Phipps v. Collman
| Decision Date | 31 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 16-cv-00857-JPG |
| Parties | D'MARKO PHIPPS, #69596, Plaintiff, v. SGT. COLLMAN and JOHN LAKIN, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Plaintiff, who is currently detained at Madison County Jail ("Jail") in Edwardsville, Illinois, brings this pro se civil rights action against two Jail officials pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (Doc. 1). In his complaint, Plaintiff claims that Sergeant Collman and Sheriff Lakin negligently failed to protect him from an attack by three detainees at the Jail on November 26th1 (Doc. 1, p. 5). He seeks monetary relief against both defendants (id. at 6).
This case is now before the Court for a preliminary review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Under § 1915A, the Court is required to promptly screen prisoner complaints to filter out nonmeritorious claims. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to dismiss any portion of the complaint that is legally frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or asks for money damages from a defendant who by law is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
An action or claim is frivolous if "it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted if it does not plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The claim of entitlement to relief must cross "the line between possibility and plausibility." Id. at 557. Conversely, a complaint is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Although the Court is obligated to accept factual allegations as true, see Smith v. Peters, 631 F.3d 418, 419 (7th Cir. 2011), some factual allegations may be so sketchy or implausible that they fail to provide sufficient notice of a plaintiff's claim. Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009). Additionally, Courts "should not accept as adequate abstract recitations of the elements of a cause of action or conclusory legal statements." Id. At the same time, however, the factual allegations of a pro se complaint are to be liberally construed. See Rodriguez v. Plymouth Ambulance Serv., 577 F.3d 816, 821 (7th Cir. 2009). The complaint is subject to dismissal under this standard.
According to the complaint, Plaintiff was attacked, beaten, and severely injured by three detainees at Madison County Jail ("Jail") on November 26th (Doc. 1, p. 5). The assault occurred soon after Sergeant Collman moved Plaintiff into the same cellblock with a detainee who was involved in his criminal case (id.). The cellblock had no panic button, and no one responded to his cries for help, until an officer made his regular 30-minute rounds and observed the three detainees beating Plaintiff.
As a result of the attack, Plaintiff sustained severe injuries, including a collapsed lung, three broken ribs, a broken nose, and facial swelling. Immediately after the assault, he was taken to Barnes-Jewish Hospital in St. Louis, Missouri. He remained hospitalized there for four days.
After returning to the Jail on November 30th, Plaintiff was placed in segregation because the Jail has no infirmary. At the time, he was still suffering from serious injuries, and he required additional medical treatment. He claims that the treatment he received was inadequate but offers no details in this regard.
Plaintiff now sues Sergeant Collman and Sheriff Lakin for negligence under the FTCA. He claims that Sergeant Collman failed to protect him from an obvious risk of harm when he moved Plaintiff into the same cellblock with a detainee who was involved in his criminal case. He further alleges that Sheriff Lakin failed to install panic buttons in the cellblock, which would have enabled Plaintiff to quickly summon help. Plaintiff generally alleges that he received inadequate medical care after returning to the Jail on November 30th. In connection with these claims, Plaintiff seeks monetary damages (id. at 6).
Plaintiff asserts negligence claims against Sergeant Collman and Sheriff Lakin pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2671-2680 (Doc. 1). The FTCA provides jurisdiction for suits against the United States for torts committed by federal officials. Plaintiff has not brought this lawsuit against the United States. He has also not named federal officials as defendants. Therefore, the FTCA claims must be dismissed with prejudice.
Claims for constitutional deprivations by state actors are typically brought in a civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Section 1983 creates a cause of action based on personal liability and predicated upon fault; thus, "to be liable under [Section] 1983, an individualdefendant must have caused or participated in a constitutional deprivation." Pepper v. Village of Oak Park, 430 F.3d 809, 810 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). Even when construing the allegations in the complaint liberally, Plaintiff does not allege that Sergeant Collman or Sheriff Lakin violated his constitutional rights. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). Instead, he brings claims against them for negligence. Under § 1983, a defendant can never be held liable for negligence, or even gross negligence. Gomez v. Randle, 680 F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 2012). Claims of negligence arise under state law, not federal law. The negligence claims against both defendants shall therefore be dismissed without prejudice.
Under the circumstances, the complaint fails to state a claim for relief against either defendant and shall be dismissed. However, the dismissal shall be without prejudice, and Plaintiff will have an opportunity to file an amended complaint. His amended complaint should focus on constitutional deprivations that occurred in connection with the November 26th incident.
Plaintiff's claims likely arise under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which applies to pretrial detainees and prohibits punishment. See Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 842 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Rice ex rel. Rice v. Corr. Med. Servs., 675 F.3d 650, 664 (7th Cir. 2012)). See also Klebanowski v. Sheahan, 540 F.3d 633, 637 (7th Cir. 2008). The Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment applies to claims brought by prisoners. Id. The inquiry under both provisions of the Constitution is essentially the same. Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 (7th Cir. 2008) (). The Seventh Circuit has "found it convenient and entirely appropriate to apply the same standard to claims arising under the Fourteenth Amendment (detainees) and EighthAmendment (convicted prisoners) 'without differentiation.'" Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 478 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d 839, 845 n.2 (7th Cir. 1999)). Against this backdrop, the Court will briefly address each of Plaintiff's potential claims.
A constitutional claim may arise under the Fourteenth Amendment (detainee) or the Eighth Amendment (prisoner), if either defendant failed to protect Plaintiff from a known and substantial risk of serious harm. To state a failure-to-protect claim, the plaintiff must allege that jail officials "knew that he faced a substantial risk of serious harm and deliberately disregarded the risk" by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it. Key v. Kolitwenzew, 630 Fed. Appx. 620, 623 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Estate of Miller, ex rel. Bertram v. Tobiasz, 680 F.3d 984, 989 (7th Cir. 2012)). It is not enough to allege that an officer might have known, probably should have known, or could have learned about a substantial risk of serious harm posed by a fellow detainee, as Plaintiff has alleged with respect to Sergeant Collman. The defendant must have acted with "conscious disregard" of a significant risk of violence to the pretrial detainee. See Junior v. Anderson, 724 F.3d 812, 815 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994)). This requires a showing that the officer acted with the equivalent of criminal recklessness, not negligence or even gross negligence. Fisher v. Lovejoy, 414 F.3d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 2005); Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835. Further, an officer who actually knew of a substantial risk to a detainee's safety is still free of liability "if [he] responded reasonably to the risk, even if the harm ultimately was not averted." Fisher, 414 F.3d at 662 (quoting Peate v. McCann, 294 F.3d 879, 882 (7th Cir. 2002)). The complaint does not support a failure-to-protect claim against Sergeant Collman under this standard.
Plaintiff also alleges that Sheriff Lakin should have installed panic buttons in each cellblock to ensure that detainees could call for help in emergency situations. He acknowledgesthat a panic button would not have prevented the attack that occurred on November 26th, but he argues that it would have enabled him to summon help sooner.
Regardless of how Plaintiff characterizes this claim (e.g., as a failure-to-protect or conditions-of-confinement claim), the allegations must at least suggest that the sheriff's failure to install a panic button in the cellblock before November 26th amounted to deliberate indifference. Allegations that a defendant disregarded "a generalized risk of violence [are] not enough" because jails are inherently dangerous places. Wilson v. Ryker, 451 Fed. Appx. 588, 589 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Brown v. Budz, 398 F.3d 904, 909, 913 (7th Cir....
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