Pickett v. Brown

Citation76 L.Ed.2d 372,103 S.Ct. 2199,462 U.S. 1
Decision Date06 June 1983
Docket NumberNo. 82-5576,82-5576
PartiesJeffrey Lee PICKETT, etc. et al., Appellants v. Braxton BROWN et al
CourtUnited States Supreme Court
Syllabus

Under Tennessee law the father of an illegitimate child is responsible for the child's support. Enforcement of this obligation depends on the establishment of paternity. A Tennessee statute provides that a paternity and support action must be filed within two years of the child's birth unless the father has provided support or has acknowledged his paternity in writing, or unless the child is, or is liable to become, a public charge, in which case the State or any person can bring suit at any time prior to the child's 18th birthday. In May 1978, appellant mother of an illegitimate child born in November 1968 brought a paternity and support action in the Tennessee Juvenile Court against appellee Brown, who moved to dismiss the action on the ground that it was barred by the 2-year limitations period. The court held that the limitations period violated, inter alia, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because it imposed a restriction on the support rights of some illegitimate children that was not imposed on the identical rights of legitimate children. The Tennessee Supreme Court reversed and upheld the constitutionality of the 2-year limitations period.

Held: The 2-year limitations period in question denies certain illegitimate children the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 7-18.

(a) Restrictions on support suits by illegitimate children "will survive equal protection scrutiny to the extent that they are substantially related to a legitimate state interest." Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99, 102 S.Ct. 1549, 1554-1555, 71 L.Ed.2d 770. The period for obtaining paternal support has to be long enough to provide a reasonable opportunity for those with an interest in illegitimate children to bring suit on their behalf; and any time limit on that opportunity has to be substantially related to the State's interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. Id., at 99-100, 102 S.Ct., at 1554-1555. Pp. 99-100.

(b) Here, the 2-year limitations period does not provide an illegitimate child who is not covered by one of the exceptions in the statute with an adequate opportunity to obtain support. The mother's financial difficulties caused by the child's birth, the loss of income attributable to the need to care for the child, continuing affection for the child's father, a desire to avoid family and community disapproval, and emotional strain and confusion that often attends the birth of an illegitimate child, all may inhibit a mother from filing a paternity suit within two years after the child's birth. Pp. 12-13.

(c) Nor is the 2-year limitations period substantially related to the legitimate state interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. It amounts to a restriction effectively extinguishing the support rights of illegitimate children that cannot be justified by the problems of proof surrounding paternity actions. The State's argument that the different treatment accorded legitimate and illegitimate children is sustantially related to the above legitimate state interest is seriously undermined by the exception for illegitimate children who are, or are likely to become, public charges, since claims filed on behalf of these children when they are more than two years old would be just as stale or as vulnerable to fraud as claims filed on behalf of illegitimate children who are not public charges at the same age. Moreover, the fact that Tennessee tolls most actions during a child's minority, when considered in combination with the above factors, leads one to question whether the burden placed on illegitimate children is designed to advance permissible state interests. And the advances in blood testing render more attenuated the relationship between a statute of limitations and the State's interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. Pp. 13-18.

638 S.W.2d 369 (Tenn.1982), reversed and remanded.

Harold W. Horne, Memphis, Tenn., for appellants.

Susan Short, Nashville, Tenn., for appellees.

Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case requires us to decide the constitutionality of a provision of a Tennessee statute 1 that imposes a two-year limitations period on paternity and child support actions brought on behalf of certain illegitimate children.

