Phyllis v. Cordry Sweetwater Conservancy Dist.
| Decision Date | 16 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 07A01–1008–PL–429.,07A01–1008–PL–429. |
| Citation | 947 N.E.2d 429 |
| Parties | Phyllis and Michael KLOSINSKI, Appellants–Petitioners,v.CORDRY SWEETWATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT, Appellee–Respondent. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
John Emry, Franklin, IN, Attorney for Appellant.Douglas A. Hoffman, Carson Boxberger, Bloomington, IN, Roger A. Young, Young and Young, Franklin, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
Phyllis and Michael Klosinski appeal the trial court's judgment in their action against the Cordry Sweetwater Conservancy District (“the District”). We affirm in part and reverse in part.
The Klosinskis raise several issues, which we consolidate and restate as whether the trial court erred by partially denying their request for injunctive relief. On cross appeal, the District argues that the trial court erred by finding that the Klosinskis were “aggrieved” parties for purposes of filing a mandate or injunction action against the District pursuant to Indiana Code Section 14–33–5–24.
The District was established in Brown County in June 1959 for the purposes of: (1) “[p]roviding water supply, including treatment and distribution for domestic, industrial and public use”; (2) “[p]roviding for the collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage and other liquid wastes produced within the district”; and (3) “[d]eveloping forests, wildlife area, and park and recreational facilities [where] feasible in connection with beneficial water management.” App. p. 64. A board of directors was established and created a district plan (“District Plan”), which was approved by the trial court on August 7, 1961. On August 3, 1972, the trial court approved an amendment to the District Plan. In 1974, the District again sought to amend its District Plan. On February 21, 1975, the trial court approved some of the proposed amendments, but it struck down others because they were beyond the District's statutory authority.
The Klosinskis have owned real estate in the District since 1979. On April 4, 2008, the Klosinskis filed a petition for writ of mandate, injunctive relief, damages, and attorney fees against the District.1 The Klosinskis filed a petition for a preliminary injunction, which the trial court denied. The District and the Klosinskis filed motions for summary judgment, which the trial court also denied. Essentially, the Klosinskis argued that a mandate was necessary because the District was failing to construct sanitary sewer facilities and failing to keep the lakes' coves free of sediment. The Klosinskis argued that an injunction was necessary because the District was exceeding its statutory authority by enacting rules concerning building codes, use of roads within the District, creation of a police force, the keeping of wild and domestic animals, vegetation, use of firearms, hunting, fishing, swimming, use of the lakes, discontinuing water service, attorney fees, and private septic systems.2
After a bench trial, the trial court issued a twenty-three-page order denying the Klosinskis' petition for mandate and granting in part and denying in part their petition for an injunction. The trial court found that the Klosinskis had standing to file their petition for mandate and injunction. The trial court addressed each of the Klosinskis' arguments and determined that they were not entitled to a mandate. Further, the trial court addressed each of the Klosinskis' requests for injunctions. In most instances, the trial court denied the Klosinskis' requests for injunctions. However, regarding some arguments, the trial court did issue a general injunction prohibiting the District from establishing or enforcing any rule that does not further its statutory purpose. The Klosinskis now appeal, and the District cross appeals.
On appeal, the Klosinskis argue that the trial court erred by denying their petition for an injunction against the District. 3 The District argues on cross appeal that the trial court erred by finding that the Klosinskis had standing to challenge the District's plan. The trial court issued sua sponte findings of fact and conclusions thereon. Sua sponte findings control only as to the issues they cover, and a general judgment will control as to the issues upon which there are no findings. Yanoff v. Muncy, 688 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind.1997). We will affirm a general judgment entered with findings if it can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. Id. When a trial court has made special findings of fact, we review sufficiency of the evidence using a two-step process. Id. First, we must determine whether the evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact. Id. Second, we must determine whether those findings of fact support the trial court's conclusions of law. Id.
