Phillips v. Chase

• Decision Date: 23 November 1909
• Citation: Phillips v. Chase, 203 Mass. 556, 89 N.E. 1049 (Mass. 1909)
• Parties: PHILLIPS et al. v. CHASE.
• Court: Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

203 Mass. 556

89 N.E. 1049

PHILLIPS et al. v. CHASE.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Essex.

November 23, 1909

COUNSEL

Robt.M. Morse, Jos. H. Soliday, and Richd.Y. Fitzgerald, for appellant.

Moorfield Storey and Ezra R. Thayer, for appellees.

OPINION

LORING J.

On April 23, 1889, the judge of the probate court for the county of Essex made a decree, after hearing, by which De Forest Woodruff Chase, son of her husband by a former wife, became the adopted son of Mrs. Chase.Mrs. Chase died on September 13, 1905.A month later (on October 14, 1905) a petition was filed by those who but for the adoption would have been her next of kin, to set aside the decree of adoption.On October 20, 1905, Woodruff Chase voluntarily accepted service.He gave his deposition on November 10, in the presence of the judge of probate who entered the original decree of adoption and died on December 19, 1905.The same judge, after hearing found that the petition for adoption and the decree entered thereon 'were procured by the undue influence of her husband, the said Horace Chase, and were a fraud upon said court,' and entered a decree revoking the decree of adoption.This was on February 19, 1906.On March 8, 1906, Horace Chase took two appeals from this decree, one as sole heir of Woodruff, adopted son and interested in the estate of Mrs. Chase, and the other as administrator of the estate of Woodruff, adopted son and interested in Mrs. Chase's estate.

The appellant filed five objections to the decree of the probate court.

On his motion the following issues were tried by a jury: '(1) Did Jeannie P. Chase of her own free will adopt De Forest Woodruff Chase on April 23, 1889?(2) Was she unduly influenced in the making of said adoption by Horace Chase or any other person?'

On the first issue the jury answered 'No,' and on the second, 'Yes.'

After these issues had been tried the appeal came on for hearing before the Chief Justice of this court on the other issues involved in it.The appellant introduced in evidence the evidence taken before the jury.No other evidence was offered by either party.The Chief Justice, on the answers made by the jury and on the evidence introduced before him, found for the appellees and entered a decree affirming the decree of the probate court revoking the decree of adoption.The case is before us on an appeal from that decree.

1.The first question raised is that covered by the fifth objection filed by the appellant, to wit: 'The procuring of said adoption did not constitute a fraud upon said court.'

We are of opinion that the answers given by the jury on the two issues tried by them settle that question in the affirmative.

The second of the two issues settled by the verdict of the jury in the case at bar is not in the usual form.But we are of opinion that the verdict must be taken to be tantamount to a finding on an issue in the usual form, and to mean: That the adoption was procured by the undue influence of Horace Chase or of some other person; and we are further of opinion that we ought to construe it in the light of the evidence on which (as appears from the evidence at the later hearing) it was founded.So construed it must be taken to be a finding that the adoption was procured by the undue influence of Horace Chase.There is nothing in that evidence showing undue influence by any other person.

Undue influence in procuring another to adopt his child means the same thing as undue influence in procuring another to make a will, for example, in favor of his child.It is established that that means that the person exercising the influence so far dominated the will of the other person as to substitute his will for that of the other person with the result that the action brought about by the undue influence is not in reality the act of the person whose act it is in form, but the act of the person exercising the undue influence.Shailer v. Bumstead,99 Mass. 112;Woodbury v. Woodbury,141 Mass. 329, 5 N.E. 275, 55 Am. Rep. 479.

The appellant has argued that the finding of the jury in the case at bar should not be taken to be a finding of undue influence in that sense of the term.But the record does not disclose what the instructions were under which the jury made their finding on this issue.The instructions given to the jury should have been those stated above, and in the absence of the charge actually given must be taken to have been so.

The appellant now seeks to raise the further point that the evidence did not warrant a finding that there was undue influence on the part of Dr. Chase, if that is what undue influence means.

