Phillips v. Cain
Decision Date | 08 September 2014 |
Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 13-5868 SECTION: "J" (1) |
Parties | HENRY PHILLIPS v. N. BURL CAIN, WARDEN |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana |
This matter was referred to this United States Magistrate Judge for the purpose of conducting a hearing, including an evidentiary hearing, if necessary, and submission of proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C) and, as applicable, Rule 8(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. Upon review of the record, the Court has determined that this matter can be disposed of without an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2). Therefore, for all of the following reasons, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the petition be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Petitioner, Henry Phillips, is a state prisoner incarcerated at the Louisiana State Penitentiary, Angola, Louisiana. On October 19, 2009, he was convicted of purse snatching underLouisiana law.1 On November 9, 2009, he was sentenced to a term of ten years imprisonment.2 On December 2, 2009, he was found to be a third offender,3 and he was then resentenced as such to a term of life imprisonment on January 20, 2010.4 The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed his conviction and sentence on February 17, 2011,5 and the Louisiana Supreme Court denied his related writ application on October 7, 2011.6
On or about October 29, 2012, petitioner filed an application for post-conviction relief with the state district court.7 That application was denied on December 11, 2012.8 His relatedwrit applications were then likewise denied by the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal on January 30, 2013,9 and by the Louisiana Supreme Court on July 31, 2013.10
On or about September 9, 2013, petitioner filed the instant federal application seeking habeas corpus relief.11 The state concedes that the application is timely filed.12
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") comprehensively overhauled federal habeas corpus legislation, including 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Amended subsections 2254(d)(1) and (2) contain revised standards of review for pure questions of fact, pure questions of law, and mixed questions of both. The amendments "modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 693 (2002).
As to pure questions of fact, factual findings are presumed to be correct and a federal court will give deference to the state court's decision unless it "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding." 28U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) () .
As to pure questions of law and mixed questions of law and fact, a federal court must defer to the state court's decision on the merits of such a claim unless that decision "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Courts have held that the "'contrary to' and 'unreasonable application' clauses [of § 2254(d)(1)] have independent meaning." Bell, 535 U.S. at 694.
Regarding the "contrary to" clause, the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:
A state court decision is contrary to clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in the [United States] Supreme Court's cases. A state-court decision will also be contrary to clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of the [United States] Supreme Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [United States] Supreme Court precedent.
Wooten v. Thaler, 598 F.3d 215, 218 (5th Cir. 2010) ( ).
Regarding the "unreasonable application" clause, the United States Supreme Court has held: "[A] state-court decision is an unreasonable application of our clearly establishedprecedent if it correctly identifies the governing legal rule but applies that rule unreasonably to the facts of a particular prisoner's case." White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1706 (2014). However, the Supreme Court cautioned:
Section 2254(d)(1) provides a remedy for instances in which a state court unreasonably applies this Court's precedent; it does not require state courts to extend that precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as error. Thus, if a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand, then by definition the rationale was not clearly established at the time of the state-court decision. AEDPA's carefully constructed framework would be undermined if habeas courts introduced rules not clearly established under the guise of extensions to existing law.
Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). Therefore, when the Supreme Court's "cases give no clear answer to the question presented, let alone one in [the petitioner's] favor, it cannot be said that the state court unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law." Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 126 (2008) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). The Supreme Court has also expressly cautioned that "an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell, 535 U.S. at 694. Accordingly, a state court's merely incorrect application of Supreme Court precedent simply does not warrant habeas relief. Puckett v. Epps, 641 F.3d 657, 663 (5th Cir. 2011) ().
While the AEDPA standards of review are strict and narrow, they are purposely so. As the United States Supreme Court has held:
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786-87 (2011) (citations omitted; emphasis added); see also Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010) ().
The Supreme Court has expressly warned that although "some federal judges find [28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)] too confining," it is nevertheless clear that "all federal judges must obey" the law and apply the strictly deferential standards of review mandated therein. White v. Woodall, 134 S. Ct. 1697, 1701 (2014).
On direct appeal, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal summarized the facts of this case as follows:
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