City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Institution for Instruction of Blind

• Decision Date: 26 February 1906
• Citation: Philadelphia v. Penna. Co., 214 Pa. 138 (Pa. 1906)
• Docket Number: 257
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court
• Parties: Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Company for the Instruction of the Blind, Appellant

214 Pa. 138

Philadelphia

v. Pennsylvania Company for the Instruction of the Blind, Appellant.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

January 10, 1906.

February 26, 1906.

Argued Jan. 10, 1906.

Appeal, No. 257, Jan. T., 1905, by defendant, from judgment of Superior Court, Oct. T., 1903, No. 245, reversing judgment of C. P. No. 1, Phila. Co., Sept. T., 1898, No. 368, M. L. D. discharging rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense in case of City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Institution for the Instruction of the Blind.

Before MITCHELL, C. J., FELL, BROWN, MESTREZAT, POTTER, ELKIN and STEWART, JJ. Affirmed.

H. Gordon McCouch, of Dickson, McCouch & Glasgow, with him Henry S. Drinker, Jr., for appellant.

James Alcorn, assistant city solicitor, with him John L. Kinsey, city solicitor, and Mayne R. Longstreth, for appellee.

OPINION BY MR. JUSTICE FELL, February 26, 1906:

The appeal to the Superior Court was from an order of the common pleas discharging a rule for judgment for want of a sufficient affidavit of defense in a proceeding by the city on a claim for taxes for the year 1897. It was alleged in the affidavit of defense that the defendant conducted a school for the blind, founded, endowed and maintained by public charity and open to all blind persons in need of instruction; that in 1896 it purchased for the use of the school the land against which the tax claim was filed, and on July 29, 1897, it began the erection of school buildings which were not completed until the end of the year 1898; that all this land is necessary to, and is used exclusively for, the purpose of the school, and that no rent, revenue or income is derived therefrom. It was admitted in the affidavit that the land was liable for an apportioned tax from January 1 to July 29, 1897, but an exemption was claimed for the remainder of the year 1897.

The judgment of the common pleas was reversed by the Superior Court for two reasons: (1) that the decision of the taxing officers was final and conclusive, no appeal having been taken from the assessment; (2) that no valid ground of defense was set up by the affidavit. It is not disputed that the decision of the taxing officers unappealed from was conclusive, but it was claimed that the court misapprehended the facts. The first specification of error is: "The Superior Court erred in its statement of fact in the following passage of the opinion: `No appeal having been taken from the assessment of the tax in question, the decision of the taxing officers became final.'" It was stated in the argument that an appeal had been taken from...