Philpot v. Abner Taylor.

• Decision Date: 30 September 1874
• Citation: 20 Am.Rep. 241,75 Ill. 309,1874 WL 9244
• Parties: BRYAN PHILPOT et al.v.ABNER TAYLOR.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

75 Ill. 309

1874 WL 9244 (Ill.)

20 Am.Rep. 241

BRYAN PHILPOT et al.

v.ABNER TAYLOR.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

September Term, 1874.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. JOHN BURNS, Judge, presiding.

Messrs. GRANT & SWIFT, and Mr. H. S. MONROE, for the appellants. Messrs. AYER & KALES, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE BREESE delivered the opinion of the Court:

This was case, in the Superior Court of Cook county, by Abner Taylor, against Bryan Philpot and Henry E. Pickett, for falsely pretending to be the agents of plaintiff to sell certain real estate belonging to him, in the city of Chicago, and, under that pretense, entering into a contract with one Merrill to sell the premises to him, which contract they caused to be recorded in the proper office in Cook county, and to enforce which, Merrill filed a bill in chancery against the plaintiff, by means whereof plaintiff was put to great charges and expenses in defending the same, and for attorneys' fees on appeal, and for printing abstracts and briefs, to his damage five thousand dollars.

The cause was tried by a jury on the general issue, resulting in a verdict for the plaintiff for fourteen hundred sixty seven dollars sixty-three cents. A motion for a new trial was denied, and judgment rendered on the verdict, to reverse which, defendants appeal, and raise several questions, all of which we have considered.

Appellants make the point that the action cannot be maintained, because the damage complained of is too remote from the alleged cause.

Many authorities are cited on this point, which do not seem to have any direct bearing on the proposition arising out of the facts of this case.

It is argued it did not follow, by means of making the contract complained of, that Merrill would institute suit for a specific performance. This, in the ordinary course of business, was reasonably to have been expected; and defendants are charged with placing it in the power of Merrill to bring such action, to defend against which, heavy expenses were incurred. This is the very gist of this action.

The rule, as found in the text-books, is, that whosoever does an illegal or wrongful act is answerable for all the consequences in the ordinary and natural course of events, though these consequences be directly brought about by the intervening agency of others, provided the intervening agents were set in motion by the primary wrong-doer; or, provided their acts, causing the damage, were the necessary or legal and natural consequence of the original wrongful act.

Here, Merrill was the intervening agent, who was set in motion by these pretended agents--the appellants, the original and primary wrong-doers. Had they not given the contract, there would have been no chancery suit, by Merrill, to compel performance. A case is referred to from 30 Law Journal, Queen's Bench, 137, Dixon v. Fourcoy, where it was held, if the natural result of a wrongful act, committed by a defendant, has been to plunge the plaintiff into a chancery suit, and thereby to cause him to incur costs and expenses, whatever may be the event of the suit, there is that conjunction of wrong and damage which will give the plaintiff good cause of action.

But we need not go beyond our own court for authority on this point. In McEwen v. Kerfoot, 37 Ill. 530, which was assumpsit by Kerfoot against McEwen, to recover his commissions on a sale of land made by plaintiff for defendant, and at his request, the special plea sought to set off and liquidate damages arising out of the subject matter of the suit, growing out of the alleged fact of want of authority...