Philadelphia M. Tr. Ass'n v. INTERNATIONAL LONG. ASS'N, L. 1291

• Decision Date: 17 November 1966
• Docket Number: No. 15804.,15804.
• Citation: 368 F.2d 932
• Parties: PHILADELPHIA MARINE TRADE ASSOCIATION v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1291, Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

368 F.2d 932 (1966)

PHILADELPHIA MARINE TRADE ASSOCIATION v. INTERNATIONAL LONGSHOREMEN'S ASSOCIATION, LOCAL 1291, Appellant.

No. 15804.

United States Court of Appeals Third Circuit.

Argued June 14, 1966.

Reargued September 29, 1966.

Decided November 17, 1966.

Martin J. Vigderman, Philadelphia, Pa. (Abraham E. Freedman, Freedman, Borowsky & Lorry, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellant.

Francis A. Scanlan, Philadelphia, Pa. (Kelly, Deasey & Scanlan, Philadelphia, Pa., on the brief), for appellee.

Before GANEY and SMITH, Circuit Judges, and KIRKPATRICK, District Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

KIRKPATRICK, District Judge.

This is an appeal from an order of the District Court holding the defendant union in contempt for violation of a previous order of the court. The order (affirmed by this court August 11, 1966, 365 F.2d 295) which was the basis of the contempt proceeding, directed the union to comply with an arbitration award in a dispute as to the proper interpretation of a term of its collective bargaining agreement with the Marine Trade Association. Sometime after the entry of that order, a widespread work stoppage closing the Port of Philadelphia occurred because the men were dissatisfied with the arbitrator's award.

The Court, at 6:45 P.M. on March 1, after hearing, held the union responsible for the mass action of its members, adjudged it to be "in civil contempt only" and imposed a fine of "$100,000 per day effective this date at 2:00 P.M." (the time when the hearing began) "the first payment to be made within 24 hours * * * and every thereafter (sic) as long as the order of this Court is violated." The record made before the trial court fully justifies the Court's finding that the mass action of the members of the union was, in fact, the action of the union. The union appealed the next day.

The character of the order, whether for civil or criminal contempt, was the subject of a reargument in this court. Of course, the fact that the judge called his action a judgment in civil contempt, though persuasive, is not conclusive. However, under the rule laid down by the Supreme Court in Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 16 L.Ed.2d 622, June 6, 1966, the judge was clearly right.

In the Shillitani case the court announced a perfectly clear, simple, and easily applied test for determining whether a penalty imposed in a contempt proceeding is for a civil or criminal contempt. The court said, "The test may be stated as: what does the court primarily seek to accomplish by imposing sentence?" It seems that in this case there can hardly be much doubt that the judge was primarily, if not solely, seeking to put an end to the strike, and that he may have had in mind some thought of punishment as well does not affect the nature of the proceeding.

The fact that the order of $100,000 per day was made "effective" at a time more than four hours past, with the first payment not due until the following day, is no indication that its purpose was punitive rather than coercive — rather the contrary. It would be hard to think...