Phoenix Railway Company of Arizona v. Paul Geary

• Decision Date: 29 November 1915
• Docket Number: No. 48,48
• Citation: 239 U.S. 277,36 S.Ct. 45,60 L.Ed. 287
• Parties: PHOENIX RAILWAY COMPANY OF ARIZONA, Appt., v. W. PAUL GEARY, Frank A. Jones, and Amos W. Cole, Members of the Corporation Commission of the State of Arizona, et al
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

239 U.S. 277

36 S.Ct. 45

60 L.Ed. 287

PHOENIX RAILWAY COMPANY OF ARIZONA, Appt.,

v W. PAUL GEARY, Frank A. Jones, and Amos W. Cole, Members of the Corporation Commission of the State of Arizona, et al.

No. 48.

Submitted October 29, 1915.

Decided November 29, 1915.

Messrs. Alexander Britton, Evans Browne, F. W. Clements, Floyd M. Stahl, Edward Kent, and Louis H. Chalmers for appellant.

[Argument of Counsel from page 278 intentionally omitted] Mr. Wiley E. Jones, Attorney General of Arizona, and Messrs. Edward M. Clearly, Leslie C. Hardy, and George W. Harben for appellees.

Mr. Justice Pitney delivered the opinion of the court:

In June, 1913, the Corporation Commission of the State of Arizona made an order directing appellant to double-track its line of street railway on West Washington street in the city of Phoenix, in that state, between Seventh and Seventeenth avenues,—a distance of ten blocks; the work to be commenced within thirty days from the date of the order and completed on or before September 1st. By a subsequent order the time for completion was extended until December 1st, 1913. Having unsuccessfully applied to the Commission for a rehearing, appellant filed its present bill of complaint in the United States district court, praying that the Commission's order be declared null and void as in contravention of the Constitution of the United States, and that the defendants (who include the members of the Corporation Commission, the attorney general of the state, and the county attorney), be enjoined from enforcing or attempting to enforce it by suit, prosecution, or other proceeding, and from instituting any proceeding for the recovery of fines or penalties for any violation of or refusal to obey it; the ground of complaint being that the order was unjust and unreasonable because the service already rendered upon Washington street by appellant was adequate and efficient; that the construction of a double track was not required by the needs of the public; that appellant's operating expenses exceeded its revenues, and that it was unable to make the additional expenditure of about $14,000 required for the double-tracking; and that compliance with the order would prevent appellant from making an adequate return, or any return at all, upon the value of its property. The bill further set up that, under the Constitution and statutes of Arizona, complainant was required, under severe penalties, to put the order into effect, and to keep it in effect until modified or abrogated, and that while a right to review the reasonableness and lawfulness of the order in a state court was given by statute, the court was prohibited from issuing any injunction or restraining order until after the final determination of the matter, and in the meantime the order would be in full force and effect and must be obeyed, under heavy penalties for each day's continuance of the violation; and it was alleged that these statutory and constitutional provisions were adopted for the purpose of compelling acquiescence in any order made by the Corporation Commission, and preventing a resort to the courts to test the reasonableness, justness, and validity thereof, and thus had the effect of depriving complainant of its property without due process of law, and denying to it the equal protection of the laws, in violation of the 14th Amendment.

Upon the filing of the bill, with accompanying affidavits, a temporary restraining order was granted, and a hearing of the application for interlocutory injunction was thereafter had before three judges under the provisions of § 266, Judicial Code (act of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. at L. 1087, 1162, chap. 231, Comp. Stat. 1913, §§ 968, 1243). The court held (209 Fed. 694) that complainant's showing as to the alleged unreasonableness of the Commission's order was not sufficiently strong to warrant an injunction to restrain its enforcement pendente lite, but the temporary restraining order was continued in force pending the present appeal, taken direct to this court under the cited section of the Code.

The jurisdiction of a Federal court of equity over the subject-matter is, of course, well settled. Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, 144, 52 L. ed. 714, 722, 13 L.R.A.(N.S.) 932, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 441, 14 Ann. Cas. 764; Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard) 230 U. S. 352, 380, 57 L. ed. 1511, 1534, 48 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1151, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729; Siler v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 213 U. S. 175, 190, 53 L. ed. 753, 757, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 451; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298, 303, 58 L. ed. 229, 238, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48.

The sole question raised is whether the bill of complaint and supporting affidavits, in view of the rebutting affidavits filed by the appellees, made so clear a case of unreasonable, arbitrary, or confiscatory action on the part of the Corporation Commission as to call for an interlocutory injunction. The attempt was to show...