Pierce County v. State

Decision Date30 October 2003
Docket NumberNo. 73607-3.,73607-3.
PartiesPIERCE COUNTY, a local government in the State of Washington; Gloria Irene Thein, a Pierce County resident, voter, taxpayer, vehicle owner, vehicle driver, and public transportation user; City of Tacoma, a local government in the State of Washington; William La-Borde, a Tacoma resident, taxpayer, vehicle owner, vehicle driver, and public transportation user; King County, a local government in the State of Washington; Karen Uffelman, a King County resident, voter, taxpayer, vehicle owner, vehicle driver, and public transportation user, Respondents, and Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority, commonly known as "Sound Transit", a Washington regional transit authority; The Sierra Club, a non-profit public benefit corporation; 1000 Friends of Washington, a Washington non-profit corporation; King County Labor Council, a Washington non-profit corporation; Washington State Labor Council, a Washington non-profit organization; City of Kenmore, a Washington municipal corporation; Transportation Choices Coalition, a Washington non-profit benefit corporation; Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587, a labor organization; and Aerospace Machinist Union, a labor organization, Intervenor-Respondents, v. STATE of Washington, in its general capacity as defender of I-776, and through its agency the Washington Department of Licensing, Appellant, and Salish Village Home Owners Association, a Washington non-profit association; and G. Dennis Vaughn, a citizen and taxpayer resident of King County, Intervenor-Appellants, and Permanent Offense, a non-profit organization ex rel. Initiative 776, Intervenor-Defendant.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Rowley & Klauser, Robert Rowley, James Klauser, Seattle, Christine Gregoire Atty. Gen., James Pharris, Linda Moran, Jerald Anderson, Asst. Attys. Gen., for appellant.

Frank & Rosen, Clifford Freed, Foster, Pepper & Shefelman, Thomas Ahearne, Hugh Spitzer, Alice Ostdiek, Preston, Gates & Ellis, Paul Lawrence, Desmond Brown, Seattle, for respondents.

Norm Maleng, King County Prosecutor, Thomas Kuffel, Noel Treat, Deputy County Prosecutors, for respondent King County.

Mark Kimball, Bellevue, for defendant Permanent Offense.

OWENS, J.

In November 2002, voters passed another $30 license tab initiative, Initiative Measure 776 (I-776).1 In February 2003, the King County Superior Court declared I-776 unconstitutional on the grounds that it embraced more than a single subject and substantially impaired King County's contractual obligations to its bondholders. This court accepted direct review. Because we conclude that I-776 did not violate the Washington State Constitution, we reverse the superior court's grant of summary judgment and remand for proceedings consistent with this decision.

FACTS

I-776 was filed with the secretary of state on January 7, 2002, as an initiative to the people. CONST. art. II, § 1(a). The sponsors entitled the initiative "AN ACT Relating to limiting government-imposed charges on motor vehicles." Clerk's Papers (CP) at 19. Pursuant to RCW 29.79.035(1) and (2) and 29.79.040, the attorney general's office prepared a ballot measure summary and the following ballot title for the initiative:

Initiative Measure No. 776 concerns state and local government charges on motor vehicles. This measure would require license tab fees to be $30 per year for motor vehicles, including light trucks. Certain local-option vehicle excise taxes and fees used for roads and transit would be repealed.

Should this measure be enacted into law?

Yes [ ] No [ ]

CP at 18. On November 5, 2002, the voters approved the ballot measure by a majority vote. The measure was to take effect on December 5, 2002, 30 days after the election, as provided in article II, section 1(d) of the state constitution.

On November 27, 2002, Pierce County, the City of Tacoma, two Pierce County residents, and one King County resident filed a complaint in King County,2 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on the grounds that I-776 was unconstitutional. On December 2, 2002, King County joined the suit by amended complaint. Two days later, King County Superior Court Judge Mary Yu granted Pierce County's motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining implementation of I-776 in King and Pierce Counties prior to a hearing on the merits. A summary judgment hearing on cross-motions for summary judgment was set for January 31, 2003.

On December 16, 2002, the superior court permitted intervention on Pierce County's side by the Central Puget Sound Regional Transit Authority (Sound Transit) and eight other parties. Four days later, G. Dennis Vaughn and Salish Village Condominium Association (Salish) moved to intervene and filed a complaint seeking a declaration that I-776 was constitutional and that Sound Transit was not a constitutionally formed entity. The superior court granted the motion to intervene on December 27 but restricted Salish's claims to the constitutionality of I-776. On January 23, 2003, the court granted Permanent Offense's January 14 motion to intervene as a defendant.

