Pier v. Board of Assessment Review of Town of Niskayuna

• Decision Date: 03 November 1994
• Citation: 209 A.D.2d 788,617 N.Y.S.2d 1004
• Parties: In the Matter of James B. PIER et al., Respondents, v. BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW OF the TOWN OF NISKAYUNA, Respondent, and Elin M. Howe, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, Proposed Intervenor-Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 1004

617 N.Y.S.2d 1004

209 A.D.2d 788

In the Matter of James B. PIER et al., Respondents, v. BOARD OF ASSESSMENT REVIEW OF the TOWN OF NISKAYUNA, Respondent and Elin M. Howe, as Commissioner of the New York State Office of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, Proposed Intervenor-Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division Third Department.

Nov. 3, 1994.

G. Oliver Koppell, Atty. Gen. (Barbara A. Mehlman, of counsel), New York City, for proposed intervenor-appellant.

Grasso, Rodriguez, Putorti, Grasso & Zyra (Lawrence J. Zyra, of counsel), Schenectady, for James B. Pier and another, respondents.

Before CREW, J.P., and CASEY, YESAWICH and PETERS, JJ.

YESAWICH, Justice.

Appeal from that part of an order of the Supreme Court (Keniry, J.), entered July 8, 1993 in Schenectady County, which, in a proceeding pursuant to RPTL article 7, denied a motion by the Commissioner of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities to intervene.

At issue is whether the Commissioner of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities should be permitted to intervene in a tax certiorari proceeding brought by petitioners, wherein they claim that the assessor improperly failed to take into consideration the decrease in their property's value allegedly caused by the proximity of a group home for the mentally disabled. The pertinent facts are set out in Supreme Court's decision (158 Misc.2d 732, 601 N.Y.S.2d 413). His motion to intervene having been denied, the Commissioner appeals.

The Commissioner maintains that Supreme Court acted injudiciously by refusing to permit him to intervene pursuant to CPLR 1013. While the only requirement for obtaining an order permitting intervention via this section is the existence of a common question of law or fact, the resolution of such a motion is nevertheless a matter of discretion (see, Kaczmarek v. Shoffstall, 119 A.D.2d 1001, 1002, 500 N.Y.S.2d 902). As a consequence, when deciding whether to grant such a request, a court may properly balance the benefit to be gained by intervention, and the extent to which the proposed intervenor may be harmed if it is refused, against other factors, such as the degree to which the proposed intervention will delay and unduly complicate the litigation (see, Osman v. Sternberg, 168 A.D.2d 490, 562 N.Y.S.2d 731). These latter considerations, which are grounded in general concepts of judicial efficiency and fairness to the original litigants, are more likely to be outweighed, and intervention therefore warranted, when the intervenor has a direct and substantial interest in the outcome of the proceeding. When that interest is less substantial or more indirect, other elements take on greater importance.

In our judgment, the Commissioner's interest in this proceeding is insubstantial. As Supreme Court aptly observed, "[w]ere intervention to be permitted in this case, the convenience store operator or the apartment building owner located down the street from a disgruntled taxpayer or indeed, the next door neighbor, would have to be afforded the same right to intervene...