Philadelphia Facilities Management Corp. v. Biester
| Decision Date | 08 July 1981 |
| Citation | 431 A.2d 1123,60 Pa.Cmwlth. 366 |
| Parties | PHILADELPHIA FACILITIES MANAGEMENT CORPORATION et al., Plaintiffs, v. The Honorable Edward G. BIESTER et al., Defendants. Tenant Action Group, Intervenor. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
John J. Leonard, James Lewis Griffith, Daniel J. Zucker, Obermayer, Rebmann, Maxwell & Hippel, Philadelphia, for plaintiffs.
Robert B. Hoffman, Deputy Atty. Gen., Norman J. Watkins, Dept. of Justice, Harrisburg, for defendants.
George D. Gould, Stephen Bosch, Stephen P. Ulan, Community Legal Services, Inc., Philadelphia, for Tenant Action Group.
Before CRUMLISH, President Judge, and WILKINSON, MENCER, ROGERS, CRAIG, WILLIAMS and PALLADINO, JJ.
Before us in this matter is an original action challenging the constitutionality of the Utility Service Tenants Rights Act. 1 The suit was brought by Philadelphia Facilities Management Corporation (Management Corporation) suing on behalf of itself, on behalf of the Philadelphia Gas Works (PGW), and on behalf of all the ratepaying customers of PGW. Also named as a party-plaintiff is PGW itself, suing in its own right and on behalf of all its ratepaying customers. The plaintiffs urge this Court to declare the Act to be violative of the federal and state constitutions, and to enjoin the Act's enforcement. 2
The defendants are the state Attorney General, the state Secretary of Revenue, and an organization called "Tenant Action Group," which was permitted to intervene as a party-defendant. The defendants have filed preliminary objections which (1) demur to the standing of the named plaintiffs to bring the action; (2) question, by demurrer, the legal sufficiency of the complaint; and (3) move for a more specific complaint. The preliminary objections, and only the preliminary objections, are the point of our decision in the instant matter.
The Utility Service Tenants Rights Act (Act), enacted in 1978, seeks by a series of provisions to protect the utility service to residential tenants from discontinuance caused by the failure of the landlord ratepayer to pay the bill. One of the striking features of the Act is that it applies only to a public utility owed or operated by a "municipal corporation" as that term is defined by the Act.
The Act provides that before a subject utility may discontinue service to a residential landlord ratepayer, the utility must give such a landlord at least 37 days advance written notice of the proposed discontinuance. More significantly, the utility must also give written notice of the proposed discontinuance to "each residential unit reasonably likely to be occupied by an affected tenant." 3 And, the utility must notify a prescribed agency of local government. The notice to the tenants must be given at least 7 days after notice to the landlord and at least 30 days before any actual discontinuance. Notice to the local agency must be given at the time the tenants are notified.
The Act imposes on the landlord a duty of supplying the utility with the names and addresses of every affected tenant. So too, the Act imposes on the utility the duty of pursuing any appropriate legal remedy to obtain that information from a landlord.
What may be considered the key substantive provisions of the Act for tenants are Sections 7 and 9. 4 Section 7 grants to affected tenants the legal right to prevent discontinuance of service by paying the landlord's utility bill, and states in part as follows:
(a) At any time before or after service within the utility's corporate limits is discontinued by a public utility on account of nonpayment by the landlord ratepayer, the affected tenants may apply to the utility to have service continued or resumed. A public utility shall not discontinue such service or shall promptly resume service previously discontinued if it receives from the tenants an amount equal to the bill of the landlord ratepayer for the 30-day period preceding the notice to the tenants.
By force of Section 9 of the Act, any tenant who has made such payment is entitled to deduct it from any rent or other charges owed to the landlord, or to obtain reimbursement from the landlord.
The power and the duty of enforcing the Act are vested in the Attorney General. The Attorney General may seek injunctive relief to restrain any person from using any method, act or practice declared by the Act to be unlawful. 5 In that regard, if it is found by the court that any such violation was willful the offender may be subject to a civil penalty of up to.$1000.00 for each violation. If a person violates the term of any injunction, he shall forfeit and pay a civil penalty of up to $5,000.00 for each such violation. The civil penalties assessable under the Act are payable to the Commonwealth. 6
We turn now to the plaintiffs' complaint. Besides contesting the reasonableness of the notice provisions and making general allegations of adverse public impact, the complaint raises five identifiable constitutional challenges to the Act.
