Phifer v. City of Bayonne
| Decision Date | 18 June 1929 |
| Parties | PHIFER v. CITY OF BAYONNE et al. |
| Court | New Jersey Supreme Court |
Certiorari by Philip Phifer against the City of Bayonne and the Montrose Contracting Company, Inc., to set aside a contract awarded to the latter by the Board of Commissioners of such City. Writ dismissed.
Argued before Justice KALISCH, sitting by virtue of the statute.
Patrick J. O'Connell, of Bayonne (John Drewen, of Jersey City, of counsel), for prosecutor.
James Benny, of Bayonne, for defendant city.
Aaron A. Melniker, of Bayonne, for defendant company.
The prosecutor, a taxpayer, of the city of Bayonne, seeks to set aside a contract awarded by the board of commissioners of said city to the Montrose Contracting Company, Inc., for the lowering of the existing 30-inch castiron submarine pipe under the waters of the Hackensack river. There were four bidders, of which the Montrose Contracting Company was the lowest on the alternate bid as advertised; its bid being $284,676. The next lower bidder was the Merritt-Chapman & Scott Corporation; its bid being $303,485. None of the unsuccessful bidders is contesting the validity of the award. The prosecutor, as a private citizen and taxpayer, assails the validity of the contract on three grounds, which, taken together, present the single question whether or not the contract was awarded to the lowest bidder as a result of fair and competitive bidding.
For the prosecutor it is first contended that the specifications do not invite nor permit fair and open competition, in that the same standard of competition is not set up for each bidder. It is asserted that the specifications not only permit bidders to submit bids on the specifications adopted by the city, but also bids based on each bidder's particular plan, and that the bid which resulted in an award by the board of commissioners to the Montrose Contracting Company was upon the particular plan submitted by that company, and for which no specifications had been approved or adopted by the city, and upon which all the bidders were not invited or permitted to compete.
This contention is not borne out by an examination of the specifications and the testimony taken in the cause. The specifications are as definite as was practicable, from the character of the work which was to be performed and the quality and quantity of the work and the materials to be furnished. The specifications give precise and full information to prospective bidders, as the nature of the contemplated work permits. No more than that can reasonably be required. It is; sufficient and meets with legal requirements, when it appears, as it does in this case, that the specifications furnish the same information to all prospective bidders, so that there may be intelligent bidding. Schwitzer v. Board of Education of Newark, 79 N. J. Law, 342, 75 A. 447.
It is a significant circumstance that none of the unsuccessful bidders is here complaining of any unfairness in the specifications. Nor do I perceive any merit in the contention of the prosecutor that the specifications unlawfully permit each bidder to set the length of the time within which to complete the contract. There was nothing in the specifications submitted for bids which required the proposed work to be done within any particular time, but impliedly within a reasonable time. All bidders were treated alike in this respect. The various bids received from the bidders stated the time within which they would do the work. While it is true that section C of the specifications, coupled with the contract, recites that the time limit is essential to, and of the essence of, the contract, it is obvious from the context of the section that the provision refers to the penalty to be paid by the contractor who obtains the contract, and who fails to furnish the work within the time fixed by the contract.
On behalf of the prosecutor it is objected that the bids were in the alternative. This is not a valid objection. Alternative bids are permissible. Johnson v. Atlantic City, 85 N. J. Law, 145, at page 147, 88 A. 950.
It is further urged against the validity of the award that the bid of the Montrose Company was unbalanced. The term "unbalanced" seems to comprehend a bid based upon...
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