Pier 48 Indy LLC v. Knipscheer (In re Knipscheer)
Decision Date | 28 March 2023 |
Docket Number | 20-02581-JMC-7A,Adversary Proceeding 20-50114 |
Parties | IN RE: FREDERICUS JAN KNIPSCHEER, JR., Debtor. v. FREDERICUS JAN KNIPSCHEER, JR., Defendant. PIER 48 INDY LLC, Plaintiff, |
Court | U.S. Bankruptcy Court — Southern District of Indiana |
THIS ADVERSARY PROCEEDING comes before the Court on Pier 48 Indy LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Pier 48 Indy LLC ("Creditor") on February 16, 2022 (Docket No. 33) (the "Motion"). The Court having reviewed and considered the Motion, Pier 48 Indy LLC's Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Creditor on February 16, 2022 (Docket No. 34) (the "Brief), the Amended Complaint to Determine Dischargeability of Debt Pursuant to Section 523(a)(2), 523(a)(4), and 523(a)(6) filed by Creditor on August 11, 2020 (Docket No. 6) (the "Complaint") the Answer, Defenses, and Affirmative Defenses filed by Fredericus Jan Knipscheer, Jr. ("Debtor") on October 15, 2020 (Docket No. 12) (the "Answer") and the evidence designated by Creditor in support of the Motion (Docket No. 33-1), having noted that no response to the Motion was timely filed, and being duly advised, now GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion.
Creditor moves the Court to enter summary judgment in its favor and against Debtor pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56, made applicable to this adversary proceeding by Fed.R.Bankr.P. 7056.
To obtain summary judgment, Creditor must show that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that Creditor is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The burden rests on Creditor, as the moving party, to demonstrate that there is an absence of evidence to support the case of Debtor, the nonmoving party. Celotex Corp. v Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554 (1986). After Creditor demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue for trial, the responsibility shifts to Debtor to "go beyond the pleadings" to cite evidence of a genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment. Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. If Debtor does not come forward with evidence that would reasonably permit the Court to find in Debtor's favor on a material issue of fact and if the law is with Creditor, then the Court must enter summary judgment against Debtor. Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir. 1994) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-87, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1355-56 (1986); Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-24, 106 S.Ct. at 2552-53; and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511-12 (1986)).
The Court first looks to the evidence presented by Creditor to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, including (1) the Affidavit of Keith Stucker in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment attached to the Motion (Docket No. 33-1) (the "Stucker Affidavit"); (2) matters deemed admitted by virtue of Debtor's failure to respond to Plaintiff's Request for Admissions (Docket No. 31-1) (the "Admissions") attached to Plaintiff's Verified Motion to Deem Requests Admitted filed by Creditor on February 7, 2022 (Docket No. 31) and by virtue of this Court's Order on Plaintiff's Verified Motion to Deem Requests Admitted entered on February 10, 2022 (Docket No. 32);[1] and (3) the allegations Creditor made in the Complaint that Debtor admitted in the Answer.[2] "Admissions made under Rule 36, even default admissions, can serve as the factual predicate for summary judgment." United States v. Kasuboski, 834 F.2d 1345, 1350 (7th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted). "[Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(b)] provides that a matter admitted is 'conclusively established.'" Id.
Debtor is deemed to have admitted the following material facts:[3]
There are no additional material facts that were offered via the Stucker Affidavit nor through allegations in the Complaint that were admitted by Debtor in the Answer.
Creditor alleges that a debt owed by Debtor to Creditor is nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A), (a)(4) and/or (a)(6).[4]
Exceptions to discharge under § 523 "are to be construed strictly against a creditor and liberally in favor of the debtor." In re Zarzynski, 771 F.2d 304, 306 (7th Cir. 1985). "The burden is on the objecting creditor to prove exceptions to discharge." Goldberg Sec., Inc. v. Scarlata (In re Scarlata), 979 F.2d 521, 524 (7th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). The burden of proof required is a preponderance of the evidence. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 291, 111 S.Ct. 654, 661, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991).
Section 523 provides, in relevant part:
Reasoning - § 523(a)(2)(A)
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals distinguishes material differences among the three possible grounds for nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2)(A) and has formulated two different tests, one for both "false pretenses" and "false representation" and another for "actual fraud." See Rae v. Scarpello (In re Scarpello), 272 B.R. 691, 699-700 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 2002) (citing McClellan v. Cantrell, 217 F.3d 890, 894 (7th Cir. 2000)).
To prevail on a nondischargeability claim under the "false pretenses" or "false representation" theory, a creditor must prove all of the following elements: "(1) the debtor made a false representation or omission, (2) that the debtor (a) knew was false or made with reckless disregard for the truth and (b) was made with the intent to deceive, (3) upon which the creditor justifiably relied." Ojeda v. Goldberg, 599 F.3d 712, 716-17 (7th Cir. 2010).
"What constitutes 'false pretenses' in the context of § 523(a)(2)(A) has been defined as 'implied misrepresentations or conduct intended to create and foster a false impression.'" Mem'l Hosp. v. Sarama (In re Sarama), 192 B.R. 922, 927 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 1996) (quoting Banner Oil Co. v. Bryson (In re Bryson), 187 B.R. 939, 959 (Bankr. N.D.Ill. 1995) (quotations omitted)). Id. at 928 (citation omitted).
A "false representation" is a...
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