Phillips v. Parke, Davis & Co.
| Citation | 869 F.2d 407 |
| Decision Date | 12 April 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 88-2080,88-2080 |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
| Parties | Prod.Liab.Rep.(CCH)P 12,070 Henry E. PHILLIPS, Appellant, v. PARKE, DAVIS & COMPANY, Deseret Medical Co., Appellees. |
Robert S. Blatt, Fort Smith, Ark., for appellant.
G. Alan Wooten, Fort Smith, Ark., for appellee.
Before McMILLIAN and BEAM, Circuit Judges, and WHIPPLE, * District Judge.
Henry E. Phillips appeals from a final judgment entered in the District Court 1 for the Western District of Arkansas upon a jury verdict finding in favor of Parke, Davis & Co. and Deseret Medical Co. (collectively referred to as Parke Davis) on On February 28, 1986, Henry E. Phillips was hospitalized at Sparks Regional Medical Center in Fort Smith, Arkansas, for treatment of a pancreatic abscess. Phillips was critically ill, and on March 3, 1986, he underwent surgery for treatment of his condition. As a result of his illness and treatment thereof, Phillips had to be fed intravenously. A subclavian jugular catheter manufactured and distributed by Parke Davis was used on Phillips in the intravenous procedure known as hyperalimentation.
Phillips' claim that Parke Davis manufactured a defective, unreasonably dangerous product; was negligent; and breached implied and express warranties. For reversal, Phillips argues that the district court erred in (1) instructing the jury on the defense of intervening cause and (2) denying his alternative motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (jnov) or a new trial. For the reasons discussed below, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
On April 17, 1986, the catheter separated at the juncture of the hinged snap-on adapter and the cannula of the catheter, allowing air to enter the catheter. Phillips suffered an air embolus, resulting in brain damage and a probable stroke. Later on during his hospitalization, an abscess developed on the left side of Phillips' brain. The medical testimony was equivocal on whether the air embolus had caused his brain abscess.
Phillips' permanent injuries include mild paralysis and loss of coordination in his right arm. He also suffers from marked clumsiness and weakness as well as sensory loss in his left leg.
Phillips brought this diversity action in federal district court alleging strict products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty under Arkansas state law. Before the case was submitted to the jury, an instruction conference was held at which time the district court judge distributed a packet of proposed jury instructions to counsel and asked for specific objections. Included in the packet was Arkansas Model Jury Instruction (AMI) 503 which states:
Defendant contends and has the burden of proving that following any act or omission on his part an event intervened which in itself caused damage completely independent of his conduct. If you so find, then his act or omission was not a proximate cause of any damage resulting from the intervening event.
Phillips' counsel did not object to the inclusion of AMI 503 in the instruction packet and concedes that he did not "specifically carefully enough [sic] read through the packet ... to find this instruction."
Counsel for Parke Davis asked during the instruction conference if the district court intended to give AMI 503. The district court replied in the negative because, in its estimation, the issue of intervening cause was not in the case. According to the district court, any evidence of misuse by doctors installing the catheter was evidence of foreseeable misuse which, under Arkansas law, is not an intervening cause.
Despite its ruling on this matter, the district court inadvertently read AMI 503 to the jury because it had been included in the packet of proposed instructions, none of which had been objected to by Phillips' counsel. Phillips' counsel was present when the instructions were read to the jury and also failed to object to AMI 503 at that time. After the jury had deliberated for about two hours, the district court discovered its mistake and informed counsel. Phillips' counsel asked the district court to recall the jury and withdraw the instruction while counsel for Parke Davis argued that the jury would only be confused by such an act.
After hearing the arguments of counsel, the district court ruled that it would not withdraw the instruction. It based its ruling on the fact that Phillips' counsel had two opportunities to object to submission of AMI 503 to the jury and had failed to do so. The district court also ruled that by requesting Instruction 28A, Phillips' counsel had injected the issue of intervening cause into the case and therefore could not complain that the issue had been improperly submitted. Instruction 28A stated the following You are instructed that foreseeable misuse by third parties is not a defense to Henry Phillips' cause of action against the defendants.
Phillips' counsel had, therefore, waived any objection to AMI 503.
The jury returned a verdict on special interrogatories in favor of Parke Davis on all four counts. Phillips moved alternatively for jnov or a new trial on the grounds that the jury was improperly instructed and that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence. The district court denied both motions. This appeal followed.
Phillips argues that when the district court refused to withdraw the intervening cause instruction, it erroneously allowed the jury to consider an issue that was unsupported by the evidence, thus introducing conflict and confusion into the deliberative process. He contends that he did not waive his objection by remaining silent during both the instruction conference and the reading of the instruction to the jury. Phillips argues that the chronology of events was not as the district court found and that, in fact, the district court first stated that an intervening cause instruction would not be given and then distributed the packet of proposed instructions while asking for specific objections. Phillips maintains that his counsel properly relied on the district court's assurances that AMI 503 would not be given and cannot, therefore, be faulted for failing to object to inclusion of AMI 503 in the instruction packet and to its reading to the jury. We disagree.
Fed.R.Civ.P. 51 states in pertinent part "[n]o party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction...
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