Phillips v. Chicago Housing Authority

• Decision Date: 02 February 1982
• Docket Number: No. 54481,54481
• Citation: Phillips v. Chicago Housing Authority, 431 N.E.2d 1038, 89 Ill.2d 122, 59 Ill.Dec. 281 (Ill. 1982)
• Parties: , 59 Ill.Dec. 281 Eliza PHILLIPS, Adm'r, Appellee, v. The CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1038

431 N.E.2d 1038

89 Ill.2d 122, 59 Ill.Dec. 281

Eliza PHILLIPS, Adm'r, Appellee, v. The CHICAGO HOUSING AUTHORITY, Appellant.

No. 54481.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Feb. 2, 1982.

Orner, Wasserman & Moore, Ltd., Chicago (Norton Wasserman, and H. Elisabeth Huber, Chicago, of counsel), for appellant.

Epton, Mullin, Segal & Druth, Ltd., Chicago (Edward J. McCambridge and Mary F. Stafford, Chicago, of counsel), for appellee.

WARD, Justice:

This appeal is from a negligence action brought in the circuit court of Cook County for the wrongful death and personal injuries of plaintiff's decedent, a resident of a housing project operated by the defendant, the Chicago Housing Authority (CHA). The circuit court struck the complaint for failure to state a cause of action and also three successive amended complaints. Upon striking the third amended complaint, the court dismissed the case with prejudice. The appellate court concluded that a cause of action was stated and reversed and remanded for further proceedings. (91 Ill.App.3d 544, 47 Ill.Dec. 17, 414 N.E.2d 1133.) We granted the CHA's petition for leave to appeal.

The plaintiff's third amended complaint alleged:

"1. The plaintiff's decedent, DEBRA PHILLIPS, was a minor who resided at 1119 North Cleveland Street, which is located in the Cabrini Green Housing Project in Chicago.

2. Cabrini Green is a public housing development of approximately 78 buildings, owned, operated, maintained and controlled by the CHA.

3. At the time of Debra's death and for a long time prior thereto numerous incidents of crimes of extreme violence had taken place on the premises in question in the possession and control of the defendant. The offenses included criminal homicides, aggravated assaults, and rapes of adults and minors. The crimes were committed against tenants, their families, and their invitees and licensees. In particular, crimes of rape of female minors had taken place in the areas which later were secured or locked by the defendant as described hereafter in paragraph 5.

4. At all times concerned, the defendant knew or by exercise of due care and caution should have known of the existence of these crimes.

5. At some time prior to April 2, 1977, the CHA closed and locked off certain floors of the aforementioned building to prevent criminals, of whom they knew or in the exercise of due care and caution should have known, from entering these floors to conduct criminal activities and to keep the premises safe for the tenants of the building.

6. On April 2, 1977, Debra was abducted by persons unknown and violently assaulted and raped and taken to and beaten on one of the allegedly secured floors and was thrown out a window on that floor, causing her death.

7. At that time and place the CHA negligently and carelessly committed one or more of the following acts:

(a) kept the keys to the closed-off floors in an area or place that was known to or accessible to the general public or to those criminals that the CHA knew or should have known came on the premises;

(b) left the keys to the elevator allowing travel to the closed off floors accessible to the general public and to those criminals that the CHA knew or should have known came on the premises;

(c) failed to inspect the elevator to determine if it had been prevented from being stopped at the closed-off floors;

(d) failed to inspect the doors to the closed-off area to determine if the locks were working so as to bar access to the closed-off areas;

(e) failed to inspect the elevator to determine whether the elevator lock, preventing it from traveling to the closed-off floors, was working (f) failed to warn the tenants that the doors to the closed-off areas were in fact unsecured and were accessible to the public and to those criminals who the CHA knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have been known came on to the premises;

(g) failed to warn the tenants that the elevator was not locked and closed off to the floors which were being remodeled and (that such floors were) accessible to the general public and to those criminals who the CHA knew or should have known came on to the premises;

(h) failed to provide police protection or security guards in the building notwithstanding the fact that the CHA had provided police protection by furnishing security guards for some of the buildings in the Cabrini Green Project.

8. As a direct and proximate result of one or more of the negligent acts of the CHA, Debra was abducted on the premises of 1119 North Cleveland, taken to the closed-off area of the building, assaulted, beaten, raped and thrown out of a window.

The appellate court held that the plaintiff's third amended complaint did state a cause of action. We agree. It will not be necessary to consider the correctness of all of the grounds given by the appellate court for its holding.

Our conclusion that the complaint did state a cause of action rests upon the holding in Pippin v. Chicago Housing Authority (1979), 78 Ill.2d 204, 35 Ill.Dec. 530, 399 N.E.2d 596.

In Pippin, this court held that the CHA owed no duty, either by statute or under the common law, to protect its tenants from criminal acts. The court recognized, however, that as a general principle liability is imposed upon a landlord who voluntarily undertakes to provide security measures, but performs the undertaking negligently, if the negligence is the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. (78 Ill.2d 204, 209, 35 Ill.Dec. 530, 399 N.E.2d 596, citing Nelson v. Union Wire Rope Corp. (1964), 31 Ill.2d 69, 74, 199 N.E.2d 769 (insurer held responsible in tort for personal injuries suffered as a result of the insurer's negligent performance of a voluntary inspection of the premises where the injuries occurred).)

The duty of care imposed upon the landlord under that analysis was held to be limited to the extent of the landlord's undertaking. Because the CHA's undertaking in Pippin was to hire a security firm to provide guard services for its building, this court concluded that the CHA could be held liable only for negligence in hiring. The Civil Practice Act states that pleadings should be liberally construed (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 110, par. 33(3)), and that no pleading is bad in substance if it contains sufficient information reasonably to inform the opposing party of the nature of the claim that the party is called upon to meet (Ill.Rev.Stat.1979, ch. 110...