Phipps v. Brunkhorst Trucking, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 May 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 21-cv-03464-RM-NRN |
| Parties | JORDAN PHIPPS, Plaintiff, v. BRUNKHORST TRUCKING, INC., and JENSEN TRUCKING COMPANY, INC., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Colorado |
This matter is before the Court on Defendants' separate Motions for Summary Judgment. For the reasons below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the Motion by Defendant Brunkhorst Trucking, Inc. (“Brunkhorst”) and grants the Motion by Defendant Jensen Trucking Company, Inc. (“Jensen”).
This is a negligence action arising out of a collision between a train and a semi-truck at a railroad crossing. The driver of the truck, David McKnight, was employed by Brunkhorst, which also owned the truck. Jensen contracted with Brunkhorst for driving services and leased the truck pursuant to an Independent Contractor Lease Agreement. (ECF No. 48-4.) The Agreement states that Brunkhorst is “an independent contractor,” limits Jensen's right to “control the manner or prescribe the method by which [Brunkhorst's] obligations under this Agreement are performed,” and requires Jensen to comply with federal regulations “relating to the leasing of equipment by and operational safety of motor carriers.” (Id. at 2.)
On the day of the accident, Mr. McKnight drove a truck with a loaded trailer from his home in Peetz, Colorado, to a facility in Cozad, Nebraska, before driving the unloaded trailer to Brunkhorst's terminal in Mitchell, Nebraska. From there, the owner and manager of Brunkhorst, David Brunkhorst, had Mr. McKnight switch trucks and take the truck (with a loaded trailer) that was in the accident. The plan was for Mr. McKnight to drive that truck to his home, where he would be off duty for at least thirty-six hours, and later, to the facility in Cozad. But the accident intervened, killing Mr. McKnight. There is no dispute that his negligence caused the accident. An autopsy report determined Mr. McKnight had illegal drugs in his system.
Plaintiff, the conductor of the train, was seriously injured in the accident, and asserts against each Defendant substantially similar claims for (1) agency, (2) negligence/negligence per se respondeat superior vicarious liability, (3) negligent entrustment, and (4) negligent hiring, supervision/training, and retention.
Summary judgment is appropriate only if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); Gutteridge v. Oklahoma, 878 F.3d 1233, 1238 (10th Cir. 2018). Applying this standard requires viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolving all factual disputes and reasonable inferences in its favor. Cillo v. City of Greenwood Vill., 739 F.3d 451, 461 (10th Cir. 2013). However, “[t]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).
“The substantive law of the case determines which facts are material.” United States v. Simmons, 129 F.3d 1386, 1388 (10th Cir. 1997). A fact is “material” if it pertains to an element of a claim or defense; a factual dispute is “genuine” if the evidence is so contradictory that if the matter went to trial, a reasonable jury could return a verdict for either party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Whether there is a genuine dispute as to a material fact depends upon whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law. Id. at 251-52; Stone v. Autoliv ASP, Inc., 210 F.3d 1132, 1136 (10th Cir. 2000).
Brunkhorst seeks partial summary judgment on the first two claims against it, arguing that Plaintiff's agency and respondeat superior claims fail as a matter of law. Plaintiff contends there are genuine issues of material fact which preclude summary judgment on these claims. The Court agrees with Plaintiff except to the extent Plaintiff's claims are premised on Jensen's conduct.
To the extent that these claims seek to impose liability on Brunkhorst for the conduct of Mr. McKnight, they both hinge on whether Mr. McKnight was acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. “An employer may be held vicariously liable for an employee's tort only when the tort is committed within the course and scope of employment.” Moses v. Diocese of Colo., 863 P.2d 310, 329 (Colo. 1993). “The employer is liable if the employee's conduct was motivated by an intent to serve the employer's interests and connected to acts the employee was authorized to perform.” Suydam v. LFI Fort Pierce, Inc., 490 P.3d 930, 934 (Colo. 2020) (quotation omitted). Although “[t]he existence of an agency relationship is ordinarily a question of fact to be determined by the fact finder,” a court can decide whether an agency relationship exists as a matter of law if the facts are not in dispute. Moses, 863 P.2d at 324. “The control a principal exercises over the manner of work performed by an agent is evidence that an agency relation exists.” Id.
