Piedmont Public Service Dist. v. Cowart
| Decision Date | 17 October 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 24521,24521 |
| Citation | 324 S.C. 239,478 S.E.2d 836 |
| Parties | PIEDMONT PUBLIC SERVICE DISTRICT, Respondent, v. Douglas W. COWART, Petitioner. . Heard |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Deborah R.J. Shupe, of Berry, Adams, Quackenbush & Dunbar, P.A., and Herbert W. Louthian, Jr., of Louthian & Louthian, Columbia, for petitioner.
Michael A. Farry and Vance B. Drawdy, both of Horton, Drawdy, Ward & Johnson, P.A., Greenville, for respondent.
This case is before us on a writ of certiorari to review the Court of Appeals' decision 1 affirming the circuit court's ruling that petitioner Cowart's employment contract with respondent (District) was not binding on District's successor commissioners. We affirm.
On November 1, 1984, District's four commissioners signed a contract with Cowart for him to serve as administrator for a twenty-year period. This employment contract was subsequently modified 2 to add a severance clause allowing District to fire Cowart with or without cause only upon five years' notice or the payment of five years' severance pay.
By November 12, 1992, District's entire board of commissioners had changed. The new commissioners voted to terminate Cowart without cause and pay him his annual salary of $37,781.40 for the next five years as required under the severance clause of the employment contract. They made an immediate payment of $30,000. Several weeks later, 3 District informed Cowart that the vote to terminate him had been taken in violation of the Freedom of Information Act and was therefore rescinded. It directed Cowart to return the $30,000 payment which he refused to do. District then terminated Cowart for insubordination.
District subsequently commenced this action seeking a declaration the employment contract with Cowart was void and demanding a return of the $30,000 payment. The trial judge granted District's motion for summary judgment. He found District properly rescinded Cowart's termination because of the Freedom of Information Act violation. 4 Further, he found Cowart's insubordination was just cause for termination and the employment contract, including the five-year severance clause, was void. Accordingly, he ordered Cowart to pay District $30,000 with pre-judgment interest.
Both the trial judge and the Court of Appeals relied on Newman v. McCullough, 212 S.C. 17, 46 S.E.2d 252 (1948), and found the employment contract was not binding on the commissioners who terminated Cowart because the contract extended beyond the terms of the commissioners who signed it. In Newman, we held the appointment or removal of a public officer is a governmental function that cannot be impaired by an employment contract extending beyond the terms of the members of the local governing body. Id. at 23, 46 S.E.2d at 255. Such a contract is not binding on the successors to the local governing body.
Newman allows an exception, however, where the enabling legislation clearly authorizes the local governing body to make a contract extending beyond its members' own terms. Id. at 23, 46 S.E.2d at 255. Cowart argues the exception applies in this case because District's enabling legislation gives it the power of "perpetual succession." 5 The Court of Appeals rejected Cowart's proposed exception finding the policy considerations to be the same even if the governing body has perpetual succession by its enabling legislation.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the policy considerations are not changed by the bestowal of perpetual succession. The purpose of the rule in Newman is to prevent impairment of the successor commissioners' right to exercise discretion regarding governmental functions. Perpetual succession relates only to corporate business and proprietary functions, 6 functions distinguished in Newman from governmental functions. 7 To qualify for the exception under Newman, the enabling legislation must clearly authorize a contract...
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Cunningham v. Anderson Cnty.
...its administrator that required five years' severance pay. 319 S.C. 124, 459 S.E.2d 876 (Ct.App.1995)( Cowart I ),aff'd,324 S.C. 239, 478 S.E.2d 836 (1996)( Cowart II ). Relying on Newman v. McCullough, 212 S.C. 17, 46 S.E.2d 252 (1948), which involved an employment contract with the City o......
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Anderson Cnty. v. Joey Preston & the S.C. Ret. Sys., Opinion No. 5490.
...discharge claim. Bright also advised the committee that, under our supreme court's ruling in Piedmont Public Service District v. Cowart (Cowart II ), 324 S.C. 239, 478 S.E.2d 836 (1996), the County had a good argument that Preston's Employment Agreement was voidable—and therefore, had no va......
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Bishop v. City of Columbia
...a contract claim. See Piedmont Pub. Serv. Dist. v. Cowart, 319 S.C. 124, 131, 459 S.E.2d 876, 880 (Ct.App.1995), aff'd by324 S.C. 239, 478 S.E.2d 836 (1996). Further cases hold that estoppel will not lie against a governmental entity when the government's employee gives erroneous informatio......
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Cunningham v. Anderson Cnty.
...administrator that required five years' severance pay. 319 S.C. 124, 459 S.E.2d 876 (Ct. App. 1995) (Cowart I), aff'd, 324 S.C. 239, 478 S.E.2d 836 (1996) (Cowart II). The court held that the contract involved the "governmental or legislative powers" of the District, and, therefore, could n......