Piedra, Inc. v. Transp. Commission

• Court: Court of Appeals of New Mexico
• Writing for the Court: Sutin
• Citation: Piedra, Inc. v. Transp. Commission, 188 P.3d 106, 2008 NMCA 89 (N.M. App. 2008)
• Decision Date: 31 March 2008
• Docket Number: No. 26,923.,26,923.
• Parties: PIEDRA, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE OF NEW MEXICO TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION, John Hummer, Johnny Cope, Norman Assed, Jim Franken, David Schutz, and Greg Ortiz, as Commissioners for The New Mexico State Transportation Commission, The New Mexico Department of Transportation, a State Agency, and Rhonda G. Faught, P.E., Cabinet Secretary, Defendants-Appellants.

188 P.3d 106

2008 NMCA 089

PIEDRA, INC., Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE OF NEW MEXICO TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION, John Hummer, Johnny Cope, Norman Assed, Jim Franken, David Schutz, and Greg Ortiz, as Commissioners for The New Mexico State Transportation Commission, The New Mexico Department of Transportation, a State Agency, and Rhonda G. Faught, P.E., Cabinet Secretary, Defendants-Appellants.

No. 26,923.

Court of Appeals of New Mexico.

March 31, 2008.

Certiorari Denied, No. 31,071, May 22, 2008.

Scheuer, Yost and Patterson, P.C., Donald A. Walcott, Christopher M. Grimmer, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellee.

New Mexico Department of Transportation, Germaine R. Chappelle, William T. Moyers, Dan Gershon, Santa Fe, NM, for Appellants.

OPINION

SUTIN, Chief Judge.

{1} The New Mexico Department of Transportation (the Department) and the New Mexico State Transportation Commission (the Commission), together with other defendants¹, appeal and assert that the district court erred in holding that they acted in excess of delegated authority in conveying parts of a road in the state highway system to the Pueblo of San Juan (the Pueblo) and to the County of Rio Arriba (the County). They also assert that the district court lacked jurisdiction to review the action of the Commission in declaring part of the road vacated and abandoned. We hold that, under the particular facts in this case, Defendants did not act in excess of their delegated authority. We further hold that the district court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction.

BACKGROUND

{2} This case involves a road in the State of New Mexico highway system, State Road 582 (SR 582). A little over a mile and a half of SR 582 ran through and therefore existed within the lands of the Pueblo. This portion of the road consisted of the Department's right-of-way easement that was obtained from the Pueblo. A larger, northern portion of just less than seven and a half miles ran through and therefore existed within the County. This portion of the road was owned by the Department. Defendants had statutory administrative and management duties, and certain delegated authority, with respect to SR 582. See NMSA 1978, §§ 67-3-1 to -66 (1909, as amended through 2006).

{3} In 1999 the Pueblo sought to obtain and assume control over that portion of SR 582 that ran through its land, which we refer to as "the Pueblo portion of the road." The Pueblo's request was made as a part of negotiations between the Department and the Pueblo over the Department's plans to realign and widen nearby U.S. 84/285, a federal highway situated immediately to the west of the Pueblo's village. The Department needed to acquire a new right-of-way from the Pueblo for the U.S. 84/285 work. The Department agreed to transfer the Pueblo portion of the road to the Pueblo, and to spend approximately $150,000 to improve the Pueblo portion of the road and also to pay the Pueblo $171,660 for the new right-of-way for the widened portion of U.S. 84/285. This transfer was carried out pursuant to a written Declaration of Vacation and Abandonment (the declaration) approved by the Commission and accepted by the Pueblo in July 2000. The Commission declared the Pueblo portion of the road vacated and abandoned and stated that, upon execution of a road exchange agreement between the Commission and the County conveying the balance of SR 582 to the County "(1) all rights, title, and interest to the [Pueblo portion of the road] shall vest in the Pueblo, (2) the Pueblo shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the [Pueblo portion of the road], and (3) the [Pueblo portion of the road] shall be deleted from the state highway system." The Commission made the declaration effective immediately upon the execution of a road exchange agreement between the Commission and the County conveying or transferring the balance of SR 582 to the County. With respect to this transfer, the Department and the Commission agreed to spend an estimated $850,000 to improve that portion of SR 582 being conveyed to the County.

{4} Earlier, in March 2000, the Department signed and the Commission approved the Road Exchange Agreement (the exchange agreement) with the County. In the exchange agreement, the Department agreed to delete a 7.349 mile portion of SR 582 from the state highway and maintenance systems and to transfer title of it to the County.

