Phillips v. Bramlett

• Decision Date: 07 June 2013
• Docket Number: No. 12–0257.,12–0257.
• Citation: 56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 635,407 S.W.3d 229
• Parties: Benny P. PHILLIPS, M.D., Petitioner, v. Dale BRAMLETT, Individually and as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Vicki Bramlett, Deceased, Shane Fuller and Michael Fuller, Respondents.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

407 S.W.3d 229

56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 635

Benny P. PHILLIPS, M.D., Petitioner,

v.Dale BRAMLETT, Individually and as Independent Administrator of the Estate of Vicki Bramlett, Deceased, Shane Fuller and Michael Fuller, Respondents.

No. 12–0257.

Supreme Court of Texas.

Argued Feb. 6, 2013.

Delivered June 7, 2013.

Jim Hund, Hund Krier Wilkerson & Wright, P.C., Lubbock, TX, for Benny P. Phillips, M.D.

Alexander B. Klein III, J. Todd Tombley, The Klein Law Firm, Houston, TX, John Smithee, Templeton Smithee Hayes, Heinrich & Russell LLP, Amarillo, TX, Thomas J. Turner, Turner and Jordan, P.C., Lubbock, TX, for Dale Bramlett.

Justice BOYD delivered the opinion of the Court.

When the life cycle of a judgment extends beyond an initial appeal, courts often face unique or unsettled jurisdictional and procedural issues. This case presents three of those issues; namely, (1) whether the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the judgment that the trial court entered after this Court remanded the case to the trial court for entry of judgment; (2) whether postjudgment interest should be calculated from the date of the trial court's first judgment (the “original judgment”) or the date of the judgment that the trial court entered following our remand (the “remand judgment”); and (3) whether the trial court erred by “vacating” the original judgment when it issued the remand judgment. We hold that (1) the court of appeals had jurisdiction to review the trial court's remand judgment; (2) postjudgment interest must be calculated from the date of the original judgment; and (3) the trial court's order vacating the original judgment was unnecessary because that judgment had already been reversed in its entirety, but it was not reversible error. We affirm the court of appeals' judgment on these grounds and again remand the case to the trial court for entry of a final judgment consistent with this opinion.

I. Background

This is our second time to hear this health care liability case. Because several prior opinions address the underlying facts,¹ we will describe only the procedural history that is relevant to the issues currently before us. In 2005, a Lubbock County trial court entered a judgment on a jury's verdict in favor of Respondents, the family of Vicki Bramlett (the Bramletts),² on their claims against Petitioner Benny P. Phillips, M.D. (Phillips). This original judgment awarded the Bramletts approximately $9 million in actual damages and $3 million in punitive damages. Former article 4590i,³ which governs this case, capped the recoverable amount of actual damages, but the trial court concluded that a statutory exception to the cap—the Stowers exception—applied.⁴ Apparently to support its application of the Stowers exception, the trial court made certain recitals in the original judgment, including statements that Phillips was insured under a liability policy with limits of $200,000; that the Bramletts made, and Phillips did not timely accept, two “proper” Stowers demands to settle for the policy's limits; and that “facts exist to enable a party to invoke the common law theory of recovery known as the ‘Stowers Doctrine.’ ” ⁵

Phillips appealed. The Amarillo Court of Appeals reversed in part and modified and affirmed in part. First, the court found the evidence legally insufficient to support the jury's gross negligence finding, and thus reversed the part of the original judgment that awarded punitive damages and ordered that the Bramletts take nothing on that claim. The court next found the evidence sufficient to support the jury's remaining liability and damages findings, except as to certain future damages. The court suggested a remittitur on those future damages, which the Bramletts accepted. The court agreed with the trial court that the Stowers exception to article 4590i's damages cap applied, and therefore affirmed the actual damages portion of the trial court's original judgment, as modified to conform to the remittitur.

The Bramletts did not challenge the court of appeals' reversal of the punitive damages award. Phillips, however, petitioned for review of the court of appeals' judgment on actual damages, and we granted review on the issue of whether former article 4590i capped Phillips's liability. We held that it did, reversed the court of appeals' judgment, and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of a new judgment consistent with our opinion. 288 S.W.3d 876 (Tex.2009). Because the Bramletts did not seek review of the court of appeals' take-nothing judgment on punitive damages, we did not address that claim. Id.

