Picard v. McCormick

• Decision Date: 06 December 1862
• Citation: 11 Mich. 68
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: Isaac Picard v. Robert McCormick

11 Mich. 68

Isaac Picard v. Robert McCormick

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 6, 1862

Heard November 15, 1862 [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material] [Syllabus Material]

Error to Washtenaw Circuit, where McCormick recovered judgment against Picard for false representations of the value of watches and other jewelry for which plaintiff had bargained with defendant at four hundred dollars, and paid in a horse at $ 160, and the balance in notes. The declaration and the objections made to a recovery under it are sufficiently stated in the opinion.

After the evidence was in, the Circuit Judge charged the jury as follows: "It is a rule of law that a mere assertion of value made by the seller, when no warranty is intended, is no ground of relief to a purchaser, because the assertion is a matter of opinion which does not imply knowledge, and in which men differ. Every person reposes at his peril in the opinions of others, when he has equal opportunity to form and exercise his own judgment.

"This rule applies only when the vendor and vendee rely upon their own judgment. But when the vendee expressly relies upon the knowledge of the vendor as to quality or value of the article of sale, the vendor is bound to act honorably and deal fairly with the vendee. When confidence is reposed in the vendor he is bound not to abuse it, and the rule of caveat emptor does not apply.

"When one piece of property is given for another, without regard to value, that is an exchange; but where one piece of property is sold at a price, and other property is by the same contract received in part payment at a price, and the balance in money, this is a sale and not an exchange.

"It is contended by defendant's counsel that the bill of sale is the evidence of the contract, and can not be contradicted by the parol evidence. Though the contract be in writing, if the defendant has been dishonest in the transaction, the plaintiff may disregard the writing and sue directly for the fraud."

Judgment affirmed, with costs.

H. J. Beakes, for plaintiff in error:

A misrepresentation of value, unconnected with any misrepresentations of kind, quality or quantity, though willful on the part of the vendor, and credited by the vendee, affords no cause of action: 3 Bulst. 94; Cro. Jac., 386; 1 Lev. 102; 2 Ld. Raym., 1118; 5 Johns. 354; 5 Hill 69, 303; 6 Paige 254; 6 Met. 250; 3 Woodb. & M., 420; 1 Dana 611; 2 Ired. 32; 1 Dev. 21; 18 Me. 418; 1 Ark. 41; 1 Sug. Ven. & Pur., 3; 2 Kent 658; 2 Pars. Cont., 275; Story on Sales, 36; Hill on Sales, 252; Bull. N. P., 31.

The third count is bad, because claiming a sum below the jurisdiction of the court.

The evidence of what Picard said about the diamonds was improperly received. It did not tend to prove any of the allegations in the declaration. It was an attempt to prove a different fraud from the one alleged: 6 Ind. 23. The court erred in his charge that the written contract might be disregarded. It must be set out in the declaration: 1 Chit. Pl., 384; and must be proved by precisely the same evidence as if the action was ex contract; that is, by the best evidence. The court also erred in his definitions of an exchange and a sale: Bouv. L. Dic., Title "Sale."

A. Felch, for defendant in error:

The representation of value set out in the declaration included all the little details given by the vendor to deceive the purchaser, and they are all receivable in evidence.

The charge of the judge was correct.

In no case does the law allow a misrepresentation, knowingly made to the injury of another, to go unpunished by an appropriate remedy, and the vendor is liable for any intentional mis-statement whereby the vendee is induced to purchase under a false impression: 1 Smith Lead. Cas., 243; 3 Story R., 660; I bid., 700; 6 Exch. 761; 3 Seld. 352; Story on Sales, § 165.

The rule goes to this extent when no express trust is reposed by the purchaser in the seller. When such trust is reposed, and the vendor knows it, the rule is extremely stringent. The least departure from strict truth--the artful statement of a false opinion, or even an artful silence by which the purchaser is induced to buy, is a fraud for which the law holds the vendor liable: Story on Sales, §§ 170, 171, 179, 181, 374 and 380; 1 Story Eq. Juris., §§ 198, 208; 1 Pars. Cont., 461; 1 Hill Torts, 5; 1 Clark & Fin., 232; Smith v. Babcock, 1 Wood. & M., 246; I bid., 217; 7 Blackf. 178; 3 B. & C., 623.

This rule is clear as to representations made relative to the condition and quality of the articles sold; but it seems to be claimed in this case that it does not apply when the vendor speaks of the value of his wares.

Vague and general representations as to the value of the article of sale by the vendor are, in ordinary cases, understood to be mere expressions of opinion, and deceive nobody. But this rule applies only when they are given and received as mere opinion, or are the ordinary boasting of the vendor. When any artifice is employed to aid in the deception, or in any improper manner to enhance the price, or the buyer has not full opportunity to judge for himself, the injured purchaser has his remedy for the fraud: Story on Sales, § 169; 2 Kent 485, 487; 1 Story Eq. Juris., § 201.

The relation of confidence and trust once established between the negotiators, new duties are imposed upon the vendor. In other cases he may puff his goods and make extravagant statements of their value, but when he undertakes to tell facts to one expressly trusting to his statement he must be as truthful as to the value of his goods as in any other representation.

Where special confidence exists, he can no more be allowed to deceive by knowingly misrepresenting the value than any specified quality of the article. The rule of caveat emptor gives place to the confidential relations of the parties. That rule tells the buyer to look out for himself; the relation of confidence substitutes for that rule, by consent of parties, a reliance upon the statement of the seller, as the full and honest truth: Story on Sales, §§ 380, 381; Story Eq. Juris., §§ 202, 207, 308, 197, 198, 192; 7 Blackf. 178.

A contract of warranty, whether verbal or written, does not prevent a recovery in an action for deceit in any fraudulent and false representations willfully made by the vendor at the time of the purchase: 3 Stew. & Port., 322; 1 Tenn. (Overt.), 174; 2 Woodb. & M., 246; 6 Geo. 584.

OPINION

Campbell J.:

McCormick sued Picard to recover damages on account of false representations whereby the former was induced to purchase of the latter watches and other jewelry to a large amount.

The declaration contains several different counts, and, inasmuch as it is claimed that all or some of them are fatally defective, it becomes necessary to refer to them.

The first count avers the ignorance of plaintiff concerning the value and quality of the articles sold, the defendant's knowledge of such ignorance, he himself being a skillful dealer in such goods, the application by defendant to McCormick to induce him to purchase, the refusal of McCormick to do so except in reliance upon Picard's representations, and a sale based on fraudulent representations of the value of the property, whereby the purchaser was damnified.

The second count is for a breach of warranty of value, by which Picard knowingly, falsely and fraudulently deceived McCormick.

The third count is for false representations concerning the value and quantity of gold in a necklace which Picard, knowing McCormick's ignorance, induced him to purchase by...