{5} Piedra owns and operates a gravel mining operation situated along SR 582. Piedra and its assigns use the Pueblo portion of the road to transport gravel to various delivery sites. It appears that in the past, the Pueblo regulated travel on the Pueblo portion of the road through enforcement of traffic laws against Piedra drivers. It also appears that the Pueblo owns a competing gravel operation in the area.

{6} In April 2003, the Pueblo's realty officer, Herman Agoyo, sent a letter to Piedra (the Agoyo letter). The realty officer informed Piedra's owner that the Department had conveyed its right, title, and interest in the Pueblo portion of the road to the Pueblo. The Agoyo letter further stated:

Since the 1990s, the Pueblo has regulated traffic, including vehicle weights, on S.R. 582 to protect the public health and safety of the residents of the Pueblo of San Juan. As you know, these Pueblo regulations affect your company's sand and gravel hauling operations on S.R. 582. I plan to discuss this matter with the Tribal Council soon, and after doing so, I would like to meet with you to discuss our respective interests in an effort to reach an accommodation over the use of this tribal road. Please let me know when you are available to meet.

No meeting occurred. Piedra filed the present suit in November 2003 and, in an amended complaint, Piedra sued in mandamus to require Defendants to maintain SR 582 as a state road in the state highway system. After the parties filed motions for summary judgment, the district court entered an order in June 2006 granting Piedra's motion and denying Defendants' motion.

{7} In its June 2006 order, the district court determined, among other things, that Defendants lacked the "requisite statutory authority to permanently transfer or convey ownership of roads" and "to promulgate rules or policies that would grant them [such] authority." The court issued a writ of mandamus, in which it found that Defendants "exceeded the authority granted to them by the [L]egislature ... by entering into or otherwise approving" the exchange agreement and the declaration. The writ required the Commission, its individual members, and the Secretary "to desist from enforcing, implementing, completing, finalizing, or effectuating" the declaration and the exchange agreement, and to continue to maintain SR 582 "in full compliance with statutory law."

{8} Defendants appeal, asserting first that the court erred in issuing the writ finding that Defendants exceeded the authority granted them by the Legislature. Defendants' second point is that the court erred in issuing the writ because the exercise by Defendants of legislatively delegated authority is not subject to judicial review. Ancillary to this second issue, Defendants contend that a mandamus writ is improper where, as here, Defendants were exercising statutorily delegated discretionary power, and they also contend that Piedra lacked standing to challenge Defendants' actions.

DISCUSSION

{9} We preface our analyses with the various statutes that play a role in the parties' arguments. We then set out specific determinations the district court made with respect to certain statutes. Thereafter, we address the various arguments and issues that need to be addressed to properly dispose of this case on appeal.

A. Pertinent Statutes and Department Regulation

{10} The parties argue the application of several statutes. We first set out those pertinent in this case to the duty and authority of Defendants pursuant to Chapter 67 of the statutes to establish and maintain public roads and highways. Section 67-3-14 states that the Commission "has charge of all policy matters pertaining to the expenditure of the state road fund in the construction, improvement and maintenance of state highways." § 67-3-14(A). The Commission may make rules and regulations governing those matters. § 67-3-14(B). Section 67-3-16 states that the Commission has "the duty ... to construct, repair and maintain, at the expense of the state . . . such public roads and highways, within the state, as in their judgment will best subserve the interest of the general public, looking to the construction and maintenance of a complete system of highways in the state." Id. Under Section 67-3-26, the Secretary, under the direction of the Commission, is to "select and designate the highways that should comprise a system of state roads, which shall, as nearly as practicable, be such as will serve the traffic needs and develop the resources of the state." Id. The designation of the system of state roads "may be changed or added to from time to time by the secretary subject to the approval of the [Commission]". Id. Pursuant to Section 67-3-28, the Department has authority to enter into cooperative agreements with a broad number of government entities to share expense relating to construction and improvement of highways or for the acquisition of rights-of-way. Id. Section 67-3-37 grants the Commission rights to acquire property and property rights in connection with construction or reconstruction of the national system of interstate and defense highways. § 67-3-37(A). Under Section 67-3-40, the Commission is given "full control over all roads designated by the commission as state highways"; however, if insufficient funds exist in the state road fund for the maintenance of the highways, the statute requires the highways to "be improved and maintained wholly by the respective counties until sufficient funds shall be provided in the state road fund to enable the state to take over and maintain them as state...