Phoenix Printing Co. v. Robertson

Decision Date01 February 1921
Docket Number9953.
Citation195 P. 487,80 Okla. 191,1921 OK 30
PartiesPH×NIX PRINTING CO. v. ROBERTSON.
CourtOklahoma Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court.

Words charged to be libelous may be divided into three classes First, those that cannot possibly bear a defamatory meaning second, those that are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning, as well as an innocent one; third, those that are clearly defamatory on their face.

Words used in an alleged libelous article are to be construed by their most natural and obvious meaning, and in the sense they would be understood by those reading the article.

If the alleged defamatory words are not actionable on their face but derive their defamatory import from extrinsic facts and circumstances, such extrinsic facts and circumstances must be set forth and connected with the words charged by a proper averment. Words not actionable per se may be made to appear actionable by averring such extrinsic facts as will show that they were intended to be libelous and were so understood. These averments must be distinctly stated in the inducement and applied to the plaintiff by a proper colloquium, with the intended and understood meaning correctly set out in the innuendoes.

If alleged defamatory words are not actionable on their face, but derive a defamatory import from extrinsic facts and circumstances which are pleaded by way of inducement, colloquium, and innuendo, it becomes the duty of the trial court to determine whether the language used in the publication can fairly and reasonably be construed to have a meaning imputed to it by the pleader, and if the court determine the words are susceptible of the meaning attributed to them by the pleader, it then bcomes a question of fact for the jury to determine under all the circumstances whether they were intended to mean what the pleader avers they do.

The fact that a publication may be unpleasant and annoy or irk the subject thereof, and may subject him to jest or banter, so as to affect his feelings, is not, standing alone, sufficient to make it libelous. In order to be libelous, it must tend to lower him in the opinion of men whose standard of opinion the court can properly recognize or tend to induce them to entertain an ill opinion of him.

If the alleged defamatory words are not actionable upon their face, but derive their defamatory import from extrinsic facts and circumstances, it is error for the trial court to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff.

Appeal from District Court, Muskogee County; Chas. G. Watts, Judge.

Action by Charley Robertson against the Ph nix Printing Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded, with instructions.

Joseph C. Stone, Charles A. Moon, and Francis Stewart, all of Muskogee, for plaintiff in error.

Don M. Crump, Myron White, and W. J. Crump, all of Muskogee, for defendant in error.

McNEILL J.

This controversy arose over the publication of an article in the Muskogee Daily Ph nix, a daily paper published by the Ph nix Printing Company in the city of Muskogee on May 24, 1914. The publication complained of is as follows:

"Man's Tango Talk Proved Provoking--This Way Out, Sir. Charley Robertson, a Chauffeur, Didn't Make a Hit with His Opinion.
Just what Charley Robertson, a chauffeur, thinks about the tango will probably never be known. Charley started to tell last night as he was tripping the light fantastic at Leighton's Hall, South Fourth street.
He had no more than started before he was interrupted. He left the hall hurriedly, in his haste leaving a shoe, his coat, and a few minor whatnots of his apparel behind him. If it were not for the fact that Leighton Hall is on the second floor and a flight of stairs lead up to it--and also down--Charley's exit might have been more gracefully accomplished.
As it was, Charley descended the stairs very awkwardly, principally on an ear, witnesses said after they could be quieted. His departure was followed by an almost equally hurried exit of about fifty or more girls, shrieking and screaming that murder was being done. Robertson was encoring their sentiments.
A call went to the police and a detective took Robertson in tow. It is presumed that he was taken home, as he was not brought to police headquarters.
Those at the dance declared that the proprietor of the dance hall ejected Robertson."

The plaintiff in his petition pleaded by way of innuendo that the article accused the plaintiff of being drunk, rude, profane, immoral, indecent, and guilty of disturbing the peace. It was further alleged that the article was false, malicious, unprivileged, and exposed the plaintiff to contempt and ridicule by imputing to him that he was a man of base character without shame and self-respect and a drunken and immoral citizen.

The defendant filed a demurrer to the petition, which was overruled and then filed an answer setting up numerous defenses. At the close of the evidence the court instructed the jury that the article was libelous per se and directed the jury to return a verdict for the plaintiff in a sum of not less than $100 nor more than $10,000. The plaintiff in error assigned this as error, contending the article is not libelous per se.

In determining whether the article is libelous per se, it is essential to recognize certain well-established rules that are recognized by this court in determining that question. This court in the case of Kee v. Armstrong Byrd & Co., 75 Okl. 84, 182 P. 494, 5 A. L. R. 1349, has classified articles purported to be libelous under three classifications:

First, those that cannot possibly bear a defamatory meaning.

Second, those that are reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning as well as an innocent one.

Third, those that are clearly defamatory upon their face.

In determining to which class the publication...

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