Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger
| Decision Date | 22 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 95-12574-GAO. |
| Parties | PHILIP MORRIS INCORPORATED; R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company; Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation; Lorillard Tobacco Company; and Liggett Group Inc., Plaintiffs, v. Scott HARSHBARGER, Attorney General of Massachusetts, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Massachusetts |
O'TOOLE, District Judge.
The plaintiffs, who are manufacturers of cigarettes, brought this action to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendant attorney general's threat to sue them to recover certain expenses paid by Massachusetts under its Medicaid program. The attorney general has moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. If the action is not to be dismissed, the attorney general urges the court to abstain from considering it, relying on alternative abstention doctrines. For the reasons that follow, the court denies the motion to dismiss but determines that it ought to abstain from consideration of the case until issues arising under Massachusetts law have been resolved by the courts of the Commonwealth.
Under the Commonwealth's Medicaid plan and in conformity with federal requirements, Massachusetts must take reasonable measures to recover medical benefits paid on behalf of Medicaid patients from any person who is or ought to be legally liable for those expenses. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(25); 42 C.F.R. §§ 433.135-.153. See also Mass. Gen.L. ch. 118E, § 22. News stories published throughout 1995 reported that the Massachusetts attorney general was preparing to file suit against the plaintiffs to recover money the Commonwealth had spent under its Medicaid program for the treatment of patients who had illnesses caused by smoking. The reports were based on public statements by the attorney general or members of his staff. See Compl., ¶¶ 45-50.
In March, 1995, the Massachusetts Lawyers Weekly carried the following classified advertisement:
The Attorney General of Massachusetts has extensively reviewed the possibility of litigation against cigarette manufacturers and now requests qualification statements from law firms interested in undertaking such litigation at the direction of and in conjunction with the Office of the Attorney General. The purpose of the litigation would be to recover funds expended by the Commonwealth's Division of Medical Assistance for tobacco-related illnesses, as authorized by 1994 Mass.Acts 60, § 276, and to pursue related claims. Compensation to the firm selected to undertake the litigation will be paid from any monies recovered or awarded in the suit.
Compl., ¶ 48.1 According to a newspaper report published September 21, 1995, the attorney general had said he would make a final decision about filing the threatened suit by December 1. Compl., ¶ 50.
This action was commenced November 28, 1995. The complaint seeks declaratory and injunctive relief on several grounds: violation of the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Count I); violations of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, U.S. Const. amend. XIV (Counts II, III); preemption under the Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, by reason of the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 et seq., and the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1334 (Counts IV, V); violation of the Takings Clause, U.S. Const. amend. V (Count VI); violation of the Free Speech Clause, U.S. Const. amend. I (Count VII); and violations of the prohibitions against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10 (Count VIII). The complaint also presents a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a deprivation of federally protected rights under color of state law (Count IX) and a claim alleging violations of Massachusetts state constitutional, statutory, and common law (Count X).
On December 19, 1995, before any application for injunctive relief was presented or heard, the attorney general filed the anticipated lawsuit on behalf of the Commonwealth in the Massachusetts Superior Court. The complaint in that case sets forth various state law claims against the cigarette manufacturers, area cigarette distributors, and research institutes affiliated with the cigarette manufacturers. The same day, the attorney general moved to dismiss this case.
The defendants in the state court action removed the case to this court, where Massachusetts moved to remand it. This court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Massachusetts' action and granted the motion to remand it to the Massachusetts state courts. See Commonwealth v. Philip Morris Inc., 942 F.Supp. 690 (D.Mass.1996).
On the present motion, the attorney general's principal contention is that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs' complaint because it does not present any claim for affirmative relief arising under federal law but rather seeks only a declaration that the manufacturers have good federal law defenses to the state law claims in the Massachusetts action. Such a complaint, he contends, does not come within the federal question jurisdiction of the court.