Back in the trial court on remand, both sides moved for entry of a new judgment. After a hearing at which the trial court admitted no new evidence, the trial court entered a new judgment (the remand judgment) that awarded the Bramletts actual damages capped under former article 4590i plus postjudgment interest calculated from the date of the remand judgment. In addition, the remand judgment expressly “vacated” the original judgment, did not include the Stowers recitals that were included in the original judgment, and stated that any suit against Phillips's insurer under former article 4590i was “reserved for another case.”

In response to the remand judgment, the Bramletts filed a petition for writ of mandamus in this Court and separately appealed again to the Amarillo Court of Appeals. In both instances, the Bramletts argued that the trial court (1) should have calculated postjudgment interest from the date of the original judgment rather than the date of the remand judgment and (2) should not have vacated the original judgment. The Bramletts asserted that these actions conflicted with the mandate that we issued when we reversed the original judgment and remanded the case to the trial court.

We denied the Bramletts' mandamus petition without issuing an opinion. Meanwhile, Phillips moved to dismiss the Bramletts' appeal, contending that the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction because this Court had exclusive jurisdiction to enforce its mandate. The court of appeals held that it had jurisdiction and denied the motion to dismiss. 322 S.W.3d 443, 444. The court then held that the trial court had erred by vacating its original judgment and by calculating postjudgment interest from the date of the remand judgment rather than the date of the original judgment. 359 S.W.3d 304, 312. The court of appeals thus reversed the remand judgment and again remanded the case to the trial court. Id. at 313.

We granted Phillips's petition for review. Phillips contends that the court of appeals (1) lacked jurisdiction to review the trial court's remand judgment, (2) erred in holding that the trial court erred by calculating postjudgment interest from the date of the remand judgment, and (3) erred in holding that the trial court erred by vacating its original judgment.

II. Jurisdiction Following Remand

Phillips argues that this Court has “exclusive jurisdiction to enforce [its] mandate and opinion,” and the court of appeals therefore lacked jurisdiction over the Bramletts' appeal from the remand judgment. The court of appeals disagreed, and held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by taking actions outside the scope of our mandate and judgment—specifically, by vacating its original judgment. We therefore begin by discussing the trial court's and the court of appeals' jurisdiction over a case that we have remanded to the trial court.

A. The Trial Court's Jurisdiction on Remand

The court of appeals held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction on remand by acting beyond the scope of its authority under our mandate and judgment. While we agree that our mandate and judgment limited the trial court's authority on remand, such limits are not “jurisdictional” in the true sense of that word.

When an appellate court reverses a lower court's judgment and remands the case to the trial court, as we did here, the trial court is authorized to take all actions that are necessary to give full effect to the appellate court's judgment and mandate. See In re Columbia Med. Ctr. of Las Colinas, 306 S.W.3d 246, 248 (Tex.2010) (per curiam) (holding trial court erred on remand by failing to reduce punitive damages award to conform to this Court's reduction of actual damages, as dictated by statutory cap on punitive damages). But the trial court has no authority to take any action that is inconsistent with or beyond the scope of that which is necessary to give full effect to the appellate court's judgment and mandate. See, e.g., Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex.1986) (“When this court remands a case and limits a subsequent trial to a particular issue, the trial court is restricted to a determination of that particular issue.”).

Parties and courts sometimes use the term “jurisdiction” to refer to the trial court's authority on remand, as the court of appeals did here. See Bramlett, 359 S.W.3d at 311–12. In doing so, however, they are not referring to the trial court's constitutional or statutory power to conduct the necessary proceedings or to enter a judgment, but are instead referring to the scope of the trial court's authority in exercising that power. See generally State v. Holloway, 360 S.W.3d 480, 484–85 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (distinguishing court's jurisdiction to hear a case from its authority to act under that jurisdiction). The appellate court's mandate and judgment do not limit the trial court's jurisdiction to preside over the case and enter a remand judgment, but instead limit the trial court's authority in exercising that jurisdiction.

This is why we have reversed, rather than vacated, remand judgments that failed to comport with an appellate court's mandate. See Wall v. Wall, 143 Tex. 418, 186 S.W.2d 57 (1945) (reversing trial court's remand judgment and remanding case to trial court for entry of new judgment complying with appellate court's prior instruction); see also Tex. Workers'...