Picket Pub. Co. v. Board of Com'rs of Carbon County

• Decision Date: 18 November 1907
• Citation: 92 P. 524,36 Mont. 188
• Parties: PICKET PUB. CO. v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF CARBON COUNTY.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

92 P. 524

36 Mont. 188

PICKET PUB. CO. v. BOARD OF COM'RS OF CARBON COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Montana

November 18, 1907

Appeal from District Court, Carbon County; C. H. Loud, Judge.

Action by the Picket Publishing Company against the board of county commissioners of Carbon county to restrain the violation of a contract. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Albert J. Galen, Atty. Gen., and E. M. Hall, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellant.

HOLLOWAY J.

In December, 1904, the board of county commissioners of Carbon county entered into a contract for the county printing for a term of two years. Upon the expiration of that contract, in December, 1906, the same board entered into a contract with the Picket Publishing Company, plaintiff and respondent herein, by the terms of which that company agreed to do the public printing for Carbon county for two years from December 11, 1906, at a certain specified rate, payments to be made quarterly. The personnel of the board of county commissioners was entirely changed by the election in November, 1906, the new board coming into existence in January, 1907. On January 22, 1907, the new board, without the knowledge or consent of the Picket Publishing Company, made and entered upon its minutes an order which assumed to abrogate and set aside the contract of December, 1906, made by the old board. This action was thereupon commenced by the Picket Publishing Company to restrain the new board from violating that contract. A temporary injunction was issued. The defendant interposed a demurrer to the amended complaint and filed a motion to dissolve the injunction. The demurrer and motion were overruled. The defendant declined to plead further, its default was entered, and, upon a hearing had, a judgment was rendered and entered in favor of the plaintiff, which made perpetual the injunction and awarded plaintiff its costs. From the order refusing to dissolve the injunction and from the final judgment, the defendant appeals.

It is contended on behalf of the appellant that a contract of this character entered into by the outgoing board, which contract extends beyond the term of such board and tends to bind the incoming board, is void, and numerous cases are cited in support of that contention. Bank v. Peck, 43 Kan 643, 23 P. 1077; Shelden v. Butler County, 48 Kan 356, 29 P. 759, 16 L. R. A. 257; Coffee County v Smith, 50 Kan. 350, 32 P. 30; Millikin v. Edgar County, 142 Ill. 528, 32 N.E. 493, 18 L. R. A. 447; Board of Commissioners of Jay County v. Taylor, 123 Ind. 148, 23 N.E. 752, 7 L. R. A. 160; Morrison v Board, 16 Ind.App. 317, 44 N.E. 65; Vacheron v. New York City, 34 Misc. 420, 69 N.Y.S. 608; Hudson County v. Layton, 28 N. J. Law, 244; Franklin County v. Ranck, 9 Ohio Cir. Ct. R. 301, 6 O. C. D. 133; State v. Platner, 43 Iowa, 140. The case of Bank v. Peck arose out of an attempt on the part of the First National Bank of Medicine Lodge to compel the board of county commissioners to deposit the public moneys of that county in such bank, and set up a contract made with the old board for a term of three years. Under the Kansas statutes public moneys are required to be deposited in some bank or banks and interest collected on the average daily balances, but the matter of choosing the particular depository or depositories, and the character of security to be required, are left to the discretion of the several boards. The court held that, since the credit of the designated depository might become impaired or the security furnished valueless, it would be manifestly injurious to the public welfare and against public policy to permit a board of county commissioners to bind the county to deposit in a particular bank for a long period of time. Shelden v. Butler County arose out of the attempted breach of a printing contract. The court held that, since there is not any limit fixed by law upon the time during which a printing contract may run, therefore, if the old board could contract for more than one year, it could likewise for a long term of years-almost an indefinite time. In view of this, and since under the statutes of Kansas the board is required to reorganize once a year, the powers of the board must be held to be limited, in matters of this character, to the making of a contract which does not extend beyond one year. Coffee County v. Smith was decided by the same court, and the same result reached upon the same principles. Millikin v. Edgar County was a controversy between the keeper of the county poor and the board of supervisors. The old board entered into a contract with Millikin to act as keeper for three years. The new board annulled that contract, and this action resulted. The court held that, as there was not any limit expressly imposed by law upon the time during which such a contract might run, therefore, if it could be made to run for a term beyond that of the board making it, it might likewise be made to run for many years; but the court, construing the statute of Illinois authorizing the employment of such keeper with other provisions of the laws of that state-which are not set out in the opinion-reached the conclusion that the legislative intent was to limit the term of such employment by any board to one year. In the case of Board of Jay County v. Taylor the court particularly characterizes the contract under consideration in that case as one which was not for the public welfare, and, since it provided for the employment of a legal advisor to the board, the old board ought not to be permitted by such a contract to impose upon the new board an attorney in whom the new board might not have any confidence. The court held that the contract was void as against public policy. Morrison v. Board arose out of the attempt by a county auditor, after his successor had been elected and 18 months before the next election, to bind his county by a contract which he made with a printing house to furnish the necessary election blanks, books, etc., for such election. The court held...