Phillips v. Virginia Bd. of Medicine, Civ. A. No. 90-1007-A.
| Citation | 749 F. Supp. 715 |
| Decision Date | 01 November 1990 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 90-1007-A. |
| Parties | Alice T. PHILLIPS, M.D., Plaintiff, v. VIRGINIA BOARD OF MEDICINE, and Virginia Department of Health Professions, and Bernard L. Henderson, Jr., Director, Virginia Department of Health Professions, and Hilary H. Connor, M.D., Executive Director, Virginia Board of Medicine, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Victor M. Glasberg, Jeanne Goldberg, Victor M. Glasberg & Associates, Alexandria, Va., for plaintiff.
Mary Sue Terry, Atty. Gen., Jessica Sanders Jones, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Howard M. Casway, Lynne R. Fleming, Asst. Attys. Gen., Office of the Attorney General, Richmond, Va., for defendants.
This suit by a psychiatrist to enjoin the State of Virginia from revoking her medical license raises an unsettled question under the Younger abstention doctrine.1 Plaintiff, a Virginia resident, is licensed by the Virginia Board of Medicine (the "Board") to practice psychiatry in the Commonwealth. She seeks injunctive relief in this Court to save her medical license, alleging that the Board's revocation decision was unconstitutionally based on plaintiff's belief in, and practice of, fundamentalist Christianity. The Board, as a threshold matter, urges the Court to abstain from consideration of plaintiff's federal constitutional claim pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine and to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Alternatively, the Board seeks dismissal or summary judgment, arguing that its revocation of plaintiff's license is not infected with any unconstitutional considerations and rests instead on facts, independent of plaintiff's religious beliefs, that demonstrate plaintiff's unfitness to practice medicine. Plaintiff responds that Younger is inapplicable here and that the Board's action is flagrantly unconstitutional.
For the reasons set forth here, the Court concludes that Younger and its progeny counsel abstention where, as here, a plaintiff files a federal court constitutional challenge to an ongoing state enforcement proceeding. The Court therefore abstains from deciding the constitutional claim presented here and dismisses plaintiff's complaint without prejudice.
Plaintiff is a board-certified psychiatrist who terms herself a "born again" fundamentalist Christian. Until July 24, 1990, plaintiff was licensed to practice psychiatry in Virginia.
Four defendants are named. They are (i) the Board, (ii) the Virginia Department of Health Professions (the "Department"), (iii) Bernard L. Henderson, Jr., the director of the Board, and (iv) Hilary Connor, M.D., the director of the Department.2 Defendants are state agencies and individuals charged with the licensure of medical doctors in Virginia.
In March 1989, by written notice, the Board advised plaintiff of certain charges against her, including (i) the inappropriate introduction of religious themes and modalities into her psychiatric work with three of her patients, (ii) the improper maintenance of simultaneous religious as well as professional relationships with patients from 1986 through 1988, and (iii) impermissible self-prescription of certain controlled medications. Thereafter, on May 18, 1989, before a panel consisting of defendants' agents, an informal hearing was conducted. At that hearing, plaintiff was represented by counsel, and she acknowledged in her opening statement that she had over-stepped the proper line of demarcation between her private religious beliefs and her professional responsibilities as a psychiatrist. She informed the Board that she would immediately conform her practice to professional standards in that regard.
In September 1989, plaintiff received a second notice advising her of charges essentially identical to those in the March 1989 notice. Pursuant to that notice, another informal hearing was conducted in October 1989. Again, plaintiff was represented by counsel, and she acknowledged the inappropriateness of her behavior and expressed her desire and intention to conform her psychiatric practices to professional standards. At that time, the Board proposed that plaintiff enter into a consent order subjecting her to certain supervisory conditions, but fully preserving her right to retain her license and practice psychiatry. Plaintiff declined to accept the consent order and instead requested a formal review of her case. Pursuant to plaintiff's request, the Board ordered a formal hearing before a hearing officer. At that hearing, plaintiff, as she had at the two prior informal proceedings, expressly stipulated that her introduction of religious themes into her therapeutic work had been inappropriate and that she had ceased such behavior and would henceforth strictly adhere to the November 1989 American Psychiatric Association's Guidelines governing religion and psychiatry.
