Phillips v. Scully
| Decision Date | 21 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 22-00125-TFM-B |
| Parties | MICHAEL BENJAMIN PHILLIPS, BCSCC # 20007708, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM E. SCULLY, JR., et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Alabama |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Michael Benjamin Phillips, a Baldwin County Sheriff's Corrections Center inmate who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1988 and 28 U.S.C. § 1343. This action has been referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge for appropriate action pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1)(B) and S.D. Ala. GenLR 72(a)(2)(R). Upon careful review, it is recommended that this action be DISMISSED without prejudice, prior to service of process, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and (ii), because Phillips's claims are either frivolous or fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
The amended complaint that is presently before the Court (Doc. 5) was filed at the Court's directive after it was determined that Phillips's initial complaint was deficient. (See Doc. 4). In the amended complaint, Phillips names as Defendants William E. Scully, Jr., District Court Judge for Baldwin County, Alabama; Jody Wise Campbell, the Circuit Court Clerk for Baldwin County, Alabama; and Baldwin County, Alabama. (Doc. 5 at 10). Phillips states that his claims arose between October 31, 2020 and February 14, 2022. (Id. at 4) .
According to Phillips, after he was returned to jail on October 31, 2020, Judge Scully denied him the 72-hour hearing required by Ala. R. Crim. P. 4.3 and 7.5. (Id.). Phillips asserts that because no hearing was held on November 3, 2020, no determination was made as to whether he was guilty or not guilty of violating a condition of his release, and therefore no reason existed to hold him without bond. (Id.).
Phillips contends that previously, on September 10, 2020, his attorney, Donald Doett, Jr., moved for a preliminary hearing, but a hearing was not held until approximately 135 days later, on January 22, 2021, in violation of Ala. R. Crim. P. 5.1(a), (c), and (d). (Id. at 5). Phillips alleges that this delay caused him to be held at the Baldwin County Sheriff's Corrections Center for 84 of the 135 days. (Id.). Phillips asserts that Judge Scully would not allow him to testify at the preliminary hearing on January 22, 2021, and that this violated his rights under Ala. Const. § 6 and Ala. R. Crim. P. 5.3(a). (Id.).
Phillips further alleges that on December 17, 2021, Judge Scully denied his motion for a speedy trial with an order stating: (Id.). As a result, Phillips, on December 20, 2021, filed a motion with the circuit court and sent a letter to a circuit court judge with a copy of Judge Scully's order stating that the district court no longer had jurisdiction, and Phillips requested a “remedy from Judge Scully's errors and wrongdoings.” (Id.). According to Phillips, Defendant Campbell did not refer the motion or the letter to a circuit court judge; instead, she referred them to Judge Scully, who denied the motion. (Id.). Phillips alleges that this constituted a conflict of interest according to the U.S. Const. amend. VI and Ala. R. Crim. P. 8.1. (Id.).
According to Phillips, on January 9, 2022, he sent the circuit court a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to Ala. Code § 15-21-6, which requires that habeas petitions be addressed to the nearest circuit court judge. (Id. at 6) . Phillips contends that he addressed the petition to Judge Stankoski, who was the nearest circuit judge, but upon receipt of the petition, Defendant Campbell filed it and sent it to Judge Scully, about whom the petition was complaining. (Id.). On January 10, 2022, Judge Scully denied the petition and stated in his order: “District court no long[er] has Jurisdiction.” (Id.). Phillips contends that this is evidence that Judge Scully acted outside his jurisdiction. (Id.). Phillips maintains that the petition should not have been referred to Judge Scully and should instead have been directed to the addressee, Judge Stankoski, or to another circuit court judge. (Id.).
Phillips states that on January 11, 2022, he wrote Defendant Campbell and informed her that his petition for writ of habeas corpus was handled incorrectly and that “he would file with the Southern federal court if errors [weren't] corrected.” (Id.). Phillips asserts that on January 12, 2022, Defendant Campbell ”rushed copies and paperwork to [him] so he could refile his petition” because she knew that errors had been made. (Id.). Rather than refiling his state habeas petition, Phillips filed a habeas petition in federal court.[1] (Id. at 6-7).
Phillips alleges that on January 23, 2022, he wrote Defendant Campbell a letter complaining about not receiving a response to his motions, and that Defendant Campbell returned the letter to him and wrote on the top of the letter that “the Judge didn't respond.” (Id. at 7). Phillips further asserts that on January 25, 2022, he wrote Defendant Campbell complaining about Judge Scully's treatment of him and requested to file a grievance, to seek an administrative remedy, and to appeal Judge Scully's decision, but he did not receive a response. (Id.). Additionally, Phillips alleges that on February 3, 2022, he again wrote Defendant Campbell complaining about disappearing motions and again raising the matters complained of in his prior letter of January 25, 2022. (Id.). In response, she returned the letter with a note stating: (Id.). According to Phillips, Defendant Campbell did not respond to the other matters he raised. (Id.).
Phillips contends that Judge Scully and Defendant Campbell “had it worked out to where no letters, complaints, petitions, or motions made it past Judge Scully, no matter who[m] they were addressed to, or whos[e] jurisdiction it fell under.” (Id.). He also alleges that Judge Scully denied everything he sent in, and that Defendant Campbell refused to send “things” anywhere other than to Judge Scully and refused to allow him to appeal, file a grievance, or seek an administrative remedy. (Id.). Phillips contends that Defendant Campbell aided Judge Scully in depriving him of his civil rights in a “conspiracy” to interfere with his civil rights. (Id. at 7-8) .
Phillips asserts that Judge Scully's actions were “an unconstitutional exercise of his [judicial] authority,” and that Judge Scully's “discriminatory decisions clearly violated established constitutional laws, and set in motion a series of events [that Judge Scully] knew would deprive [Phillips] of his constitutional rights, such as Due Process and Equal [P]rotection.” (Id. at 8). Moreover, Phillips contends that Judge Scully “stepped outside of his jurisdiction [when he] acted . . . outside of the established laws govern[ing] the proceeding[s] in all Alabama courts . . . .” (Id.) .
Phillips seeks injunctive and declaratory relief; nominal, compensatory, and punitive damages; statutory damages; and administrative actions if monetary relief is not granted to prevent a repeat of the actions alleged. (Id. at 9).
Because Phillips is proceeding in forma pauperis, the Court is reviewing his amended complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), a claim may be dismissed as “frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A claim is frivolous as a matter of law where, inter alia, the defendants are immune from suit, or when the claim seeks to enforce a right that clearly does not exist. Id. at 327.
Moreover, a complaint may be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1490 (11th Cir. 1997). To avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the allegations must show plausibility. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 557 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). That is, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and must be a “‘plain statement' possess[ing] enough heft to ‘sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557 (last brackets in original). “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
When considering a pro se litigant's allegations, a court construes them liberally, giving them more leniency than those drafted by an attorney. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam). However, this “does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an action.” Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, a court treats as true a plaintiff's factual allegations, but it does not treat as true conclusory assertions or a recitation of a cause of action's elements. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681. In addition, a pro se litigant “is subject to the relevant law and rules of court, including the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989).
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