Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R.R. v. Quaker City Flour Mills Co.

• Decision Date: 19 January 1925
• Docket Number: 142
• Citation: 127 A. 845,282 Pa. 362
• Parties: Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R.R. to use v. Quaker City Flour Mills Co., Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

127 A. 845

282 Pa. 362

Philadelphia, Baltimore & Washington R.R. to use v. Quaker City Flour Mills Co., Appellant

No. 142

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

January 19, 1925

Argued December 5, 1924

Appeal, No. 142, Jan. T., 1925, by defendant, from judgment of C.P. No. 5, Phila. Co., March T., 1922, No. 395, for plaintiff on statutory demurrer, in case of Philadelphia Baltimore & Washington R.R. Co. to use of Penna. R.R. Co. v Quaker City Flour Mills Co. Affirmed.

Assumpsit for demurrage charges.

Statutory demurrer. Before MARTIN, P.J.

The opinion of the Supreme Court states the facts.

Judgment for plaintiff for $11,067.47 on demurrer. Defendant appealed.

Error assigned was, inter alia, judgment, quoting it.

We therefore hold that the plaintiff brought his suit within the time fixed by the law, and the judgment of the court below is affirmed.

M. Hampton Todd, for appellant. -- The act says "all actions" shall be begun within three years from the time the cause of action accrues and not after. It does not say that the limitation shall apply to such rights of action as shall hereafter accrue, nor is the expression "all actions" in any wise limited in its application: Sohn v. Waterson, 84 U.S. 596; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628; Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U.S. 668; McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662; Rodebaugh v. Traction Co., 190 Pa. 358; Bowden v. R.R., 196 Pa. 562; Black v. Rys., 257 Pa. 273; Shelly v. Dampman, 1 Pa. Superior Ct. 115, 119; Rankin v. Rinehart, 60 Pa.Super. 385, 393.

Charles Myers, with him Barnes, Biddle & Morris, for appellee. -- All statutes are to be considered prospective unless the language is express to the contrary or there is a necessary implication to that effect: U.S. Fidelity Co. v. Struthers, Wells Co., 209 U.S. 306; Taylor v. Mitchell, 57 Pa. 209; Horn & Brannen Mfg. Co. v. Steelman, 215 Pa. 187; Lewis v. Penna. R.R., 220 Pa. 317; Brubaker's Est., 59 Pa.Super. 109; Union P.R.R. v. Laramie Stock Yards, 231 U.S. 190; Cameron v. U.S., 231 U.S. 710; Schwab v. Doyle, 258 U.S. 529; Bowden v. R.R., 196 Pa. 562.

It should be noted that in the case at bar the cause of action accrued more than three years before the passage of the Transportation Act and, therefore, will be presumed that it was not the intention of Congress to bar this cause absolutely, since such an intent would be unconstitutional.

Before MOSCHZISKER, C.J., FRAZER, WALLING, SIMPSON, KEPHART, SADLER and SCHAFFER, JJ.

OPINION

MR. JUSTICE KEPHART:

Plaintiff is a common carrier engaged in the transportation of interstate commerce. Defendant, because of a violation of the company's rules, duly promulgated, relating to holding consigned cars, became liable to plaintiff for a sum of money, commonly called demurrage, for which this suit was brought. The cause of action arose in 1916 and this proceeding was instituted in 1922. It was defendant's position in the court below, and is here, that the right to sue was barred by the Transportation Act of February 28, 1920, ch. 91, section 424, 41 Stat. at L. 456, 492, which reads as follows: "All actions at law by carriers subject to this act for recovery of their charges, or any part thereof, shall be begun within three years from the time the cause of action accrues, and not after." Demurrage is not a penalty, but earnings improperly lost in the detention of the carrier's cars for a period of time longer than necessary to load or unload. The claim therefore comes under the designation "charges or any part thereof."

