Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, American Federation of Teachers, Local 3, AFL-CIO v. Ridge, AFL-CIO

• Decision Date: 30 July 1998
• Docket Number: A,97-1589,No. 97-1553,Nos. 97-1553,AFL-CIO,AFL-CI,No. 97-1589,97-1553,s. 97-1553
• Parties: PHILADELPHIA FEDERATION of TEACHERS, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 3,; Local 22, International Association of Fire Fighters,; District Council 47, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,, Appellants, v. Thomas J. RIDGE, in his official capacity as the Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Johnny Butler, in his official capacity as Secretary of Labor and Industry of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Richard A. Himler, in his official capacity as Director of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation. PHILADELPHIA FEDERATION of TEACHERS, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF TEACHERS, LOCAL 3,; Local 22, International Association of Fire Fighters,; District Council 47, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, v. Thomas J. RIDGE, in his official capacity as the Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Johnny Butler, in his official capacity as Secretary of Labor and Industry of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Richard A. Himler, in his official capacity as Director of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, Thomas J. Ridge, Governor of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Johnny J. Butler, Secretary of Labor and Industry of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and Richard A. Himler, Director of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellants
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 319

150 F.3d 319

PHILADELPHIA FEDERATION of TEACHERS, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF

TEACHERS, LOCAL 3, AFL-CIO; Local 22, International

Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO; District Council 47,

American Federation of State, County and Municipal

Employees, AFL-CIO, Appellants No. 97-1553, v. Thomas J. RIDGE, in his official capacity as the Governor of

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Johnny Butler, in his

official capacity as Secretary of Labor and Industry of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Richard A. Himler, in his

official capacity as Director of the Bureau of Workers'

Compensation.

PHILADELPHIA FEDERATION of TEACHERS, AMERICAN FEDERATION OF

TEACHERS, LOCAL 3, AFL-CIO; Local 22, International

Association of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO; District Council 47, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Thomas J. RIDGE, in his official capacity as the Governor of

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Johnny Butler, in his

official capacity as Secretary of Labor and Industry of the

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; Richard A. Himler, in his

official capacity as Director of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation,

Thomas J. Ridge, Governor of the Commonwealth of

Pennsylvania; Johnny J. Butler, Secretary of Labor and

Industry of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania; and Richard

A. Himler, Director of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation

of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Appellants No. 97-1589.

Nos. 97-1553, 97-1589.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued March 20, 1998.

Decided July 30, 1998.

Deborah R. Willig, Ralph J. Teti, Catherine M. Reisman (Argued), Willig, Williamson

& Davidson, Philadelphia, PA, for Appellants/Cross-Appellees.

Paul F. Tufano, Roger E. Grimaldi (Argued), Anthony S. Potter, Office of General Counsel, Harrisburg, PA, for Appellees/Cross-Appellants.

Before: BECKER, Chief Judge, RENDELL and HEANEY, ^* Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BECKER, Chief Judge.

On June 24, 1996, Pennsylvania Governor Tom Ridge signed into law the Act of June 24, 1996, P.L. 350, No. 57 ("Act 57"), which substantially reformed Pennsylvania's system of workers' compensation. On December 4, 1996, the plaintiffs, three unincorporated labor organizations--the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, Local 3, AFL-CIO; Local 22 of the International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO; and District Council 47 of the American Federation of State, County, and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO (collectively "plaintiffs")--filed this action against the Governor; Johnny J. Butler, Secretary of Labor and Industry; and Richard A. Himler, Director of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation, in their official capacities, seeking a declaration that Sections 204(a) and 306(a.2) of the Pennsylvania Worker's Compensation Act, Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736 ("WCA"), as amended by Act 57, violate the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions. The plaintiffs also sought an injunction permanently enjoining the defendants from enforcing these sections. They rely upon 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1), and for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). With regard to their Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the defendants argued that the district court lacked jurisdiction because: (1) the matter is not ripe for judicial review; (2) plaintiffs lack standing to pursue their claims; and (3) plaintiffs' claims are barred by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution. The district court granted the Motion to Dismiss, basing its holding on the conclusion that plaintiffs' claims were not ripe and, therefore, did not present a justiciable controversy. The court rejected defendants' argument that plaintiffs' complaint is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, and declined to address whether plaintiffs had standing or whether they had stated proper claims for relief.