Brunkhorst contends that at the time of the accident, Mr. McKnight was driving the truck for his own convenience, as a personal conveyance, because his home was not on the route that the truck otherwise would have followed. Brunkhorst further contends that Mr. McKnight was not paid for trips to and from his home and that he was not on duty when the accident occurred. However, there is no dispute that Mr. McKnight left Mitchell with a loaded truck he was expected to deliver to Cozad days later. Nor is it disputed that, as directed by Mr. Brunkhorst, Mr. McKnight took a specific truck for a specific purpose. “An employee is acting within the scope of his employment if he is doing the work assigned to him by his employer, or what is necessarily incidental to that work, or customary in the employer's business.” Id. at 330. Considering that Brunkhorst's business revolves around transporting trucks and cargo, the Court cannot conclude Mr. McKnight was not furthering Brunkhorst's interests by driving a loaded truck from one location to another albeit with a detour to his home with his employer's permission and on a schedule set by his employer.
Plaintiff's reliance on the going-and-coming rule is misplaced in the context of this case. According to that rule, employees traveling between work and home are generally not considered to be within the service of the employers. See Stokes v. Denver Newspaper Agency, LLP, 159 P.3d 691, 693-94 (Colo.App. 2006). But unlike a case where an employee does little to serve the employer's purposes by using a personal vehicle to drive to and from work, here there is evidence that Mr. McKnight was transporting work-related material in a vehicle provided and maintained by his employer and providing his employer with a benefit. See id. at 695-69. Nor is this a case where the employee was driving home from and then back to the same work location. Rather, because Mr. McKnight was bringing the truck to a different location, it appears his trip was “of such character or importance that it would have necessitated a trip by someone else if [he] had not handled it in combination with his otherwise personal journey to or from work.” Suydam, 490 P.3d at 935 (quotation omitted). Thus, the undisputed circumstances are sufficient to create a disputed issue of material fact as to Mr. McKnight's status vis-a-vis Brunkhorst when the accident occurred.
Brunkhorst also contends that it cannot be held liable for Mr. McKnight's conduct because he used illegal drugs in contravention of Defendants' policies. This contention is premised on the undisputed fact that Mr. McKnight's autopsy revealed he had amphetamine, methamphetamine, and THC in his system. But this fact is insufficient to establish that he had wholly abandoned his employer's business for personal reasons, as Brunkhorst argues. (ECF No. 46 at 11.) First, there is no evidence as to when Mr. McKnight used illegal drugs or his level of impairment at the time of the accident. Second, although driving a tractor-trailer while under the influence of illegal drugs may constitute negligence, this does not necessarily mean that the driver is outside the scope of his employment. See Frederick v. Swift Transp. Co., 616 F.3d 1074, 1080 (10th Cir. 2010) (applying New Mexico law). Accordingly, the Court finds that the autopsy report alone does not establish that there are no disputed issues of material fact as to whether Mr. McKnight was working within the scope of his employment at the time of the accident.
To the extent Plaintiff's agency and respondeat superior claims against Brunkhorst are based on any conduct by Jensen, Plaintiff has failed to describe any such conduct that would plausibly give rise to liability or to adduce any evidence that Jensen was Brunkhorst's agent or employee. His claims asserted against Jensen directly are addressed below, but in the context of Brunkhorst's Motion, the Court separately concludes that Plaintff has not shown that Brunkhorst may be held vicariously liable for Jensen's conduct.
Therefore Brunkhorst's Motion is granted in part with respect to his agency and respondeat superior claims to the extent they are asserted against Jensen but otherwise denied, as there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Mr. McKnight was acting within the scope of his employment with Brunkhorst at the time of the...
To continue reading
Request your trial