Phillips v. Metro Transit Agency
| Decision Date | 23 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 20-cv-744-JPG |
| Parties | CLINT PHILLIPS, III, Plaintiff, v. METRO TRANSIT AGENCY, SECURITAS SECURITY COMPANY, and DENNIS BURNS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
This matter comes before the Court on the motions of defendants Metro Transit Agency (“Metro”) (Doc. 30) and Securitas Security Company (“Securitas”) (Doc 37) to dismiss the complaint of plaintiff Clint Phillips, III on a variety of grounds. They also ask the Court to strike certain material and to direct Phillips to make a more definite statement of his claims. Phillips has responded to the motions (Doc. 42).
Metro and Securitas ask the Court to dismiss Phillips's claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).
Rule 12(b)(1) governs challenges to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants' challenge is a facial challenge to the sufficiency of the complaint's jurisdictional allegations as a matter of law, in which case all well-pleaded factual allegations are accepted as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Lee v. City of Chi., 330 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2003).
Similarly, Rule 12(b)(6), which governs the sufficiency of the pleading to state a claim, requires that the Court accept as true all allegations in the complaint. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). To avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This requirement is satisfied if the complaint (1) describes the claim in sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level. Bell Atl., 550 U.S. at 555; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
This standard, however, will not prevent dismissal of a complaint that pleads too much. A case can be dismissed because a complaint pleads facts establishing that the defendant is entitled to prevail. Bennett v. Schmidt, 153 F.3d 516, 519 (7th Cir. 1998); see Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 588 (7th Cir. 2009) ().
Taking all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences in Phillips's favor, the Complaint establishes the following relevant facts.
On March 27, 2015, Phillips was a passenger on a Metro train passing through the Fairview Heights, Illinois, station. Defendant Dennis Burns, an employee of Metro and Securitas, asked to see his pass or fare card, and Phillips produced a monthly reduced fare pass showing he was disabled. Burns took the pass and made Phillips get off the train. Phillips later complained to Metro's headquarters, but never heard anything about an investigation.
Phillips filed this lawsuit in July 2020 claiming that, by the above conduct, the defendants violated the Americans With Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; his rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution; and Illinois state law prohibiting false imprisonment. The Court also construes his complaint to contain a claim under the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794, which essentially parallels the ADA without the “thorny question of sovereign immunity” but with the additional requirement that the defendant have received federal funds. See Jaros v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 684 F.3d 667, 671-72 (7th Cir. 2012). Phillips expressly seeks $16 million in punitive damages for reckless and malicious disregard for his rights.
The Court first turns to the parties' arguments regarding subject matter jurisdiction, a threshold requirement in every federal case. Crawford v. United States, 796 F.2d 924, 929 (7th Cir. 1986) (). If it determines there is subject matter jurisdiction, it will then turn to the statute of limitations argument and, if necessary, the remaining arguments.
Metro and Securitas ask for dismissal-Metro, of all the claims, and Securitas, of only the ADA and RA claims-because the Court cannot award punitive damages, the only relief Phillips has specifically requested in his complaint. They argue that the Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to decide the case.
It is true that the Court cannot award punitive damages as a remedy in private suits under Title II of the ADA or under the RA. Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 189-90 (2002). It is also true that political subdivisions/municipalities/local public entities-like Metro asserts it is-are not subject to punitive damages for the kinds of claims Phillips asserts: Title VII suits, see Passananti v. Cook Cnty., 689 F.3d 655, 677, (7th Cir. 2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1)); § 1983 suits, see City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981); and Illinois tort suits, see Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (“Tort Immunity Act”), 745 ILCS 10/2-102 (“a local public entity is not liable to pay punitive or exemplary damages. . . .”); Hubble v. Bi-State Dev. Agency of Ill.-Mo. Metro. Dist., 938 N.E.2d 483, 497 (Ill. 2010) ( Tort Immunity Act applicable to Metro).
Nevertheless, the inability to award a specific remedy does not impact the Court's subject matter jurisdiction where other remedies are available. Contrary to the defendants' belief, the Court is not limited to awarding the specific relief requested in a plaintiff's complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(c) (); 735 ILCS 5/2-604.2(c) (). Because the Court may still be able to award some type of relief to Phillips, there is no jurisdictional problem.
Metro and Securitas ask the Court to dismiss this case because it was filed five years after the incident in question, well beyond the statutes of limitations for Phillips's claims. They note that Phillips asserts the statutes of limitations should be tolled because he was disabled during those five years. However, the defendants note that Phillips filed eleven other lawsuits in that time period, which demonstrates he did not lack the ability to file a lawsuit recognizing and expressing his grievances and articulating how he believed they violated the law. Those lawsuits were all dismissed as frivolous, for failure to state a claim, or for failure to comply with a court order.[1]
Indeed, the majority of Phillips's claims are subject to a two-year statute of limitations. Most of his federal causes of action-under the RA, the ADA, and § 1983- borrow the statute of limitations for personal injury, including the tolling rules, from the law of the state where the incident occurred. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387, 394 (2007) (§ 1983); Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 721-22 (7th Cir. 2017) (§ 1983); Rutledge v. Ill. Dep't of Hum. Servs., 785 F.3d 258, 260 (7th Cir. 2015) (RA); Soignier v. Am. Bd. of Plastic Surgery, 92 F.3d 547, 551 (7th Cir. 1996) (ADA). Phillips's causes of action accrued in Illinois, where the incident occurred, so the applicable statute of limitations is two years. 735 ILCS 5/13-202 (). Phillips's state law cause of action for false imprisonment under Illinois law is expressly governed by the same two-year statute of limitations. Id. ().
The incident in question occurred in March 2015, so absent some kind of tolling, the foregoing statutes of limitations expired in March 2017. Phillips argues that his statute of limitations was tolled because he was, and continues to be, disabled. Under Illinois tolling rules, “If the person entitled to bring an action, specified in Sections 13-201 through 13-210 of this Code at the time the cause of action accrued, is . . . under a legal disability, then he or she may bring the action within 2 years after . . . the disability is removed.” 735 ILCS 5/13-211(a); see Parks v. Kownacki, 737 N.E.2d 287, 295 (Ill. 2000).
Various Illinois courts have opined on what “legal disability” means for limitations purposes. One court has held, “A person suffers from a ‘legal disability' where he or she is entirely without understanding or capacity to make or communicate decisions regarding his person and totally unable to manage his [or her] estate or financial affairs.” Hochbaum v. Casiano, 686 N.E.2d 626, 631 (Ill.App.Ct. 1997) (internal quotations omitted). That court further noted that a plaintiff is not legally disabled if he “can comprehend the nature of the injury and its implications.” Id. One Illinois trial court instructed a jury that a “legally disabled” person “was incapable of managing her person or property and could not comprehend her rights or the nature of the act giving rise to her cause of action.” Tardi v. Henry, 571 N.E.2d 1020, 1028 (Ill.App.Ct. 1991).
Metro first argues that its organizational nature prevents the application of Illinois statute of limitations...
To continue reading
Request your trial