Findings will only be set aside if they are clearly erroneous. Id. “Findings are clearly erroneous only when the record contains no facts to support them either directly or by inference.” Id. A judgment is clearly erroneous if it applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id. In order to determine that a finding or conclusion is clearly erroneous, an appellate court's review of the evidence must leave it with the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id.
We begin by addressing the District's standing arguments. The trial court found that the Klosinskis had “standing” to raise their requests for mandate and injunction. Specifically, the trial court noted that “[t]he Klosinskis own property in the District; they and their property are subject to and affected by the District's rules and regulations; and they pay assessments or fees for the services provided by the District.” App. p. 12. The trial court also relied upon Indiana & Michigan Elec. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 495 N.E.2d 779, 782 (Ind.Ct.App.1986), trans. denied, for the proposition that “[i]f an administrative entity attempts or takes action without benefit of statutory authority, its actions may be challenged and enjoined at the first expression of its intent to act, without requiring the aggrieved party to first suffer the unlawful intrusion.”
Indiana Code Section 14–33–5–24 governs conservancy districts and provides: “An interested person adversely affected by an action committed or omitted by the board in violation of this chapter may petition the court having jurisdiction over the district to enjoin or mandate the board.” No cases have addressed the meaning of “[a]n interested person adversely affected.” Ind.Code § 14–33–5–24. However, our supreme court has addressed a similar issue in the context of the Administrative Orders and Procedures Act (“AOPA”).
The AOPA allows a person “aggrieved or adversely affected” by an order to file a petition for review. I.C. § 4–21.5–3–7. In Huffman v. Office of Envtl. Adjudication, 811 N.E.2d 806 (2004), our supreme court held that the “judicial doctrine of standing” was inapplicable where the AOPA identifies who may pursue an administrative proceeding. Huffman, 811 N.E.2d at 809. In defining a person “aggrieved or adversely affected,” our supreme court noted:
Black's Law Dictionary 73, 1154 (8th ed.2004), defines “aggrieved” as “having legal rights that are adversely affected,” and “aggrieved party” as “a party whose personal, pecuniary, or property rights have been adversely affected by another person's actions or by a court's decree or judgment.” In another context, we have defined “aggrieved” as: [A] substantial grievance, a denial of some personal or property right or the imposition upon a party of a burden or obligation.... The appellant must have a legal interest which will be enlarged or diminished by the result of the appeal.
Id. at 810 (internal citations omitted). “Essentially, to be ‘aggrieved or adversely affected,’ a person must have suffered or be likely to suffer in the immediate future harm to a legal interest, be it a pecuniary, property, or personal interest.” Id. The court noted that the “concept of ‘aggrieved’ is more than a feeling of concern or disagreement with a policy; rather, it is a personalized harm.” Id. at 812. The court concluded that “[t]he language of AOPA does not allow for administrative review based on a generalized concern as a member of the public.” Id.
During the trial, Phyllis Klosinski identified no specific controversy with the District. The Klosinskis have not been denied a building permit, they have not tried to subdivide their lot and been denied, they have not applied for and been denied the ability to have wild animals, they have not been fined or ticketed for hunting, fishing, boating, or swimming improperly, they have not been sued by the District, the District has not sought attorney fees from them, and the District has not disconnected their water supply. Phyllis did testify that the District had requested to inspect their septic system, and the Klosinskis had refused. Otherwise, Phyllis simply complained that she was paying taxes to the District and that the District was using the taxes “to force other people to do things the District has no authority to provide.” Tr. p. 112.
The Klosinskis argue that they have standing because they are taxpayers in the District and that they have public standing to question the legality of the District's rules. Our supreme court recognized in Huffman that general standing principles are inapplicable where a statute identifies who may pursue an administrative proceeding. Huffman, 811 N.E.2d at 809. Statutes governing conservancy districts provide that, to bring an action for mandate or injunction against the District, the Klosinskis must have been “adversely affected” by the District's action or lack of action. I.C. § 14–33–5–24. General standing principles are inapplicable here. To be “adversely affected,” the Klosinskis must have more than a generalized concern. They must identify a specific harm to a pecuniary, property, or personal interest....
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