Philip Morris Inc. v. Blumenthal, Civil No. 3:96CV1221 (PCD).
| Decision Date | 23 December 1996 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3:96CV1221 (PCD). |
| Citation | 949 F.Supp. 93 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
| Parties | PHILIP MORRIS INC., R.R. Reynolds Tobacco Co., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Co., Lorillard Tobacco Co., Plaintiffs, v. Richard BLUMENTHAL, Attorney General of Connecticut, Defendant. |
Benjamin A. Solnit, Margaret A. Little, William R. Murphy, Robert K. Ciulla, Tyler, Cooper & Alcorn, New Haven, Connecticut, Peter C. Hein, Barbara Robbins, Ben M. Germana, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York City, for Plaintiff, Philip Morris Inc.
Edward F. Hennessey, David T. Ryan, Brien P. Horan, Dennis F. Kerrigan, Jr., Robinson & Cole, Hartford, Connecticut, Donald B. Ayer, Robert F. McDermott, Jr., Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff, R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
Andrew R. McGaan, David M. Bernick, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Illinois, Francis H. Morrison, III, James H. Rotondo, Athena Roxene Tsakanikas, Day, Berry & Howard, Hartford, Connecticut, Marjorie Press Lindblom, Kirkland & Ellis, New York City, for Plaintiff, Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
William R. Murphy, Tyler, Cooper & Alcorn, New Haven, Connecticut, James R. Fogarty, Lawrence F. Reilly, Andrew P. Nemiroff, Epstein Fogarty Cohen & Selby, Greenwich, Connecticut, Gael Mahony, Hill & Barlow, Boston, Massachusetts, for Plaintiff, Lorillard Tobacco Co.
David S. Golub, Jonathan M. Levine, Silver, Golub & Teitell, Stamford, Connecticut, Gregory T. D'Auria, Jane R. Rosenberg, Eliot D. Prescott, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, Connecticut, Andrew P. Nemiroff, Epstein Fogarty Cohen & Selby, Greenwich, Connecticut, Stephen R. Park, Attorney General's Office, Anti-Trust, Consumer Protection, Hartford, Connecticut, William M. Rubenstein, Attorney General's Office, Hartford, Connecticut, for Defendant, Richard Blumenthal, Attorney General.
RULING ON MOTION TO DISMISS
Defendant moves to dismiss under the Younger v. Harris abstention doctrine and pursuant to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. For the reasons below, defendant's motion is granted.
Plaintiffs ("Tobacco Companies") filed suit in district court (the "present action") to enjoin defendant (the "Attorney General") from filing an impending suit in state court. Shortly after the present action was filed, the Attorney General in fact filed suit in Connecticut Superior Court. The state court action seeks damages and injunctive relief for alleged violations of state antitrust law, state unfair trade practice law, and state common law. The Tobacco Companies removed the state court action to district court. The removed case came before the Honorable Janet Bond Arterton. The Attorney General moved to dismiss the present action and to remand the removed case to state court where originally filed, arguing that removal was improper due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
The motion to dismiss the present action was denied without prejudice pending resolution of the subject matter jurisdiction issue in the removed case. On October 9, 1996, the removed case was remanded to state court for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Attorney General then renewed the motion to dismiss the present action.
The Tobacco Companies' action raises the issue of federal court interference with pending state litigation. The Supreme Court has noted that "[s]ince the beginning of this country's history Congress has, subject to few exceptions, manifested a desire to permit state courts to try state cases free from interference by federal courts." Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43, 91 S.Ct. 746, 750, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). Federalism requires comity, which Justice Black defined as:
a recognition of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe it, is referred to by many as "Our Federalism" Id. at 44, 91 S.Ct. at 750. Therefore, "the normal thing to do when federal courts are asked to enjoin pending proceedings in state courts is not to issue such injunctions." Id. at 45, 91 S.Ct. at 751. Although Younger addressed federal actions to enjoin state criminal proceedings, the same principals of comity mandate extreme caution before enjoining certain kinds of state civil proceedings as well. See, e.g., Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 1208, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982).
