Philippeaux v. North Central Bronx Hosp., 94 CIV. 3409 (DLC).

• Decision Date: 19 December 1994
• Docket Number: No. 94 CIV. 3409 (DLC).,94 CIV. 3409 (DLC).
• Citation: 871 F. Supp. 640
• Parties: Eddy Jean PHILIPPEAUX, Plaintiff, v. NORTH CENTRAL BRONX HOSPITAL, New York City Health & Hospital Corporation, and The City of New York, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

871 F. Supp. 640

Eddy Jean PHILIPPEAUX, Plaintiff, v. NORTH CENTRAL BRONX HOSPITAL, New York City Health & Hospital Corporation, and The City of New York, Defendants.

No. 94 CIV. 3409 (DLC).

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

December 19, 1994.

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Eddy Jean Philippeaux, pro se.

Paul A. Crotty, Corp. Counsel of City of New York (Paul Marks, Katherine Winningham of counsel), New York City, for defendants.

OPINION & ORDER

COTE, District Judge:

Plaintiff Eddy Jean Philippeaux brings this action in response to North Central Bronx Hospital's ("Bronx Hospital") failure to hire him as a Senior Storekeeper. In his complaint and amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that, in failing to hire him, Bronx Hospital discriminated against him based on his race, national origin and age, and failed to give him preference as a veteran of the armed forces in violation of state and federal law. As a result of this alleged discrimination, plaintiff seeks recovery in the form of "back pay, hiring, promotion, compensatory and punitive damages." Plaintiff also sues the New York City Health and Hospital Corporation ("HHC"), and The City of New York ("The City"). The specific causes of action asserted include claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 631(a); the Veterans' Preference Act of 1944, 38 U.S.C. § 523; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985; and New York Civil Service Law § 85. In response, defendants have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, or in the alternative to grant summary judgment in defendants' favor. Plaintiff has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.¹ For the reasons set out below, this Court denies plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and grants in part defendants' motion to dismiss.

STANDARDS FOR DISMISSAL AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The Court may dismiss an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), Fed.R.Civ.P., only when plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Christ Gatzonis Electrical Contractor, Inc. v. New York City School Construction Authority, 23 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir.1994). In reviewing a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint. Annis v. County of Westchester, 36 F.3d 251, 253 (2d Cir.1994). The Court need not, however, accept as true "naked assertions" without supporting facts. Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709, 713 (2d Cir.1994) (quoting Martin v. New York State Department of Mental Hygiene, 588 F.2d 371, 372 (2d Cir.1978) (per curiam)). Only if, assuming all facts as true, plaintiff still fails to plead the basic elements of a cause of action can the Court dismiss the claim.

Summary judgment may not be granted unless the submissions of the parties taken together "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P. In making this judgment, the burden is on the moving party, and all facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). In addition, when determining whether to grant summary judgment in discrimination cases in which intent is an issue, the court must exercise extra caution. Gallo v. Prudential Residential Services, L.P., 22 F.3d 1219, 1224 (2d Cir.1994). This extra caution is further warranted in cases such as this one in which there has been only limited document discovery. Finally, this Court must construe a pro se complaint more liberally and apply a more flexible standard in determining whether the plaintiff has stated a cause of action. See Platsky v. C.I.A., 953 F.2d 26, 28 (2d Cir.1991). Thus, in determining whether to grant summary judgment, this Court must (i) determine whether a factual dispute exists, and (ii) determine, based on the substantive law at issue, whether the fact in dispute is material.

The statement of facts set forth below is derived primarily from plaintiff's pleadings, the exhibits attached to his complaint, and his affidavit in opposition to the motion to dismiss. Facts asserted by the defendants are so noted. Although it appears that plaintiff may have dropped some of his original causes of action upon filing an amended complaint, the motion to dismiss is addressed to all of plaintiff's causes of action. Therefore, the Court will review all claims asserted in both the complaint and in the amended complaint.

BACKGROUND

HHC is a "public benefit corporation" created by the State of New York to take control of hospitals formerly under the control of The City. See New York Unconsolidated Laws §§ 7381-7406. HHC is controlled by a Board of Directors who are for the most part appointed by the Mayor and the City Counsel. See id. § 7384(1). Bronx Hospital is one of several hospitals under the control of HHC. Bronx Hospital is not, however, a legal entity independent of HHC.