Prior to the Transportation Act, the limitation in this State was fixed by our own statute at six years. This act of Congress was the first legislative expression by the federal government limiting the time within which suits may be brought to recover the carrier's charges. A statute of limitations requiring existing actions to be brought within a prescribed time from the date when the cause of action arose is constitutional and within legislative powers, provided a reasonable time thereafter be given by the act for the commencement of the suits, the cause of which had accrued when the law became effective: Sohn v. Waterson, 17 Wallace 596, 598; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628, 632; Koshkonong v. Burton, 104 U.S. 668, 675; McGahey v. Virginia (In re Brown), 135 U.S. 662, 705; Bowden v. P., W. & B.R.R. Co., 196 Pa. 562; Canadian Northern Ry. Co. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 562. Congress may prescribe a limitation where none existed, and it may change one already established. Parties have no more vested right in a particular limitation than they have in an unrestricted right to sue, or the form in which the action may be prosecuted: Terry v. Anderson, supra, 633. In so legislating, Congress is not restricted by section 10, of article I, of the Constitution of the United States, which prohibits the impairment of the obligation of contracts, as this provision applies solely to the states, but is controlled equally with the states in that there is prohibition against depriving persons or corporations of property without due process of law: Sinking-Fund Cases, 99 U.S. 700, 718.

Statutes of limitation are statutes of repose enacted for the common weal to quiet threatened disputes or litigation. As a general rule a statute of limitation applies to actions occurring after its passage, unless such limitation by express language, or necessary implication, is made to cover existing rights of actions. Whether it does so apply becomes a question of legislative intent to be found in the act. It is an established rule in the interpretation of statutes that they should be construed as operating prospectively unless the language clearly expresses a contrary intent, or a necessary implication to that effect: U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U.S. 306, 314; U.P.R.R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., 231 U.S. 190, 199; Cameron v. U.S., 231 U.S. 710, 720; Schwab v. Doyle, 258 U.S. 529, 534. "There is no canon of construction better settled than this, that a statute shall always be interpreted so as to operate prospectively and not retrospectively unless the language is so clear as to preclude all question as to the intention of the legislature": Taylor v. Mitchell, 57 Pa. 209, 211; Neff's App., 21 Pa. 243, 247; Horn & Brannen Mfg. Co. v. Steelman, 215 Pa. 187, 191; Brubaker's Est., 59 Pa.Super. 109, 113. "Words in a statute ought not to have a retrospective operation, unless they are so clear, strong and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied": U.S. v. Heth, 3 Cranch 399, 413.

It is clear the Transportation Act fixing a time limit of three years for carriers to sue for charges was intended to abrogate the rule previously existing; and it is equally clear that if the limitation applies retrospectively to this cause of action, without giving a right to sue, it would violate the due process provision of the Constitution of the United States, as the right accrued more than three years before the act was passed: Sohn v. Waterson, supra, 599; Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Laramie Stock Yards Co., supra, 200; Herrick v. Boquillas Land and Cattle Co., 200 U.S. 96, 102. A right existing at the time the contract was executed should not be thus summarily swept aside, else nothing would remain as to the enforceability of obligations, -- as they might then be treated as the party in default wished to regard them.

To what extent, if any, did Congress intend the new rule to apply to rights of action already accrued? A cause of action accrues at the moment the party has a legal right to sue. The act speaks definitely, "all actions" shall be prosecuted within three years "from the time the cause of action accrues." Are these words so "clear, strong and imperative" that no other meaning may be given than that they were intended to operate retroactively? The words "all actions," comprehensive in meaning, are modified and controlled by the words which follow, -- "from the time the cause of action accrues." When treated in a strict grammatical sense, the words undoubtedly speak prospectively.

It is not possible, however, that Congress, by using these words intended to leave certain causes without limitation of time within which to sue, and therefore took away entirely from the operation of the act all causes of action already accrued. If such view were sustained, our own statute of limitation would control, but in states without laws on the subject, the right would be unlimited, and there would be no uniformity of right affecting all persons subject to the act. The Transportation Act did not intend to leave existing rights in this condition. See Rankin v. Rinehart, 66 Pa.Super. 385 (where the five-year limitation as to reviving judgments against estates of decedents was before the court), and Sohn v. Waterson, supra, the leading case in the Supreme Court of the United States. As the act did not specify a time in the future when it was to be operative, it must be held to have become effective on all causes of action from the date of enactment, giving to causes already accrued the full...