Phillips v. Ingersoll-Humphryes Division, Borg-Warner Corp., INGERSOLL-HUMPHRYES

CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Ohio
Citation291 N.E.2d 736,32 Ohio St.2d 266
Docket NumberBORG-WARNER,INGERSOLL-HUMPHRYES,No. 72-238,72-238
Parties, 61 O.O.2d 493 PHILLIPS, Appellee, v.DIVISION,CORP., Appellant, et al.
Decision Date15 December 1972

Syllabus by the Court

1. Exposure to the hazards created by extreme cold and wind resulting in a workman's weakened resistance to infectious virus, even though it may represent a derangement of his bodily functions, cannot be considered an 'injury' within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.

2. The term 'injury' as used in R.C. §§ 4123.519 and 4123.01(C), does not include or contemplate a disease.

3. In an appeal to the Court of Common Pleas from a ruling by the Industrial Commission denying a award of compensation, the appellant must establish that he has received an injury, and that it was the proximate cause of his disability.

Virgil Phillips, a crane operator employed by Ingersoll-Humphryes Division, Borg-Warner Corporation in its Mansfield yard, filed a claim with the Industrial Commission based on disability allegedly resulting from exposure while in the performance of his work on December 15, 1962.

On that day, Phillips was required to sit and operate a crane in an enclosure, approximately 200 feet long and 57 feet wide, with walls 55 to 60 feet high, being an enclosed scrap iron yard which was not heated. The cabin of the crane in which Phillips was seated was about 44 feet from the ground, had several windows which were broken out, and a heater which did not function. Phillips was required to operate the crane, the temperature ranged from approximately 8 degrees below zero to 8 or 9 degrees above zero, and severe winds were blowing through the enclosure and the crane itself. Phillips' disability from exposure is described as acute viremina, with resulting ataxia of lower limbs.

The Administrator of the Bureau of Workmen's Compensation disallowed the claim; the regional board of review affirmed the order of the administrator; and an appeal was taken to the Court of Common Pleas.

In the Court of Common Pleas, at the close of plaintiff's opening statement, the court sustained defendant's motion for directed verdict and rendered judgment for defendant. Apparently, the basis for that judgment was that plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action, or to show that he had suffered an injury which was compensable under the Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act.

The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the cause to the Court of Common Pleas, for further proceedings according to law.

This cause is now before this court upon appeal, pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.

Rader & Matthews, Mansfield, Kenneth Agee and Harry Paulion, Columbus, for appellee.

Squire, Sanders & Dempsey and James Van Carson, Cleveland, for appellant.

LLOYD O. BROWN, Justice.

Appellee's first contention is that the trial court committed error in sustaining appellant's motion for a directed verdict.

Appellee argues that his petition and opening statement contain sufficient facts to warrant submission of the case to a jury. Appellee cites Neckel v. Fox (1924), 110 Ohio St. 150, 143 N.E. 389, and quotes therefrom language which indicates that a trial court should not accept a motion for directed verdict where the facts are so meagerly stated that the nature of the claim cannot be determined. Appellee contends that the opening statement and petition do contain sufficient facts to warrant submission of the case to the jury. Moreover, Neckel v. Fox, supra, is further distinguishable, inasmuch as this court, in Pitts v. Cincinnati Metropolitan Housing Authority (1953), 160 Ohio St. 129, 113 N.E.2d 869, affirmed a directed verdict at the close of an opening statement. There, the facts were not so meagerly stated as to prevent the trial court from determining the character of the suit.

We, therefore, disagree with appellee's first contention and conclude that where a decision is rendered on defendant's motion for a directed verdict, made at the close of plaintiff's opening statement, the court does not commit error in granting the motion, if, engaging in every reasonable inference from facts favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed, the proposed proof would not sustain a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Appellee asserts also that, pursuant to R.C. § 4123.95, courts are required to liberally construe workmen's compensation statutes in favor of claimants. We are not persuaded by this argument.

Appropriate to this discussion is Szekely v. Young (1963), 174 Ohio St. 213, 188 N.E.2d 424. The second paragraph of the syllabus provides:

'A direction to liberally construe a statute in favor of certain parties will not authorize a court to read into the statute something which cannot reasonably be implied from the language of the statute.'

Consequently, in construing factual situations, court cannot bring unwarranted complainants within the spirit of a statute.

The second contention by appellee is the heart of the controversy herein. Appellee contends that he suffered an injury, with certain consequences, caused by his being subjected to extremely cold winds and temperature while working, and that his disability (physical and traumatic injury to circulatory and respiratory systems with either subsequent complications or aggravation of a pre-existing condition), * accidental in character and result, is an injury entitling him to the right to appeal to the Common Pleas Court under R.C. § 4123.519, and to compensation for 'injury,' as defined in R.C. § 4123.01(C).

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