Phouk v. Warden, Stewart Detention Center
| Decision Date | 05 April 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 4:19-CV-19-CDL-MSH |
| Parties | Samnang PHOUK, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, STEWART DETENTION CENTER, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia |
Phi Nguyen, Asian Americans Advancing Justice - Atlanta, Norcross, GA, for Petitioner.
Bowen Reichert Shoemaker, Us Attorney's Office, Macon, GA, for Respondents.
28 U.S.C. § 2241
On March 27, 2019, Petitioner filed an "Emergency Motion to Authorize Discovery[.]" Pet'r's Mot. for Disc. 1, ECF No. 9. Respondents contend that Petitioner's discovery requests are based on "speculation" that "is not enough to rise to the level of showing good cause for discovery." Resp'ts' Resp. to Mot. for Disc. 4, ECF No. 11. The Court disagrees with Respondents and finds there is good cause to authorize discovery here.
A habeas petitioner, "unlike the usual civil litigant in federal court, is not entitled to discovery as a matter of ordinary course." Bracy v. Gramley , 520 U.S. 899, 904, 117 S.Ct. 1793, 138 L.Ed.2d 97 (1997). But, habeas petitioners are not to be left without any method for developing facts in support of their claim. Rule 6 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts ("Habeas Rules") provides that "[a] judge may, for good cause, authorize a party to conduct discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" in a habeas proceedings.1
Good cause exists "where specific allegations [ ] show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that [they are] entitled to relief." Daniel v. Comm'r, Ala. Dep't of Corr. , 822 F.3d 1248, 1281 (11th Cir. 2016) (citing Bracy , 520 U.S. at 908-09, 117 S.Ct. 1793 ). Conversely, good cause "cannot arise from mere speculation" and "cannot be ordered on the basis of pure hypothesis[.]" Arthur v. Allen , 459 F.3d 1310, 1311 (11th Cir. 2006). If discovery is warranted, "Rule 6(a) [of the Habeas Rules] makes it clear that the scope and extent of such discovery is a matter confided to the discretion of the District Court." Bracy , 520 U.S. at 909, 117 S.Ct. 1793.
Before the Court can determine whether Petitioner is entitled to discovery, "we must first identify the essential elements of [his] claim." Id. at 904, 117 S.Ct. 1793. Petitioner contends his detention is unlawful because he has been detained longer than the presumptively reasonable period of six months following the entry of a final order of removal against him. Pet. 1, ECF No. 1. As prescribed by the U.S. Supreme Court, detention of an alien subject to an administratively final order of deportation/removal is authorized only for a period "reasonably necessary" to effectuate the removal. Zadvydas v. Davis , 533 U.S. 678, 699-700, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001).
The Zadvydas Court determined it was "practically necessary ... for the sake of uniform administration in the federal courts" to establish a "presumptively reasonable period of detention." Id. at 701, 121 S.Ct. 2491. The Court, believing "that Congress previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than six months[,]" set six-months as the outer boundary of that presumptively reasonable period. Id. Detention lasting longer than six months loses the presumption. Id. (). The relationship between the time of confinement and the "reasonably foreseeable future" is an inverse one. Id. ().
The Eleventh Circuit interprets Zadvydas as requiring an alien to show: "(1) that the six-month period, which commences at the beginning of the statutory removal period, has expired when the § 2241 petition is filed; and (2) evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future." Gozo v. Napolitano , 309 F. App'x 344, 346 (11th Cir. 2009) ; see also Akinwale v. Ashcroft , 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002) (). Petitioner must meet these requirements in order to obtain the relief he seeks.
The fundamental issue in this case is the likelihood that Petitioner will be removed from the United States in the "reasonably foreseeable future" as defined in Zadvydas. Respondents contend that "there is a significant likelihood of [Petitioner's] removal in the foreseeable future" and "Petitioner's detention is thus legally justified." Resp. to Pet. 3, ECF No. 7. They state that Petitioner is a native and citizen of Cambodia, and that U.S. Customs and Immigration Enforcement "submitted a request for travel documents to Cambodia for Petitioner in January 2019." Id. at 1, 5. Respondents have also asserted that Petitioner was to attend a "citizenship interview" with the Cambodian government on March 25, 2019. Id. at 5. They argue these actions render Petitioner's claim to be "without merit." Id.
Petitioner has shown good cause for discovery by making specific allegations that are both capable of further factual development and fundamental to the merits of his claim for relief. In his motion seeking discovery, he insists he "needs access to information clarifying a factual question created by existing information in the case." Pet'r's Mot. for Discovery 5. He also states that, while "the Cambodian Government has corresponded with the United States while Petitioner has been detained[,] Petitioner has never been interviewed or otherwise met with Cambodian Government officials." Id. Petitioner also claims that his assigned Deportation Officer informed him that the Cambodian government has previously "claimed that Petitioner was not Cambodian but Vietnamese." Id. at 10. Notably, Petitioner's assertion that he has not been interviewed by Cambodian officials was made after the March 25, 2019, date Respondents claimed he would be doing so, and has not been contradicted. See Id. at 12. Respondents also do not explicitly contradict Petitioner's claim that he was told the Cambodian government does not recognize him as one of their citizens. See Resp....
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