Phillips v. American Motorist Ins. Co., WD
| Decision Date | 04 May 1999 |
| Docket Number | No. WD,WD |
| Citation | 996 S.W.2d 584 |
| Parties | Robert C. PHILLIPS, D.C., Appellant, v. AMERICAN MOTORIST INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent. 55644. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Jimmie D. James, Independence, for Appellant.
Laurence R. Tucker, Kansas City, for Respondent.
Before ULRICH, P.J.; SMART and EDWIN H. SMITH, JJ.
Dr. Robert Phillips appeals a judgment in favor of American Motorist Insurance Company ("American") in a case involving a claim for tortious interference with the physician-patient relationship. Phillips claims that the trial court erred in excluding evidence related to a tape recording of a telephone conversation between Phillips and the employer of Phillips' patient. Phillips' sole point on appeal is that the trial court erred in holding that § 542.418, RSMo 1994, 1 of the Missouri Wiretap Act required the exclusion of evidence related to the tape recording of the conversation.
The judgment of the trial court is reversed and remanded for a new trial.
In June 1992, Phillips, a chiropractor, was treating Timothy Wright for work-related injuries. On June 13, 1992, Wright told Phillips that his employer, McDonald's restaurant, had informed Wright that Phillips was no longer authorized to treat him. Wright said his employer told him the workers' compensation insurance carrier had made the decision. After speaking with Wright, Phillips called McDonald's restaurant and spoke with the manager, Melanie Amos, regarding the termination of his authority to treat Wright. The following conversation, which Phillips tape-recorded without Amos' knowledge, took place:
Phillips subsequently filed suit against American, the insurance company, alleging tortious interference with his physician-patient relationship with Wright, in violation of § 287.140, 2 and seeking compensatory and punitive damages for interference with a business relationship.
American moved for summary judgment. Attached to its motion for summary judgment was an affidavit signed by Amos stating that she, not American, made the decision to terminate Phillips' authority to treat Wright. In response to American's motion for summary judgment, Phillips filed suggestions in opposition. Attached to Phillips' suggestions in opposition was a transcript of the taped phone call to Amos, in which she stated that American made the decision to terminate Phillips' authority to treat Wright.
American filed a reply in support of its motion for summary judgment. Attached thereto was a second affidavit signed by Amos after she had reviewed the transcript of the phone call. Amos also stated in her second affidavit that she was unaware that Phillips was recording the phone conversation, and that if she had been aware of the potential legal significance of the phone call, she would have admitted that she was the one who made the decision concerning treatment.
Prior to trial, American filed a motion in limine seeking the exclusion of any evidence obtained from the phone conversation between Amos and Phillips. In its motion in limine, American relied upon the Missouri Wiretap Act ("Wiretap Act"), in particular, § 542.418 which states:
The contents of any wire communication or evidence derived therefrom shall not be received in evidence or otherwise disclosed in any civil or administrative proceeding, except in civil actions brought pursuant to this section.
American sought the exclusion of the tape recording, the transcript of the tape recording and portions of the Amos' second affidavit that referred to the tape recording. Phillips responded that the Wiretap Act, as a whole, should be read to apply only to illegally-obtained evidence received through wiretaps. Phillips argued the recordings in question were not made in violation of the Wiretap Act, and therefore were admissible. The trial court ruled that the tape, the transcript of the tape and the portions of Amos' affidavit referring to the tape were inadmissible under § 542.418.
The trial commenced on January 26, 1998. Phillips called Amos as a witness for plaintiff and attempted to introduce the tape and transcript into evidence. Phillips argued that the evidence should be admitted as prior inconsistent statements to impeach Amos and as substantive evidence on the issue of who actually terminated Phillips' authority to treat Wright. The trial court ruled that Phillips could not introduce the tape, ask Amos about the transcript, or ask Amos about her affidavit referring to the telephone conversation. The court ruled all of this was inadmissible as evidence derived from a wire communication.