It is not clear that this argument does not come too late.The proper time for raising that question was at the trial of the issue by asking for a ruling that the evidence did not warrant a finding that the adoption was procured by undue influence, or by an exception to the instructions under which the jury were allowed to find that it was.No such question was then raised.SeePhillips v. Chase,201 Mass. 444, 87 N.E. 755.But all the evidence before the jury is before us and (without intimating that the appellant has a right to raise the question now)we prefer to put our decision on the ground that the evidence did warrant the finding, giving to it the meaning that we have held must be given to it.

The principal argument of the appellant on this point is that 'Mrs. Chase stated to her brother that the doctor gave her a week to decide whether she should adopt his son or have him leave her (Evidence of Leonard Phillips, p. 152), and on Mrs. Chase's fear of a possible scandal arising out of the sepation, the whole claim of the petition is based.But this was merely an appeal to motives, and an appeal to motives does not constitute duress.''Duress must overpower the mind, not merely influence the choice.'

Undue influence must overpower the mind, and in our opinion the evidence in the case at bar warranted a finding that Mrs Chase's mind had been overpowered by her husband.What is true of duress is true of undue influence, namely, it is of no consequence how the domination over the mind was acquired; it is enough that it was acquired.Silsbee v. Webber,171 Mass. 378, 50 N.E. 555.If the evidence in the case at bar had shown nothing more than the presentation by one person to another of a choice between two courses of action the jury would not have been warranted in finding that the adoption was procured by undue influence.But the evidence in the case at bar was not merely that.The marriage took place on January 26, 1889, and the adoption on April 23d of the same year.Dr. Chase made the acquaintance of the woman who afterwards became his wife in 1884 or 1885.She was then Mrs. Culliton, and came to him as a patient.By his own account she was then in a very pitiful condition, a physical wreck, anaemic and unable to walk more than a short distance without fatigue, or to read without her eyes paining her.There was another trouble which need not be mentioned.He did much to relieve her, and in six months she had greatly improved.She remained under his care as a physician continuously thereafter, and in his own words: 'There never was a day, as I lived with her, that I didn't have a suggestion to make for her physical benefit.'She obtained a decree of divorce nisi from her first husband in December, 1887, and this was made absolute in June, 1888.It turned out that Culliton had married her from mercenary motives only, and in another way the marriage and the reason for her leaving her husband made her peculiarly sensitive about it.It was also in evidence that Mrs. Chase, as she afterward became, looked upon it as a scandal so humiliating to her that she could not endure a similar one.The jury were warranted in finding that this was so, that Dr. Chase knew it, and, to force her to adopt his son, told her within three months after the marriage that if she did not do so he would desert her.There was no pretense that the adoption was made by reason of any affection which she then bore to Woodruff.Their acquaintance up to that time was casual only.Woodruff testified that he was asked to come to Swampscott and that he did so; that he was then asked to go to Salem with Dr. and Mrs. Chase, and while on the train to Salem he learned for the first time that the reason why he had been summoned to Swampscott and was going to Salem was to be adopted by Mrs. Chase.He was asked if he had any objections.'I told her, 'No;' that if I could be of any service I should be glad.She said that owing to certain conditions in her mother's will and certain conditions that the trust fund had been left in she wanted to have it so that she could leave her money as she wished to and she found that she could not do so without adopting some lawful heir; that she wished that her money should go to my father and to me.'And Dr. Chase himself testified that the reason Mrs. Chase gave for the adoption was to protect him: 'If my son had it, I presume my son would be kind enough, if I needed it, to share with me.'In addition there was evidence that Mrs. Chase frequently spoke in later years of the adoption 'bitterly,' that she said that she had been forced to do it against her will, and when her husband left for a time at a later date she tried to kill herself and finally asked him to come back on his own terms.This case therefore could be found not to be a case where one at arm's length gives another a choice of action.Dr. Chase stood in the twofold confidential relation of physician and husband; Mrs. Chase, though better, was not well; and the jury were warranted in finding that to his knowledge she was not willing to submit to a second scandal arising out of marriage,...