I

Under Tennessee law both fathers and mothers are responsible for the support of their minor children. See Tenn.Code Ann. § 34-101 (1977); Rose Funeral Home, Inc. v. Julian, 176 Tenn. 534, 539, 144 S.W.2d 755, 757 (1940); Brooks v. Brooks, 166 Tenn. 255, 257, 61 S.W.2d 654 (1933). This duty of support is enforceable throughout the child's minority. See Blackburn v. Blackburn, 526 S.W.2d 463, 466 (Tenn.1975); Whitt v. Whitt, 490 S.W.2d 159, 160 (Tenn.1973). See also Tenn.Code Ann. §§ 36-820, 36-828 (1977). Tennessee law also makes the father of a child born out of wedlock responsible for "the necessary support and education of the child." § 36-223. See also Brown v. Thomas, 221 Tenn. 319, 323, 426 S.W.2d 496, 498 (1968). Enforcement of this obligation depends on the establishment of paternity. Tennessee Code Ann. § 36-224(1) (1977) 2 provides for the fil- ing of a petition which can lead both to the establishment of paternity and to enforcement of the father's duty of support. With a few exceptions, however, the petition must be filed within two years of the child's birth. See § 36-224(2); n. 1, supra.

In May 1978, Frances Annette Pickett filed an action pursuant to § 36-224(1) seeking to establish that Braxton Brown was the father of her son, Jeffrey Lee Pickett, who was born on November 1, 1968. App. 3. Frances Pickett also sought an order from the court requiring Brown to contribute to the support and maintenance of the child. Ibid. Brown denied that he was the father of the child. Id., at 13. It is uncontested that he had never acknowledged the child as his own or contributed to the child's support. Id., at 5-6, 13-14; Brief for Appellant 5. Brown moved to dismiss the suit on the ground that it was barred by the two-year limitations period established by § 36-224(2). Frances Pickett responded with a motion challenging the constitutionality of the limitations period. App. 5-7, 13.3

The Juvenile Court held that the two-year limitations period violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and certain provisions of the Tennessee Constitution. Id., at 14. The court based its conclusion on the fact that the limitations period governing paternity actions imposed a restriction on the support rights of some illegitimate children that was not imposed on the identical rights of legitimate children. Ibid. Without articulating any clear standard of review, the court rejected the State's argument that the two-year limitations period was justified by the State's interest in preventing the litigation of "stale or spurious" claims. Id., at 15. In the court's view, this argument was undermined by the exception to the limitations period established for illegitimate children who are, or are likely to become, public charges, for "the possibilities of fraud, perjury, or litigation of stale claims [are] no more inherent in a case brought [for] a child who is not receiving public assistance than [in] a case brought for a child who is a public charge." Ibid.4

On appeal,5 the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Juvenile Court and upheld the constitutionality of the two-year limitations period. Pickett v. Brown, 638 S.W.2d 369 (Tenn.1982). In addressing Frances Pickett's equal protection and due process challenges to the statute, the court first reviewed our decision in Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 102 S.Ct. 1549, 71 L.Ed.2d 770 (1982), and several decisions from other state courts. Based on this review, the court stated that the inquiry with respect to both claims was "essentially the same: whether the state's policy as reflected in the statute affords a fair and reasonable opportunity for the mother to decide in a rational way whether or not the child's best interest would be served by her bringing a paternity suit." 638 S.W.2d, at 376. The court concluded that "[t]he Legislature could rationally determine that two years is long enough for most women to have recovered physically and emotionally, and to be able to assess their and their children's situations logically and realistically." Id., at 379.

The court also found that the two-year statute of limitations was substantially related to the State's valid interest in preventing the litigation of stale or fraudulent claims. Id., at 380. The court justified the longer limitations period for illegitimates who are, or are likely to become, public charges, on the ground that "[t]he state's countervailing interest in doing justice and reducing the number of people on welfare is served by allowing the state a longer time during which to sue." Ibid. The court also suggested that "the Tennessee statute is 'carefully tuned' to avoid hardship in predictable groups of cases, since it contains an exception for actions against men who have acknowledged their children in writing or by supporting them, and it has been held that . . . regular or substantial payments are not required in order to constitute 'support.' " Id., at 379. Finally, the court found that the uniqueness of the limitations period in not being tolled during the plaintiff's minority did not "alone requir[e] a holding of unconstitutionality of a two-year period, as opposed to any other period which can end during the plaintiff's minority." Id., at 380.6

We noted probable jurisdiction. --- U.S. ----, 103 S.Ct. 486, 74 L.Ed.2d 630 (1982). We reverse.

II

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