Phillips did ask Amos about the conversation with Phillips on June 13, 1992. Amos was asked if Dr. Phillips had asked her the specific questions listed above, and was asked whether she made the specific answers to those questions. She acknowledged she had so answered. The questions and responses in this exchange were identical in content to those which occurred during the telephone conversation. Phillips was not permitted by the court to refer to the fact that the conversation had been recorded, or to the transcript, or to the affidavits executed by Amos.
On examination by American Motorist Insurance Company, Amos acknowledged that her statements to Phillips were not accurate to the extent they indicated that the insurance company had made the choice to terminate Phillips' authority to treat Wright.
On January 28, 1998, a verdict was returned in favor of American. Phillips filed a timely motion for new trial claiming that the tape, the transcript and portions of Amos' second affidavit were wrongfully excluded from evidence, and that the trial court's exclusion of the evidence was prejudicial to his case. The trial court denied Phillips' motion for new trial. Phillips now appeals to this court.
Phillips' sole point on appeal is that the trial court erred in relying on § 542.418 of the Wiretap Act in excluding from evidence the tape recording, transcript and affidavits which contained prior inconsistent statements made by Amos. Phillips argues that the trial court should have considered § 542.418 in conjunction with the entire Wiretap Act and its legislative intent.
A trial court has great discretion in determining whether evidence should be excluded. Kelly by Kelly v. Jackson, 798 S.W.2d 699, 704 (Mo. banc 1990). The trial court's exclusion of evidence will not be grounds for reversal unless that exclusion amounts to an abuse of discretion. Id. The issue is not whether the evidence was admissible, but rather whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding it. Copeland v. Mr. B's Pool Ctrs., Inc., 850 S.W.2d 380, 381 (Mo.App.1993). An abuse of discretion occurs "when the trial court's ruling is clearly against the logic of the circumstances then before the court and is so arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration...." Richardson v. State Highway & Transp. Comm'n, 863 S.W.2d 876, 881 (Mo. banc 1993).
" Garland v. Director of Revenue, 961 S.W.2d 824, 830 (Mo. banc 1998) (quoting Centerre Bank of Crane v. Director of Revenue, 744 S.W.2d 754, 759 (Mo. banc 1988)). Our interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Wiretap Act must be derived from the plain and ordinary language of the Act. State v. Knapp, 843 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Mo. banc 1992); Jones v. Director of Revenue, 832 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Mo. banc 1992); Abrams v. Ohio Pac. Express, 819 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Mo. banc 1991); State v. Ruch, 926 S.W.2d 937, 938 (Mo.App.1996). It is not our place to construe the clear and unambiguous language of a statute. Tuft v. City of St. Louis, 936 S.W.2d 113, 118-19 (Mo.App.1996). When determining whether statutory language is clear and unambiguous, we determine whether the terms of the statute are "plain and clear to one of ordinary intelligence." Wolff Shoe Co. v. Director of Revenue, 762 S.W.2d 29, 31 (Mo. banc 1988). If an ambiguity exists, we will seek an interpretation that does not render an absurd result. Abrams, 819 S.W.2d at 341.
All statutes relating to the same subject matter are considered in pari materia 3 and are construed together. State ex rel. Rothermich v. Gallagher, 816 S.W.2d 194, 200 (Mo. banc 1991); State ex rel. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 441 S.W.2d 742 746 (Mo.App.1969). We will presume that the legislature intended that in pari materia statutes be read "consistently and harmoniously." Rothermich, 816 S.W.2d at 200. In Missouri, the general rule is that statutes adopted in the same General Assembly session are to be construed in harmony. Ferrell Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Holloway, 954 S.W.2d 712, 715 (Mo.App.1997) (citing Berdella v. Pender, 821 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Mo. banc 1991)); see also Rothschild v. State Tax Comm'n of Missouri, 762 S.W.2d 35, 37-38 (Mo. banc 1988).
A statute is passed as a whole and not in part or sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Consequently, each part or section should...
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