Pierce Tp. of Barnes County v. Ernie
| Citation | 19 N.W.2d 755,74 N.D. 16 |
| Decision Date | 22 August 1945 |
| Docket Number | 6958. |
| Court | North Dakota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. A township does not possess corporate powers not specifically provided by law except those necessary to the exercise of powers enumerated in or granted by the statutes.
2. Townships are bodies corporate and the rights of townships which flow from the powers granted by statute are determined according to the rules of law applicable to municipal corporations.
3. Where a township board has purchased real estate for the township by a consummated transaction which exceeded authority of the board, the fact that the transaction was ultra vires does not prevent title from passing to the township.
4. Where a public corporation has power to acquire and hold real estate, a stranger may not attack collaterally a transaction by which such property was acquired on the ground that it was ultra vires.
5. A purchaser of real property who has brought to his attention facts which should have put him on inquiry which, if pursued with due diligence, would have led to knowledge of a prior purchase of the same property by another, is not a purchaser in good faith within the meaning of sec. 47-1941 R.C.1943.
6. In an action to quiet title to real estate the plaintiff must rely upon the strength of his own title and not upon the weakness of that of his adversary; but such an action will not be defeated by showing that the plaintiff's interest otherwise sufficient to support the action, is subject to possibly superior rights of other parties who are not parties to the suit.
L A. W. Stephan, of Valley City, and Rittgers & Hjellum, of Jamestown, for plaintiff and appellant.
Roy A. Ployhar, of Valley City, for defendant and respondent.
The plaintiff, Pierce Township, instituted an action against the defendant to quiet title to a tract of land containing 2.2 acres, more or less. Defendant answered denying title of the plaintiff and by a counterclaim asserted that he was the owner of the title in fee simple and asked that the title be quieted in him. Judgment for the defendant was entered in the court below and the plaintiff appeals.
The plaintiff claims title by virtue of a deed from Clara O. Bloededl, dated December 1, 1941, and recorded in the office of the Register of Deeds of Barnes County on March 8, 1944. The tract is described by metes and bounds. Its value lies in that it embraces a gravel pit.
The defendant claims title by virtue of a deed from Clara O. Bloedel, dated July 23, 1943, and recorded September 13, 1943, which purports to convey to the defendant:
'All that part of: The Northeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter and the North One Half of the Southeast Quarter of the Northeast Quarter, of Section Five in Township One Hundred Forty-two, Range Sixty One, situated in Barnes County, North Dakota, which now stands of record in the name of Clara O. Bloedel.'
This tract includes the gravel pit previously conveyed to the plaintiff.
The defendant bases his claim upon two grounds. His first contention is that the purchase by Pierce Township was ultra vires both as to the township and as to the board of supervisors that negotiated the transaction. He asserts that the township was without power to purchase the tract because it lies outside of the township boundaries and that, in any event, the board of township supervisors had no authority to make the purchase regardless of the location of the tract because the purchase was neither authorized nor approved by the electors of the township at a township meeting.
The defendant's second contention is that he purchased the land from Mrs. Bloedel prior to the recording of plaintiff's deed and that he was an innocent purchaser without notice and for value.
We first consider whethere a township board may purchase a gravel pit without authorization or ratification by the electors. In this state an organized township is a body corporate with capacity 'To purchase and hold lands within its limits and for the use of its inhabitants subject to the powers of the legislative assembly.' Sec. 58-0301, R.C.1943; see also 52 Am.Jur., Towns and Townships, sec. 30. The electors of a township have the power at the annual township meeting 'To make such by-laws, rules, and regulations as may be deemed necessary to carry into effect the powers granted to the township.' Sec. 58-0307, R.C.1943. The record does not disclose any by-laws, rules or regulations adopted by the electors. Sec. 58-0601, R.C.1943, prescribes the general powers and duties of the board of township supervisors. It authorizes them 'To manage and control the affairs of the township not committed to other township officers.' This section is silent with respect to the exercise of power to purchase and hold lands within the limits of a township and for the use of its inhabitants, with the exception. Par. 3 authorizes the board of township supervisors 'To recommend to the electors the expenditure of a stated amount for the purpose of purchasing building sites, and for purchasing, erecting, locating, or removing any building, township hall, or library building for the use and benefit of the township.' No other authorization with respect to the purchase of real estate appears in either regulations adopted by the electors, minutes of annual meetings or in the statute.
A township does not possess and may not exercise corporate powers not specifically provided by law, except those necessary to the exercise of powers enumerated or granted by the statutes. Sec. 58-0302, R.C.1943. The legislature having created townships as bodies corporate, it follows that the rights of the township which flow from the powers so granted are determined according to the general rules of law applicable to municipal corporations.
The respondent relies largely upon Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Detman Tp., 62 N.D. 465, 244 N.W. 876. In that case it was held that the board of supervisors of a township has no authority to enter into a contract for the purchase of bridge material without having been authorized by the electors so to do and that a contract so made is void. The plaintiff sought to recover for bridge material furnished and used by the township upon the ground that the township having taken and retained the benefit of the material was estopped to claim irregularities in the purchase thereof. The facts in that case differ materially from the one at bar. There the purported contract had not been completed in that the material had not been paid for. The defense of ultra vires was raised in a suit brought directly against the township to recover the purchase price. It was further held that the acceptance and use of the material thus purchased did not constitute a ratification of the contract but that it could only be ratified by a vote of the electors.
In the case at bar the purchase of the gravel pit, while ultra vires, was completely performed. It was paid for out of township funds and a deed was executed and delivered to the township officers. The fact that the township board exceeded its authority in making the purchase did not prevent title from passing to the township.
The defendant's challenge to the power of the township itself to acquire the pit in question is more serious. The statute which we have quoted above, sec. 58-0301, R.C.1943, limits the power to acquire real estate to that located within the limits of the township. The purchase of the gravel pit, which was located in an adjacent township, was clearly ultra vires. That, however, does not necessarily mean that the deed is void or that it can be attacked by the defendant in this action.
It is the general rule that a stranger may not attack collaterally a transaction by which a private corporation has acquired title to property on the ground that the acquisition was ultra vires. Phillips v. Phillips, 53 N.D. 66, 204 N.W. 985; Puget Sound Nat. Bank v. Fisher, 52 Wash. 246, 100 P. 724, 17 Ann.Cas. 526; Illinois Steel Co. v. Warras, 141 Wis. 119, 123 N.W. 656; Thompson on Real Property, Perm.Ed., sec. 3133. This rule is also applicable to public corporations. Mills v. Forest Preserve Dist. of Cook County, 345 Ill. 503, 178 N.E. 126; McQuillan on Municipal Corporations, 2nd Ed., sec. 1226; Dillon on Municipal Corporations, 5th Ed., sec. 990. Hayward v. Davidson, 41 Ind. 212, involved the power of a county to acquire and hold real estate that had been bequeathed to the county. In holding that title to the real estate in question had poassed to the county, the court observes concerning the power of counties to take title to property generally, that:
In Hjelm v. City of St. Cloud, 134 Minn. 343, 159 N.W. 833, 834, it appeared that the city had entered into an agreement with Swan Hjelm, a man of advanced age, to furnish him food, care, medical attention, and personal attendance during the balance of his life and a decent burial on death, in return for a deed to his home in the City of St. Cloud. After his death his only son and heir sought to set aside the deed upon the ground that the contract between his father and the city was ultra vires in so far as the city was concerned....
To continue reading
Request your trial