Each side relies on a distinguished line of Supreme Court cases for support. Yet the separate lines of authority, for all their independent vitality, do not lie easily side by side. Where they come together, as they do in this case, they tend to snarl, and the doctrinal knot is not neatly undone.
It has long been established under a series of cases beginning with Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908) that a federal court has jurisdiction over a suit to enjoin a state official's prospective enforcement of a state regulation in violation of the plaintiff's federal rights. Ex parte Young involved a suit by stockholders of several railroad companies against the attorney general of Minnesota to enjoin him from enforcing a state law regulating railroad rates that the petitioners asserted violated the U.S. Constitution. The Supreme Court held that the claim presented a federal question for jurisdictional purposes, Young, 209 U.S. at 144-45, 28 S.Ct. at 447-48, and that state officials "who threaten and are about to commence proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal court of equity from such action." Id. at 156, 28 S.Ct. at 452.2
The Young doctrine was recently applied to support injunctive relief against the attorney general of Texas in a case that bears a strong similarity to the present controversy. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157 (1992). In Morales, seven state attorneys general had sent a memorandum to major airlines asserting that the airlines' advertising of frequent flyer programs appeared to violate the states' respective deceptive advertising and unfair trade practice laws. The memorandum threatened enforcement actions unless the airlines complied with certain guidelines established by the National Association of Attorneys General. After the Texas attorney general sent a letter to the airlines giving formal notice of his intent to bring suit, the airlines commenced an action in federal court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the ground that federal law preempted the threatened state enforcement action. The district court found preemption and granted the injunction, which decision the Fifth Circuit, and ultimately the Supreme Court, affirmed.3 Although there was no issue raised as to jurisdiction,4 the Supreme Court began its opinion by considering whether the district court could properly award the airlines injunctive relief. The Court invoked Ex parte Young to justify the grant of injunctive relief against the state attorney general. Morales, 504 U.S. at 380-81, 112 S.Ct. at 2035-36.5
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 103 S.Ct. 2890, 77 L.Ed.2d 490 (1983), is another instance of the recent application of the Ex parte Young jurisdictional doctrine. New York law forbade discrimination in employee benefits plans on the basis of pregnancy, while the federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA") did not. Delta Airlines and others sued the commissioner of the New York State Division of Human Rights, as well as the Commission itself, seeking a declaration that the New York law was preempted by ERISA. Shaw, 463 U.S. at 88-92, 103 S.Ct. at 2895-97. The question of federal jurisdiction does not appear to have been an issue raised by the parties, but the Court made a point of explaining that jurisdiction was proper under the Young doctrine:
It is beyond dispute that federal courts have...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Aroostook Band of Micmacs v. Executive Director Me, No. CIV. 03-24-B-K.
...Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 112 S.Ct. 2031, 119 L.Ed.2d 157(1992).8 I appreciate, with the assistance of Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 946 F.Supp. 1067, 1071-72 (D.Mass.1996), the murky waters one can wade into in applying the § 1331 "arising under"/well-pleaded complaint rule, while......
-
American Charities for Reasonable v. Shiffrin
...However, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine pertains only to review of a state judgment that has become final. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 946 F.Supp. 1067, 1075 (D.Mass.1996) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303; Rooker, 263 U.S. at 416, 44 S.Ct. 149). As the defendant......
-
Philip Morris, Inc. v. Blumenthal
...interests--the underlying claim is more accurately classified as a subrogation action grounded in tort. See Philip Morris Inc. v. Harshbarger, 946 F.Supp. 1067, 1077 (D.Mass.1996). Notwithstanding certain other claims, the primary aim of the state is to obtain reimbursement from the tobacco......
-
Philip Morris Inc. v. Blumenthal, Civil No. 3:96CV1221 (PCD).
...state to enforce its important interest in fair trade in Connecticut. The Tobacco Companies urge following Philip Morris v. Harshbarger, 1996 WL 676807, 946 F.Supp. 1067 (D.Mass.1996). In Harshbarger Tobacco Companies also preemptively filed suit to enjoy a state court action by the Massach......