instructions exclusively for appeals to the BTLA. The fact that one section of the form lists the correct deadline to file an appeal with the superior court does not mean that a person could reasonably read the remainder of the form as applying to appeals to the superior court. See City of Concord , 124 N.H. at 474, 471 A.2d at 1158. Accordingly, the plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the defendant was estopped from filing a motion to dismiss.

The plaintiffs argue that dismissal of their appeal is unfair because if they had appealed to the BTLA, their appeal would have been timely. We agree that, according to the BTLA's instruction form, had the plaintiffs elected to appeal to the BTLA, the plaintiffs' appeal would have been timely because it would have been considered to have been filed with the BTLA on August 30, the postmark date. This apparent inconsistency does not, however, mean that the superior court erred in dismissing their appeal as untimely. Even if we assume that the BTLA can validly determine the date of filing in such a manner, but see Appeal of Rainville , 143 N.H. 624, ––––, 732 A.2d 406, 409–10 (1999) (long-standing administrative interpretation of statute is irrelevant if interpretation clearly conflicts with express statutory language); Harkeem v. N.H. Dep't of Empl. Sec. , 115 N.H. 658, 661, 348 A.2d 711, 713 (1975) (holding a regulation in conflict with statutory pattern and policy to be invalid), that does not mean that the appeal procedures to the superior court must mirror those to the BTLA. We are unaware of, and the plaintiffs have not provided, any authority requiring that appeals to two separate entities must be governed by identical rules. Having elected to appeal to the superior court, the plaintiffs were required to follow the procedures outlined in RSA 76:17.

Next, the plaintiffs contend that RSA 76:17 is ambiguous because it does not address the possibility that the September 1 deadline could fall on a legal holiday, which would make filing on September 1 impossible. We disagree.

"On questions of statutory interpretation, this court is the final arbiter of the intent of the legislature as expressed in the words of a statute considered as a whole." State v. Johnson , 134 N.H. 570, 575, 595 A.2d 498, 502 (1991) (quotations omitted). "Our analysis begins with the statutory language...