On June 29, 1990, the hearing officer issued his written decision in plaintiff's case. The officer found that plaintiff had violated several provisions of the laws governing the conduct and licensure of doctors in Virginia, a conclusion that plaintiff does not dispute.3 One of those provisions states that a practitioner "shall be considered guilty of unprofessional conduct if he ... is unable to practice with reasonable skill or safety because of illness or substance abuse." § 54.1-2914.A.11. The hearing officer determined that this provision had been violated, and stated in his report:
The rationale that § 54.1-2914.A.11. is violated, is premised on the conclusion that respondent's acts were influenced by her seasonal mood disorder, the medications taken therefore, and/or that her extreme, aberrant (cockamamy) religious beliefs and practices evidence illness.
Hearing Officer's Decision, June 29, 1990, at 111-12. Later in the decision the hearing officer again stated his view that plaintiff's "extreme, aberrant religious beliefs and practices evidence illness" that rendered her unfit to practice medicine and thus in violation of Va.Code § 54.1-2914.A.11. Id. at 114.
Plaintiff appealed the hearing officer's decision to the Board, which conducted formal hearings on July 21 and 22, 1990. Plaintiff was again represented by counsel at these hearings. On July 23, 1990, the Board orally announced its decision to revoke plaintiff's license. On July 25, 1990, plaintiff filed with this Court her Complaint and a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO"), seeking to restrain the Board from issuing an order revoking plaintiff's license. On July 27, 1990, defendants filed a Motion to Deny plaintiff's request for a TRO and a Motion to Dismiss plaintiff's complaint.
This matter came before the Court on July 27, 1990, on the parties' motions. Both parties, having received notice of the hearing, appeared by counsel. At oral argument, the Court determined that events had overtaken plaintiff's request for a TRO, as the Board, by Order dated July 24, 1990, had already revoked plaintiff's medical license. Thus, the Court denied plaintiff's request for a TRO as moot and took defendant's Motion to Dismiss under advisement. Because the Board had previously offered to enter into a consent order with plaintiff, the Court directed the parties to meet, confer and attempt to resolve the matter and to advise the Court, not later than August 10, 1990, of the results of their efforts. Subsequently, the parties advised the Court of their inability to reach an agreement. Accordingly, defendant's Motion to Dismiss came again before the Court.
On or about September 11, 1990, plaintiff filed an appeal of the Board's decision with the Circuit Court of Prince William County. In that filing, plaintiff expressly stated that she reserved her federal constitutional claim for consideration by this Court. A hearing in the state court on plaintiff's petition for appeal is apparently scheduled for November 1, 1990.4 During the month of October, the parties filed numerous additional motions pertaining to this matter. On October 24, 1990, the Court by order dismissed plaintiff's complaint for the reasons stated in the order and to be set forth in this memorandum opinion.
Analysis properly begins with a review of Younger and its progeny, including Middlesex,5 tracing the extension of Younger to state administrative enforcement proceedings of a judicial nature. Next, the Middlesex test is applied to determine whether the revocation proceedings here at issue qualify for application of Younger. Finding that the revocation proceedings do qualify, the Court further considers whether the proceedings are still "ongoing" for purposes of Younger. Concluding both that the proceedings are still pending and that no exceptions to Younger apply, the Court abstains and dismisses plaintiff's complaint without prejudice.
In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971), the Supreme Court held that a federal court should not enjoin an ongoing state criminal proceeding, except in the very unusual situation where an injunction is necessary to prevent immediate, irreparable injury.6 In Younger, the appellee, John Harris, Jr., had been indicted and charged with violating a section of the California Criminal Syndicalism Act. While the prosecution was pending, Harris filed suit in federal district court requesting the court to enjoin the District Attorney of Los Angeles County from proceeding against him. A three-judge federal district court held that California's Criminal Syndicalism Act violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and accordingly enjoined further prosecution of Harris. Id. at 38-40, 91 S.Ct. at 747-48. The Supreme Court held that the district court judgment "must be reversed as a violation of the national policy forbidding federal courts to stay or enjoin pending state court proceedings except under special circumstances." Id. at 41, 91 S.Ct. at 749. In...
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