Oral argument on cross-motions for summary judgment was heard on January 31, 2003. On February 10, the superior court filed a memorandum decision and order, granting judgment in favor of Pierce County. The court concluded that Pierce County was entitled to summary judgment on two alternative grounds: (1) that I-776 violated article II, section 19 of the state constitution (the single-subject and subject-in-title requirement); and (2) that I-776 violated article I, section 23 of the state constitution because I-776's repeal of a $15 motor vehicle fee impaired King County's obligations to its bondholders.

The State and Salish sought direct review, which this court granted on an accelerated basis.

ISSUES

(1) (Raised by the State and Salish) Did the superior court properly conclude that I-776 violated article II, section 19 of the state constitution, which provides that "[n]o bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title"?

(a) Did precatory language in I-776 (specifically, policy expressions regarding transit agencies that have levied motor vehicle excise taxes) introduce a second "subject," as that term is used in article II, section 19?

(b) If I-776 embraced but a single subject, did the ballot title express that subject?

(2) (Raised by the State and Salish) Did the superior court correctly determine that I-776 violated article I, section 23 of the state constitution, which provides that "[n]o... law impairing the obligations of contracts shall ever be passed"?

(3) (Raised by Pierce County) Did I-776 violate constitutional precepts of local home rule set forth in article XI, sections 4 and 12 of the state constitution?

(4) (Raised by Sound Transit) In repealing the MVET, did I-776 exceed the scope of the initiative power prescribed in article II, section 1 of the state constitution or violate Sound Transit's due process rights, guaranteed in article I, section 3?

(6) (Raised by Salish) Is Salish entitled to attorney fees?

ANALYSIS

Standard of Review. The State and Salish seek reversal of the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Pierce County. This court's review is de novo. Wash. Fed'n of State Employees v. State, 127 Wash.2d 544, 551, 901 P.2d 1028 (1995). Summary judgment is properly granted where "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and ... the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." CR 56(c). As with the interpretation of a statute, the interpretation of an initiative is a question of law, subject to de novo review. See Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash.2d 183, 204-06, 11 P.3d 762, 27 P.3d 608 (2000)

; Wash. Fed'n,

127 Wash.2d at 556,

901 P.2d 1028 (noting that the people's approval of an initiative is equivalent to the legislature's enactment of a statute).

I-776's Satisfaction of Single-Subject and Subject-in-Title Requirements. Article II, section 19 of the state constitution requires that "[n]o bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title." The oft-acknowledged purpose of the first clause, the single-subject provision, is to prevent "[l]ogrolling or hodgepodge legislation," the tactic of attaching an unpopular bill to a popular one on an unrelated subject. Wash. Fed'n,127 Wash.2d at 554,901 P.2d 1028; Amalgamated, 142 Wash.2d at 207,11 P.3d 762; see WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1331 (1993) (defining "logrolling" as "the trading of votes by legislators to secure favorable action on projects of interest to each one"). In Power, Inc. v. Huntley, 39 Wash.2d 191, 235 P.2d 173 (1951), this court identified "the clearest possible illustration of the kind of `logrolling,' the `you-scratch-my-back-and-I'll-scratch-yours' situation that the constitutional provision was designed to prevent"; in that case, "neither the appropriation bill, ... nor the corporation income tax bill, ... standing on its own merits, could pass the legislature in the special session, but when the proponents of these measures combined their interests, both were enacted." Id. at 198-99, 235 P.2d 173. As to the second clause in article II, section 19, the subject-in-title requirement, the purpose is "to notify members of the Legislature and the public of the subject matter of the measure." Amalgamated, 142 Wash.2d at 207,11 P.3d 762.

The two article II, section 19 requirements apply with equal force to enactments of the legislature and to initiatives, for "[i]n approving an initiative measure, the people of Washington wield direct legislative power." In re Estate of Thompson, 103 Wash.2d 292, 294, 692 P.2d 807 (1984); see CONST. art. II, § 1(a). A statute or initiative measure is presumptively constitutional; consequently, a party asserting that either violates the state con...

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