Phillips v. Iowa Dist. Court for Johnson County

• Decision Date: 15 January 1986
• Docket Number: No. 84-1832,84-1832
• Citation: 380 N.W.2d 706
• Parties: Marsha PHILLIPS, Plaintiff, v. IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR JOHNSON COUNTY, Defendant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 706

380 N.W.2d 706

54 USLW 2455

Marsha PHILLIPS, Plaintiff, v.IOWA DISTRICT COURT FOR JOHNSON COUNTY, Defendant.

No. 84-1832.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 15, 1986.

Patricia C. Kamath, Iowa City, for plaintiff.

John T. Nolan, Iowa City, for defendant.

Considered by UHLENHOPP, P.J., and HARRIS, LARSON, CARTER, and WOLLE, JJ.

WOLLE, Justice.

We granted certiorari to determine whether the district court erred in finding plaintiff in contempt and punishing her for violating the visitation provisions of a dissolution decree.Plaintiff contends (1) that a purpose of this contempt proceeding was to punish her for violating the decree, therefore contempt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt to satisfy due process, and (2) that the contempt order violated Iowa Code section 598.23(1985) because it imposed as punishments both a fourteen day jail sentence and modification of the dissolution decree.We find merit in both contentions and sustain the writ.

On May 22, 1984, the district court entered a decree of dissolution ending the marriage of William Munn and Marsha Munn(now Marsha Phillips, the plaintiff herein).The court decreed that William and Marsha should have joint custody of the two minor children of the marriage, with Marsha having physical custody subject to William's liberal visitation rights.Detailed provisions governing the joint custody arrangement and visitation were set out in the dissolution decree.

During the following four months Marsha moved with the children to Texas, and William had great difficulty exercising visitation rights or even contacting Marsha and the children.During that time William twice filed motions requesting that Marsha be found in contempt.On October 4, 1984, William filed a third application for an order citing Marsha for contempt, supported by an affidavit alleging that Marsha had willfully refused to honor the visitation provisions of the dissolution decree.On the same day he also filed an application for modification of the dissolution decree, seeking physical custody of the two children.Marsha denied that she was in contempt of court, and the hearing on both the contempt and modification requests was held before the defendant judge on November 20, 1984.

After receiving evidence and hearing arguments of counselthe court issued a ruling in the contempt proceeding finding by clear and convincing evidence that Marsha was in contempt and should be punished.The court sentenced Marsha to serve a period of fourteen days in jail and also granted William twenty-one consecutive days of visitation to make up for the visitation he previously had lost because of Marsha's abrupt move to Texas.The court took under advisement William's petition for modification of the decree.At Marsha's request we granted her petition for a writ of certiorari and stayed enforcement of the contempt order pending our certiorari review.

Marsha has challenged the contempt ruling on several grounds.She contends that she was denied due process when the finding of contempt was based on evidence that was only deemed "clear and convincing" rather than "beyond a reasonable doubt."She argues that the order violated section 598.23 because it punished her in two ways, combining a jail sentence with modification of the decree's visitation provisions.She also contends that she received inadequate notice that a finding of contempt could result in a jail sentence.

I.The Proof Required.

Until today our court has consistently upheld the use of the clear and satisfactory evidence standard for proof of contempt.See, e.g., Callenius v. Blair, 309 N.W.2d 415, 419(Iowa1981);Lutz v. Darbyshire, 297 N.W.2d 349, 353(Iowa1980);Brown v. District Court, 158 N.W.2d 744, 748(Iowa1968);Huston v. Huston, 255 Iowa 543, 549, 122 N.W.2d 892, 896(1963).When a finding of contempt has been challenged on appeal, we have examined the evidence to ensure that proof of contempt was clear and satisfactory.Callenius, 309 N.W.2d at 419.We noted in a recent case, however, that many other courts require proof beyond a reasonable doubt before a person can be found in contempt and punished for nonpayment of child support.Skinner v. Ruigh, 351 N.W.2d 182, 185 n. 1(Iowa1984)(referencing cases from other jurisdictions).Here we are presented with the question alluded to but not addressed in Skinner--whether due process requires that contempt be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before the court may impose sanctions which punish the contemnor, even though the contempt arises from the alleged violation of a decree in a civil proceeding.

Marsha argues that due process under the Iowa Constitution and the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution requires that there be proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the elements of contempt when the proceeding may lead to a jail sentence or other punishment of a criminal nature.Marsha's constitutional argument has solid underpinnings.In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375(1970), squarely held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal proceeding is a requirement of constitutional magnitude:

Lest there remain any doubt about the constitutional stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged.

Winship was a juvenile delinquency proceeding, not a contempt action, but Marsha points out that the same potential for deprivation of liberty that is present in criminal cases was also present in this contempt proceeding.Marsha was punished for past behavior, disobedience of the dissolution decree, by being sent to jail and having her rights under the dissolution decree modified.The jail sentence had all the earmarks of punishment imposed following conviction of a crime.

Many appellate courts have attempted to draw a meaningful line of distinction between civil and criminal contempt proceedings, in an attempt to provide guidance for trial courts which must determine the extent to which substantive and procedural safeguards must be furnished to the alleged contemnor.Martineau, Contempt of Court: Eliminating the Confusion Between Civil and Criminal Contempt, 50 Cin.L.Rev. 677, 681(1981).The United States Supreme Court has explained:

When the petitioners carry "the keys of their prison in their own pockets," the action "is essentially a civil remedy designed for the benefit of other parties and has quite properly been exercised for centuries to secure compliance with judicial decrees."In short if the petitioners had chosen to obey the order they would not have faced jail....

....

... Courts often speak in terms of criminal contempt and punishment for remedial purposes."It is not the fact of punishment but rather its character and purpose that often serve to distinguish" civil from criminal contempt....While any imprisonment, of course, has punitive and deterrent effects, it must be viewed as remedial if the court conditions release upon the contemnor's willingness to testify.

Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 368-70, 86 S.Ct. 1531, 1534-35, 16 L.Ed.2d 622, 626-27(1966)(citations omitted).

The principal effect of the distinction those courts make is that certain constitutional safeguards, such as the requirement that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, are required in "criminal" contempt proceedings, but not proceedings involving only "civil" contempt.SeeGompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444, 31 S.Ct. 492, 499, 55 L.Ed. 797, 807(1911);Dobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CornellL.Rev. 183, 238, 243(1971);Martineau, supra, at 681 n. 28.(1981).

Recent Iowa cases, however, have cut through this blurred and often nebulous distinction by treating all contempts as "quasi-criminal."See, e.g., McNabb v. Osmundson, 315 N.W.2d 9, 11-14(Iowa1982)(upholding indigent's constitutional right to appointment of counsel when "predictive evaluation" suggests that contempt citation may result in jail term);Lutz v. Darbyshire, 297 N.W.2d at 353-54("Contempt proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in nature even when they generate from civil cases.");Knox v. Municipal Court, 185 N.W.2d 705, 707(Iowa1971)("As we treat all contempts as quasi-criminal in Iowa, this sometimes nebulous distinction [between civil and criminal contempts] is no longer of significance.").

In Wilson v. Fenton, 312 N.W.2d 524(Iowa1981), we explained that our governing statutes, Iowa Code chapter 665 and such other statutes as apply specific punishments for contempt, have constructively repealed the common law of contempt and treat all contempts as criminal in nature even when they arise from civil cases.

Consequently the sanctions are not compensatory as they might be in a civil contempt proceeding.SeeDobbs, Contempt of Court: A Survey, 56 CornellL.Rev. 183,...