First, it is asserted that the Act is so indefinite, inconsistent and confusing that it frustrates interpretation and execution of its terms, and thereby unfairly exposes the plaintiffs to substantial civil penalties for noncompliance. In short, this is a challenge that the Act is "void for vagueness." Second, the complaint charges that the Act infringes on the right of the plaintiffs and all Philadelphians to local self-government under the city's home rule charter, as guaranteed by the state constitution. Third, it is alleged that the Act deprives Management Corporation, PGW and their ratepaying customers of due process of law as guaranteed by both the federal and state constitutions. Underlying this allegation is the further contention that the plaintiffs are compelled, under threat of civil penalty, to supply gas at their own expense to persons not under a contract to pay for the service. Fourth, the complaint asserts that the Act alters and impairs the terms, conditions, and rights of the plaintiffs under existing contracts, with specific regard to the delivery of gas, the termination of service, and the obligation to pay for it. And, Fifth, the Act is challenged as being in violation of the uniformity provisions of the state constitution and the equal protection clause of the federal constitution. This challenge is directed to the fact that the burdens imposed by the Act apply only where the utility is one owned or operated by a "municipal corporation." Thus, it is claimed that the Act subjects plaintiff PGW to penalties which do not confront non-municipal utilities.
Given the provisions of the Act and the plaintiffs' challenges to its validity, we first consider whether the named plaintiffs have standing: to bring this suit in their own right or on behalf of the other interests designated. To resolve this question we must analyze the nature of the named plaintiffs and their relation to the matter in controversy.
The Philadelphia Gas Works, or PGW as it is referred to in this opinion, is not an identifiable legal entity or agency, but is merely the collective name for all the real and personal property by which the City of Philadelphia furnishes gas to customers. Legal title to all that property, including real estate, facilities and equipment, is in the name of the City of Philadelphia. This, the nature of PGW, was specifically noted by the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in Dawes v. Philadelphia Gas Commission, 421 F.Supp. 806, 811 (E.D.Pa.1976). We know of nothing which has altered the nature of PGW for purposes of the instant suit; indeed, there is no allegation by the plaintiffs which even suggests any change.
It has long been an axiom of our legal system that, in order to maintain a suit, a would-be plaintiff must have an actual or legal existence. The plaintiff may be a natural or artificial person, but must be an entity which the law recognizes. E. g., Thompson v. Peck, 320 Pa. 27, 181 A. 597 (1935); McConnell v. Apollo Savings Bank, 146 Pa. 79, 23 A. 347 (1892). Since PGW is not a legal entity of any type, the above jural principle precludes PGW from being a party plaintiff, either for itself or on behalf of any other person. Accordingly, that dimension of this case must be, and is, dismissed.
The standing of Management Corporation presents a more complex question. We start with the self-evident root principle that any objection to the validity of a statute can only be raised by a person having the right to do so. E. g., Kauffman v. Osser, 441 Pa. 150, 156, 271 A.2d 236, 239 (1970). A person who is not adversely or directly affected by a statute cannot attack the validity of its provisions. White v. Philadelphia, 408 Pa. 397, 184 A.2d 266 (1962). See Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 464 Pa. 168, 192, 346 A.2d 269, 280 (1975). It is also fundamental that a court will not heed objections to the constitutionality of a statute unless the complainant is harmed by the particular feature alleged to be unconstitutional; that is, the complainant must be harmed by the particular defect that is claimed to make the statute unconstitutional. Booz v. Reed, 398 Pa. 172, 157 A.2d 170 (1960); Dwyer v. Dilworth, 392 Pa. 123, 139 A.2d 653 (1958); Knowles's Estate, 295 Pa. 571, 145 A. 797 (1929).
The type of harm that can give one standing to challenge the constitutionality of a statute must be a harm in the nature of some special damage or injury to him in a right of person or property. Kauffman, supra; Dwyer, supra. Or, as more broadly formulated, the harm must be to some interest of the complainant's which the law recognizes and protects. Wm. Penn Parking Garage, Inc., supra. In that regard, our state Supreme Court has indicated that there is no standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute if the alleged harm or adverse impact is indirect or remote, or is a mere side effect of...
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