In December 1991, Bronx Hospital placed an advertisement in "The Chief," a newspaper that advertises government jobs, giving notice that it had an opening for a Senior Storekeeper. A Senior Storekeeper supervises the receipt of all Bronx Hospital commodities and supplies. Plaintiff responded to the advertisement by sending to Bronx Hospital a resume and supporting documents including plaintiff's military record. Bronx Hospital called plaintiff in for an interview, and in early January 1992, Mr. Paul Brodsky, the Material Supervisor at Bronx Hospital, interviewed plaintiff. Ms. Rosalie Galan, the Materials Manager at Bronx Hospital, interviewed plaintiff on January 23, 1992, at which time plaintiff submitted an employment application.

Bronx Hospital did not offer the position to plaintiff, but re-opened the hiring process, which was originally limited to those who applied by December 16, 1991. On February 13, 1992, Pablo Arroyo, a Food Service Supervisor at Bronx Hospital applied for the position. Mr. Arroyo was interviewed on about February 26, 1992, and was hired on March 4, 1992. Mr. Arroyo is Hispanic and was 34 years old in 1992. On June 1, 1992, plaintiff was informed by Bronx Hospital that they had hired Mr. Arroyo. Plaintiff was 39 years old at that time. Plaintiff filed a claim with the EEOC on August 18, 1992 alleging that Bronx Hospital discriminated against him on the basis of his national origin and race, which he identified as Haitian and Black, respectively. On March 4, 1994, plaintiff received a right to sue letter from the EEOC, and brought this action on April 4, 1994.

To support his allegations of discrimination, plaintiff points to three areas: the difference in qualifications of plaintiff and Mr. Arroyo, the respective races of the persons involved, and the alleged irregularities in the hiring process.

Plaintiff's application to Bronx Hospital lays out, in depth, his qualifications for the Senior Storekeeper position. Plaintiff held a New York State high school equivalency diploma and had credits from two college level programs. From 1972 to 1980, plaintiff worked as a Senior Storekeeper at various Navy bases and aboard various Navy vessels. From 1980 to at least 1983 plaintiff worked as a medical material specialist both at Andrews Air Force Base on a part-time basis and at D.C. General Hospital on a full time basis. From 1983 to 1990, plaintiff worked for the Air Force primarily in aircraft maintenance. Plaintiff does not indicate any further employment after 1990 other than some part-time work for the Metropolitan Museum of Art during the holiday season in 1991. In addition, plaintiff provided certificates of completion from Navy "Storekeeper Class `A'" training and Air Force "Medical Material Specialist" training, and stated that he attended Electronics and Computer School in Mississippi. In contrast, plaintiff points to Mr. Arroyo's experience as a Food Service Supervisor at Bronx Hospital starting in 1986, and at St. Joseph's Hospital for five years prior to that. Mr. Arroyo's employment application, which plaintiff attached as an exhibit to the complaint, also reflects that he graduated from the Bronx High School of Science and has a B.B.A. degree in computer information systems from Baruch College.

To further support his claim of discrimination, plaintiff points to the race and national origin of the various individuals involved in the hiring process. Plaintiff, who is Black and Haitian, notes that Ms. Galan is Hispanic, Mr. Brodsky is Caucasian, and Mr. Arroyo, the successful candidate, is Hispanic. Plaintiff asserts that Ms. Galan felt she "could not select an individual who was not of Hispanic origin."

As the third basis for supporting his claim of discrimination, plaintiff points to irregularities in the hiring process. Plaintiff complains that in both interviews he was given little attention. Mr. Brodsky, according to plaintiff, spent most of the first interview on the telephone and would only ask "intermittent questions between the time he would make another call." Plaintiff's second interview allegedly "lasted no more than five minutes." In addition to the brief interviews, plaintiff points to Bronx Hospital's re-opening the hiring process after the December 16, 1991 cutoff for accepting applications. According to plaintiff, this was done "in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964."

AGE DISCRIMINATION CLAIM

In plaintiff's original complaint, he alleges that Bronx Hospital discriminated against him based on his age. Section 631(a) of the ADEA provides that "the prohibitions in this chapter shall be limited to individuals who are at least 40 years of age." 29 U.S.C. § 631(a); see also Petrelli v. City of Mount Vernon, 9 F.3d 250, 253 (2d Cir.1993). Plaintiff, who was...