Piccirillo v. City of Pembroke Pines
| Decision Date | 14 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 15-cv-62378-BLOOM/Valle |
| Parties | VIRGINIA PICCIRILLO, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF PEMBROKE PINES, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Florida |
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. [21], [22], and [36] ("Motions"), Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, ECF No. [20] ("Amended Complaint" or "Am. Compl."). The Court has reviewed the Motions, all supporting and opposing filings, the record, the applicable law, and is otherwise fully advised. For the reasons set forth below, Counts I, II, III, IV, and V of the Amended Complaint survive Defendants' Motions as asserted against the City of Pembroke Pines, as well as Count VII for liability of Kevin D. Burgs.
On December 22, 2015, Plaintiff Virginia Piccirillo ("Plaintiff" or "Piccirillo"), filed her Amended Complaint, asserting claims against Defendants City of Pembroke Pines (the "City"), Pembroke Pines Police Department (the "PD"), and Kevin D. Burgs ("Burgs," together with the City and the PD, "Defendants") for sexual discrimination and retaliation pursuant to federal and state statute.1 The City hired Plaintiff as a Police Support Specialist with the PD in March 2010,alongside Burgs, a police officer with the PD. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 7-11. Subsequently, Plaintiff became a Police Service Aide. Id. ¶ 13.
The instant controversy arises from a romantic relationship between Plaintiff and Burgs, which lasted from approximately October 2010 until January 2012. Id. After Plaintiff ended the relationship, according to the Amended Complaint, Burgs began exhibiting dangerous, aggressive behavior, including stalking and assaulting Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. One such incident occurred when Plaintiff was returning home from travel, the purpose being "to put some space between herself and Burgs," and found Burgs waiting inside her apartment. Id. ¶ 16. The Amended Complaint alleges that Burgs then sexually assaulted her. Id.2
Burgs' "extreme" conduct also caused Plaintiff to move several times. Id. ¶ 18. However, Plaintiff alleges that, whenever she moved, Burgs used the PD's confidential systems to investigate her new whereabouts. Id. ¶ 19. After locating her, Burgs resumed his stalking behavior. Id. ¶18. Plaintiff eventually moved into her mother's home, because her mother lived in a gated community which she believed would provide needed protection against Burgs. Id. ¶ 20. Nonetheless, Burgs continued to stalk Plaintiff - oftentimes, while he was on duty for the PD. Id.
She reported these incidents3 to her supervisor, the Captain of the PD. Id. ¶¶17, 21. Originally, the Captain moved Burgs to a different team, the burglary surveillance unit. Id. ¶ 21. In this unit, Burgs "was unsupervised on Fridays and had access to multiple unmarked/undercover vehicles[,] which he used to continue to stalk Plaintiff." Id. AfterPlaintiff complained several additional times, she was instructed not to reveal her complaints to human resources and was promised that the PD's internal affairs department would conduct an investigation into Burgs' conduct. Id. ¶¶ 22-23. However, Plaintiff avers that the department failed to take any additional action. Eventually, the Captain told Plaintiff just to "deal with it." Id. ¶ 24. "Ultimately, Plaintiff was constructively discharged, as she had no choice but to resign [from] her employment on December 29, 2013, because her working conditions had become intolerable due to the continued harassment, retaliation[,] and stalking by Officer Burgs and the police department's refusal to remedy the situation."4 Id. ¶ 25.
In total, the Amended Complaint alleges seven separate counts: (1) sex discrimination against the City and PD pursuant to Florida statute; (2) retaliation against the City and PD pursuant to Florida statute; (3) violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and PD; (4) sex discrimination against the City and PD pursuant to Title VII; (5) retaliation against the City and PD pursuant to Title VII; (6) stalking against Burgs; (7) battery against Burgs. Plaintiff alleges that as a direct and proximate result of the unlawful actions alleged by Defendants, she has suffered damages and will continue to suffer injury and damages in the future, including, but not limited to, loss of past and future income, stress, anxiety, and emotional distress. Id. Accordingly, she seeks reasonable attorney's fees, costs, and expenses, declaratory relief, injunctive relief, front pay, in lieu of reinstatement, back pay, interest, and damages for lost employment benefits, as well as compensatory, consequential, and punitive damages for mental anguish and humiliation.
Specifically, pursuant to Count I, Piccirillo alleges that the City and the PD "discriminated against Plaintiff in the terms and conditions of her employment, up to andincluding constructive termination, because of her sex (female)." Id. ¶ 33. The tolerance of Burgs' misconduct and the City's failure to address it, according to Plaintiff, constitute intentional and unlawful discrimination based on sex in violation of the Florida Civil Rights Act of 1992, Fla. Stat. § 760.10, et seq. (the "FCRA"). Id. ¶¶ 34-35. Count II of the Amended Complaint alleges that the City and the PD unlawfully retaliated against her, pursuant to the FCRA, through discrimination in the terms and conditions of her employment, which led to her constructive termination. Id. ¶¶ 38-43. Counts IV and V of the Amended Complaint mirror Counts I and II for sex discrimination and retaliation, but, pursuant to these facts, allege violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, against the City and the PD. Id. ¶¶ 59-62. Ultimately, Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants' acts and omissions, as set forth herein, created a sexually hostile and abusive work environment, which culminated in adverse employment action to the Plaintiff, to wit, her constructive termination. Id. ¶¶ 59-71.
Plaintiff alleges violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City and the PD in Count III of the Amended Complaint. By allowing Burgs to effectuate an illegal search on the police department's confidential systems, discover Plaintiff's new home address, and subsequently hold Plaintiff against her will, Defendants violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights through the acts of their agent, Burgs - specifically, Plaintiff's right to freedom from unreasonable search and seizure, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, as well as her liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 44-47, 50-52. Burgs acted under color of the law, within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and his actions are imputable to Defendants. Id. ¶ 49. Furthermore, Plaintiff avers that it is the policy and practice of the City and the PD to tolerate a pattern of misconduct by an individual under their employ. Id. ¶¶ 53-56. Finally, in connection with Burgs' above-alleged behavior, the Amended Complaint contains allegationsagainst Burgs for stalking in Count VI, pursuant to Fla. Stat. § 784.048, and battery in Count VII. Id. ¶¶ 72-82. Defendants now seek to dismiss all claims.
Rule 8 of the Federal Rules requires a pleading to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although a complaint "does not need detailed factual allegations," it must provide "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007); see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (). In the same vein, a complaint may not rest on "'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557 (alteration in original)). These elements are required to survive a motion brought under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requests dismissal for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted."
When reviewing a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, as a general rule, must accept the plaintiff's allegations as true and evaluate all plausible inferences derived from those facts in favor of the plaintiff. See Chaparro v. Carnival Corp., 693 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th Cir. 2012); Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. S. Everglades Restoration Alliance, 304 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2002); AXA Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Infinity Fin. Grp., LLC, 608 F. Supp. 2d 1349, 1353 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (). Accordingly, a court considering a Rule 12(b) motion is generally limited to the facts contained in the complaint and attached exhibits, including documents referred to in thecomplaint that are central to the claim. See Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009). However, although a court is required to accept all of the allegations contained in the complaint and exhibits attached to the pleadings as true, this tenet is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678; Thaeter v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff's Office, 449 F.3d 1342, 1352 (11th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court was clear that courts "are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Through this lens, the Court addresses the instant Motion.
In the PD's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. [21] ("PD's Motion"), the PD argues that it does not have a legal existence apart from the City and, thus, is not subject to suit. See, e.g., Williams v. Miami-Dade Police Department, 297 F. App'x 941, 945 (11th Cir. 2008) (...
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