Phillips v. Phillips

• Decision Date: 08 June 1943
• Citation: 13 So.2d 922,153 Fla. 133
• Parties: PHILLIPS v. PHILLIPS
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

13 So.2d 922

153 Fla. 133

PHILLIPS v. PHILLIPS

Florida Supreme Court

June 8, 1943

Appeal from Circuit Court, Orange County; Frank A. Smith judge.

Murray W. Overstreet, of Kissimee, for appellant.

H. N Roth, of Orlando, for appellee.

BUFORD, Chief Justice.

On appeal we review order of the Chancellor entered February 19, 1943, awarding custody of a minor boy child to the mother, with directions that the child should be allowed to visit his father for the first week in each and every month after February 28, 1943 and requiring the father to pay to the mother $25 per month for the support of the child, said payment to be made on the first day of each month beginning with the month of March 1943. This order and decree was a modification of part of the final decree entered on October 12, 1942, wherein the court adjudged as follows:

'It is further ordered that the care, custody and control of the minor child of said union, to-wit: Gary Newton Phillips, be and the same is hereby awarded to the Defendant, subject, however, to the right of the Plaintiff to visit said child, and said child to visit the Plaintiff at any and all reasonable times.'

The decree of October 12, 1942, was final decree in a divorce proceeding wherein plaintiff, Beatrice M. Phillips, procured a divorce from the defendant Donald L. Phillips. At the time of the filing of the bill for divorce, September 7, 1942, it was alleged that the minor child was then seventeen months of age. It was living with its father in the home of the father's parents. There is no showing in the record that either parent is not a fit and proper person to have custody and control of the child or that each parent is not in position to furnish the child a comfortable home and proper surroundings. The mother remarried a few days after the final decree of divorce, supra, and this constitutes the only material change in the condition of the parties since the final decree of October 12, 1942, was entered.

It appears that in the entry of the final decree the Chancellor awarded the custody of the child to the father in deference to the well established rule that, all other things being, equal, the welfare of the child is the court's prime object and main concern. See Mehaffey v. Mehaffey, 143 Fla.

157, 196 So. 416; Fields v. Fields, 143 Fla. 886, 197 So. 530.

So it is that the terms of the final decree not only appear to have been just and right but the record also shows that it met with the approval and approbation of, and was agreed to by, both parties to the suit at that time.

The order of modification in effect divides custody of the child by allowing the father to have it in his parents' home for the first week in each month and the mother to have it the balance of the time. We cannot close our eyes to a condition which our common knowledge of man and affairs has taught all people generally affects the interests of a child. There can be no doubt that experience shows that it is detrimental to the best interest of a young child to have its custody and control shifted often from one household to another and to be changed often from the discipline and teachings which are attempted to be imparted by one custodian to that other discipline and teachings sought to be imparted by another custodian. The result is, in most cases, to confuse the child, cause it to doubt where constituted authority lies and to largely disregard the precepts which either custodian attempts to exercise.

We have reflected here one of the most unfortunate of all unfortunate conditions which follow the disruption of the marriage estate where there is a young child, or are young children, of the union. Too often the innocent child becomes the...