Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Anderson

• Decision Date: 19 June 1890
• Parties: PHILADELPHIA, W. & B. R. Co. v. ANDERSON.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

20 A. 2

72 Md. 519

PHILADELPHIA, W. & B. R. Co.

v. ANDERSON.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 19, 1890.

Appeal from circuit court, Cecil county.

Argued before ALVEY, C. J., and ROBINSON, BRYAN, McSHERRY, FOWLER, and BRISCOE, JJ.

John J. Donaldson, William J. Jones, L. M. Haines, and William Ward, for appellant. Albert Constable, for appellee.

BRYAN, J. Anderson recovered a judgment against the appellant, the defendant below, for injuries received while he was a passenger on its railroad. The circuit court left it to the jury to find on the evidence whether the injuries were caused by the negligence of the defendant, and whether the plaintiff's own negligence contributed to produce them. The defendant contended that the case ought not to have been submitted to the jury, that there was no evidence of negligence on its part, and that the court ought to have ruled that the negligence of the plaintiff directly contributed to the injury.

The plaintiff testified at the trial that he was a passenger in the defendant's cars, and that he left Philadelphia on the night of the 11th of January, 1889, having a ticket which entitled him to passage to the city of Chester; that, when they reached this place, "Chester" was called out, and the train was stopped; that he supposed that the train was at the Chester depot; that he got up, and started to go out, and when he reached the platform the train started again; that he thought that the train was then leaving Chester, and, as he did not wish to be carried to the next station, he stepped off, and just then the Philadelphia and Washington ex press came along, and knocked him down, broke his leg, and crushed this foot. The train in which the plaintiff was traveling was going west or south, and the express train which injured him was going east or north. It appears that Welsh street is at the east end of the station platform, and Market street is at the west end of it. The plaintiff testified that the train stopped at Welsh street, but that he thought at the time it was at Market street, which was at the other end of the platform, and that he stepped off on the left-hand side of the train; that at Market street, on the right side of the train, there are safety gates; that on the east side of the street they are 4 feet 9 inches from the cars, and on the west side about 24 inches from them; that the place where he stepped off is between the east and west bound track, and is called the "Six-Foot Way," but he had never measured the space, and did not know its exact width; that there are two platforms at Chester station, running the whole distance from Welsh to Market streets,—one of them on each side of the railroad tracks. He further testified that when the train slowed up, and the name of "Chester" was called out, and the train stopped, he understood that he was at the station, and that the passengers for that station were to get off; that he was in a hurry to get off, as the train had started, and he thought that, unless he got off at once, ho would be carried on to the next station; that no one called out or gave notice that the train had not reached the station, or told the passengers to keep their seats, and that he heard no warning of any kind; that the train was moving very slowly, and he alighted safely and securely on his feet; that, just as he got his foot on the ground, he saw the head-light of a locomotive coming east; that he had barely time to turn round when he was struck. He was knocked down, but he was not on the track. On cross-examination he testified that he did not look to see where he was, because he was so positive that he was at Chester depot or Market-Street crossing; that, if he had looked from the right side of the car forward, he supposed that he would have seen the lights there, [that is, the station lights;] that he supposed that he was getting off very near the middle of Market street; that he supposed that he was safe in getting off there; that he had no chance to look; that he knew all about the location of the station. He also testified that passengers get on or off the trains at Chester indifferently, on either side of it,—if they live south of the station they generally get off on the left-hand side; if they live north of the station, they generally get off on the right-hand side,—except ladies, who take the right-hand side, because the platform comes up higher on that side, and the step is shorter; that fully one-third of the passengers arriving at Chester from the east get off on the left-hand side; that he never knew or understood that there was any rule of the company against it, and never heard of any notice forbidding it, or of any protest from any agent of the company against it; that he knew that there was a rule of the defendant which forbade trains to pass a station when a train was receiving or discharging passengers. There was other evidence corroborating the plaintiff's statements about the habit of passengers in getting on or off the train on either side. One of the witnesses says he never knew of any rule of the defendant which forbade it, and never saw or heard of any notice to that effect. Another witness, a policeman, testified that he had acted as officer for the defendant at the Chester depot when their officer was absent; that his practice was to help passengers on and off the trains on either side, and such was the practice of the regular railroad officer, and that there was no rule of defendant, which he ever knew or heard of, that was against leaving the cars on the side away from the platform. Rule 112 of the defendant was offered in evidence, as follows: "A train approaching a station where a passenger train is receiving or discharging passengers must be stopped before reaching the passenger train."

We have not stated all the evidence, nor have we stated it in the order in which it was given at the trial. But the portions which we have quoted will suffice to illustrate the judgment which we have formed on the questions presented by this record. Carriers of passengers have in their charge the lives and safety of the persons whom they undertake to transport, and are subjected to a responsibility proportioned to the gravity of the trust reposed in them. They are bound to use the utmost degree of care, skill, and diligence in everything that concerns the safety of passengers; nor are their duties limited to the mere transportation of them. They are bound to provide safe and...