Plaintiffs filed a timely appeal, contending that the district court erred in holding that their claims were not ripe. Defendants cross-appealed, seeking review of the district court's refusal to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint based upon the Eleventh Amendment's jurisdictional bar. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise plenary review over the district court's order dismissing plaintiffs' complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Armstrong World Indus., Inc. v. Adams, 961 F.2d 405, 410 (3d Cir.1992). We affirm on the ground that the dispute is not justiciable because plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate a controversy ripe for resolution by the federal courts. We therefore decline to reach the issues raised by the cross-appeal.

I. THE CHALLENGED PROVISIONS

A. The Impairment Rating (Procedural Due Process Claim)

Section 4 of Act 57 amended Section 306 of the WCA to add section 306(a.2), 77 P.S. § 511.2 (West Supp.1997), permitting employers to require an employee to submit to an impairment rating evaluation after the employee receives total disability benefits for 104 weeks. See 77 P.S. § 511.2(1). Pursuant to section 511.2, an impairment rating evaluation is performed by a licensed physician chosen by the parties or appointed by the Department of Labor and Industry (the "Department"). See id. The purpose of the evaluation is to determine the level of the employee's impairment rating. If the employee's impairment rating is fifty percent or greater under the American Medical Association's Guide to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, he or she remains classified as "totally disabled." See § 511.2(2). If, however, the examination results in an impairment rating that is less than fifty percent, the employee is reclassified as "partially disabled." See id.

The change in status from "totally disabled" to "partially disabled" does not automatically affect the amount of compensation that the insurer must pay the employee. Rather, the Act provides that "[u]nless otherwise adjudicated or agreed to based upon a determination of earning power under [§ 512(2) ], the amount of compensation shall not be affected as a result of the change in disability status and shall remain the same." See § 511.2(3). The change in status does, however, affect the length of time that a claimant may receive workers' compensation benefits. An employee who is classified as "totally disabled" is entitled to collect benefits for as long as he or she remains classified as such. An employee with a partial disability, however, is eligible to receive benefits only for a period of 500 weeks, or approximately ten years. See § 511.2(7).

Before changing an employee's disability status, an employer must provide the employee with sixty days notice that his or her impairment rating evaluation showed that the employee was less than fifty percent impaired. See § 511.2(2). The Act also provides that "[a]n employee may appeal the change to partial disability at any time during the five hundred-week period of disability; Provided, That there is a determination that the employee meets the threshold impairment rating that is equal to or greater than fifty percentum impairment...." § 511.2(4).

Plaintiffs seek a declaration that, on its face, WCA § 306(a.2), 77 P.S. § 511.2, violates the due process clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions, U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Pa. Const., art. 1, § 1. Although the Act provides employees whose status is changed to partially disabled the right to appeal their change in status, see 77 P.S. § 511.2(4), plaintiffs maintain that the procedures that will ultimately be employed by the Department during this "appeal process" will deprive their members of the right to procedural due process of law. Plaintiffs rest this claim on the fact that the term "appeal" is not defined in the statute and that, typically, an appeal to the Worker's Compensation Board, as opposed to a hearing, does not involve a fact-finding procedure and de novo adjudication. Plaintiffs further allege that the Act is rendered facially unconstitutional by the fact that the appeal process contained in § 511.2(4) is only available following a determination that the employee is equal to or greater than fifty percent impaired. 77 P.S. § 511.2(4). Plaintiffs also seek to enjoin enforcement of the statute.

B. The Pension Offset (Contracts Clause Claim)

Section 3 of Act 57 amended Section 204(a) of the WCA to provide that benefits from a pension plan--to the extent funded by the employer directly liable for the payment of wage replacement compensation received by a claimant--shall be credited against the amount of the award to the claimant for wage replacement benefits based on injury or occupational disease. ¹ See 77 P.S. § 71(a) (West Supp.1997). The plaintiffs contend that the offset for pension benefits violates the contracts clause of both the United States and Pennsylvania constitutions, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; Pa. Const. art. I, § 17, by unilaterally diminishing the contractual pension rights of public sector employees by reducing the value of their pension benefits. Again, plaintiffs seek declaratory relief and an injunction.

II. RIPENESS

"The existence of a case and controversy is a prerequisite to all federal actions including those for declaratory or injunctive relief." Presbytery of New Jersey of Orthodox Presbyterian Church v. Florio, 40 F.3d 1454, 1462 (3d Cir.1994). One aspect of justiciability is ripeness which "determines when a proper party may bring an action." ² Travelers Ins. Co. v. Obusek, 72 F.3d 1148, 1154 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting Armstrong, 961 F.2d at 411). The function of the ripeness doctrine is to prevent federal courts, "through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements." Abbott Labs v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967), overruled on other grounds, Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105, 97 S.Ct. 980, 51 L.Ed.2d...