Abstention under Younger is appropriate when: "1) there is an ongoing state proceeding; 2) an important state interest is implicated; and 3) the plaintiff has an avenue open for review of constitutional claims in the state court." Hansel v. Town Court for Town Of Springfield, 56 F.3d 391, 393 (2d Cir.1995). When these conditions are met, abstention is obligatory. See Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. U.S., 424 U.S. 800, 816 n. 22, 96 S.Ct. 1236, 1245 n. 22, 47 L.Ed.2d 483 (1976).
There clearly is an ongoing state proceeding in the present case. The question is whether this element requires that the state proceeding be brought before the federal action. The typical scenario, as in Younger, is that the state action came first. However, the Supreme Court has held that Younger also applies in cases where the federal action was filed preemptively. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 95 S.Ct. 2281, 45 L.Ed.2d 223 (1975).
The Tobacco Companies argue that Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974), not Hicks, controls. Under Steffel, federal courts need not abstain under Younger if there is no pending state proceeding, lest "the hapless plaintiff [find himself] between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding." Steffel, 415 U.S. at 463, 94 S.Ct. at 1217. However, Steffel applies when there is no pending state proceeding. The Supreme Court in Hicks specifically distinguished that scenario from one in which there is a pending state proceeding which, in a race to the courthouse, happened to be filed second:
Neither Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 [94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505] (1974), nor any other case in this Court has held that for Younger v. Harris to apply, the state criminal proceedings must be pending on the day the federal case is filed. Indeed, the issue has been left open; and we now hold that where state criminal proceedings are begun against the federal plaintiffs after the federal complaint is filed but before any proceedings of substance on the merits have taken place in the federal court, the principles of Younger v. Harris should apply in full force.
Hicks, 422 U.S. at 349, 95 S.Ct. at 2292 (footnote omitted).
The Tobacco Companies attempt to distinguish Hicks on several other grounds. First they argue that Hicks applies only to criminal, not civil, proceedings. This argument is without merit. As discussed above, Younger applies to certain types of civil actions. Hicks applies to civil proceedings to the same extent that Younger does.
Second, the Tobacco Companies distinguish Hicks on the grounds that the state proceedings brought in that case could only have been brought in state court, not in federal court. However, the only reason why the claims in Hicks could have been brought uniquely in state court is that they were criminal charges. The distinction therefore is irrelevant and merely rehashes the argument that Hicks only applies to state criminal proceedings. Furthermore, the cases cited do not support this argument.
Finally, the Tobacco Companies argue that "comity works both ways": Respect for federalism would have the state, not the federal, court abstain. However the only case cited, Chaulk Services v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination, 70 F.3d 1361 (1st Cir.1995), must be distinguished. In Chaulk the state administrative action interfered with a federal statutory and administrative system constitutionally adopted by congress. There is no such federal administrative preemption in the present action.
Accordingly, there as an "ongoing proceeding" for Younger purposes.
Abstention is proper under Younger in civil cases only if the proceedings implicate "important state interests." Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn., 457 U.S. 423, 432, 102 S.Ct. 2515, 2521, 73 L.Ed.2d 116 (1982). Civil actions by the state which are "akin to a criminal prosecution" have been held important state interests. Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604, 95 S.Ct. at 1208 (). State enforcement of attorney disciplinary rules are another example. Middlesex, 457 U.S. 423, 102 S.Ct. 2515. Phrased more generally, important state interests include "[p]roceedings necessary for the vindication of important state policies or for the functioning of the state judicial system." Id. at 432, 102 S.Ct. at 2521.
The Attorney General's claims under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act ("CUTPA") and under Connecticut antitrust law are important state interests. Both claims are under statutory schemes which contemplate civil enforcement actions by state authorities to effect state policy. See C.G.S. § 42-110m(a) (); C.G.S. § 35-32(a) (). These laws are mechanisms for the state to enforce its...
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