Pierce v. Bekins Van & Storage Co.

Citation185 Iowa 1346,172 N.W. 191
Decision Date06 May 1919
Docket NumberNo. 31946.,31946.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Iowa
PartiesPIERCE v. BEKINS VAN & STORAGE CO.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Appeal from District Court, Woodbury County; George Jepson, Judge.

Appeal from an action of the district court effectuating an award against appellant by a board of arbitration sustained on review by the industrial commissioner. Affirmed.Sargent, Strong & Struble, of Sioux City, for appellant.

George Kephart and Kass Bros., all of Sioux City, for appellee.

SALINGER, J.

[1] I. The first contention of the appellant is that the accident which caused the death awarded for was occasioned by the willful misconduct of the employé, committed with intention to injure himself. The second complaint is that at the time of the injury the employé was intoxicated, and that said intoxication was the proximate cause of his injury.

It is to be doubted whether there is any evidence of willful misconduct, or of such conduct with intent to inflict the injury. Be that as it may, it is perfectly clear that whether there was such misconduct, or such misconduct with such intent, is fairly a question of fact, and that on the evidence reasonable minds may differ as to whether or not there was such misconduct. The same situation exists as to the claim that there was intoxication which was the proximate cause of the injury. One of the vital purposes of the Compensation Act (Code Supp. 1913, §§ 2477m-2477m50) is to minimize litigation and expensive contests. In aid of this purpose, the decision of the statute tribunals on some things is made final. All findings of fact upon conflicting evidence, or upon evidence from which reasonable men may draw differing conclusions, are within that class. We agree with appellant that our decision at this point should not be controlled by Fischer v. Priebe, 178 Iowa, 512, 160 N. W. 48, and we have held in Griffith v. Cole, 165 N. W. 577, L. R. A. 1918F, 923, that the limitations placed by the Priebe Case on the power of the district court are expressed in a dictum. None the less, the effect of the Griffith Case is that we cannot review a finding of fact unless the transcript makes it appear as matter of law that such finding is not sustained by or is contrary to the evidence, and say in that connection that “the court may not go into a general fact controversy.”We therefore now hold that we may not interfere with the finding of the statute tribunals that there was no willful misconduct, no intention to inflict the injury, and that there was no intoxication which was the proximate cause of the injury. See Cushman v. Doherty, Industrial Accident Board of Massachusetts, June 17, 1915; Miller v. Foreman, Maryland Industrial Accident Commission, June 2, 1915; Hansen v. Door Co., Industrial Board of Illinois, May 19, 1914.

We find nothing that is either held or cited with approval in Hunter v. Coal Co., 175 Iowa, 245, 154 N. W. 1037, 157 N. W. 145, L. R. A. 1917D, 15, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 803, inconsistent with our pronouncement at this point.

II. The appellant was in business in Sioux City, Iowa. It there employed one Pierce. In line with the employment it directed Pierce to drive a moving van from Sioux City to the town of Homer, in Nebraska, for the purpose of conveying to Sioux City a lot of household goods. Pierce was injured while so employed, and in Nebraska. Appellant presents that the Workmen's Compensation Act of the state has no application where the injury occurs outside of the state of Iowa.

It is claimed that, in jurisdictions wherein it has been held that their act has no extraterritorial effect, the statute construed indicates an intent to limit itself to the state not more strongly than does the Iowa act; that provisions in our own statute for which it is claimed they show an intention to give no extraterritorial force are not found in statutes that have been construed to have extraterritorial force; and that the cases urged by appellee are not applicable because of the nature of the statute which these cases construe. Each party here contends the authorities relied on by the other are inapplicable because of differences between our act and the statutes which these authorities construe. Both agree that the authorities are in decided conflict. We conclude that resort to the decisions in other jurisdictions would be of very doubtful value in interpreting the Iowa act, and we shall refrain from so resorting. It is fortunate that there is no disagreement on the proposition that the state can give a compensation act extraterritorial effect. The ultimate question then is this: On application of approved canons of construction, should it be found that there was an intention to limit the effect of the act to the state, or found that it was the intention that it shall be applicable where the contract of hiring is made in the state and the employé is injured while in the course and because of his employment, no matter where the injury occurs?

[2] The statute is highly remedial, and is to be construed as such statutes are. Howsoever the cases may differ, there is no difference as to the rule that such statutes as this shall have a broad and liberal construction in aid of accomplishing the object of the enactment. See Kennerson v. Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 Atl. 372, L. R. A. 1916A, 436. The title to the act indicates the breadth and scope of the act. It has a declaration that it relates to the liability of the employer for personal injuries sustained “in line of duty.” That it was not intended to limit recovery under the act to injuries sustained while the employé was in the state is to be found by an application of the reasoning upon which the rule, “Designatio unius est exclusio alterius,” rests.

[3][4] Section 2477m, subsec. d, Code Supplement 1913, provides that every employer shall be conclusively presumed to have provided compensation according to the act “for injuries sustained arising out of and in the course of the employment.” Section 2477m2a is to like effect. Section 2477m, Code Supplement 1913, that, unless the act otherwise provides, the employer has elected to pay compensation according to the act “for any and all personal injuries arising out of and in the course of the employment.” Where stated things are enumerated, things not named are excluded. On the same reasoning, where a statute declares that compensation under its terms is to be made for any and all injuries sustained without limitation beyond that they shall occur in the course of and arise out of the employment, it is the declared intention that compensation shall be made under the statute if the injury be of the class named in the statute--the only limitation is the relation of the injury to the duty. No exception based on the place where the injury occurs is found in the language, and if it is to be ingrafted upon that language it must be done by judicial legislation. It is no answer to say that it would have been wiser to have made the place of the injury a condition to recovery under the act. Had the Legislature thought that desirable, it would have been easy to add, to the words allowing a recovery for any and all injuries, some such words as “except where the injury is sustained elsewhere than in the state.” No matter how wise and beneficial such an addition may be assumed to be, the Legislature saw fit not to make it. We have not the power to rewrite the statute to supply what, for the sake of the argument, should have been enacted, but was not.

So far, we have assumed that such an exception as the act does not contain would be beneficial. Whether it would be that is quite debatable. For one thing, it would make impossible the accomplishment of the one purpose of such acts, to wit, to bring about speedy payment by procedure at once simple and inexpensive. It would further tend to nullify another thing intended, to wit, that the employer shall be enabled to charge to the industry what injury to the employé engaged therein will cost. As to the first, compelling the employé to bring a common-law suit, and to apply to its decision the statutes of another state, is certainly not calculated to promote speedy payment by procedure simple and inexpensive. As to the second, the employer could fix no tax upon his business to meet expenditures for compensation because he would not pay statute compensation where the injury occurred outside of the state, and could not foretell what proportion of injuries to be compensated for would arise outside of the state. This, however, does not so much matter. Once grant the power to make the statute apply to injury sustained outside of the state, and that this has been done, and it becomes immaterial whether it would be injurious or beneficial to have limited the statute to the state.

It is provided in subsection e, § 2477m16, that the words “personal injury arising out of and in the course of the employment shall include injuries to employés whose services are being performed on, in or about the premises which are occupied, used or controlled by the employer,” and also applies to those “who are engaged elsewhere in places where their employer's business requires their presence and subjects them to dangers incident to the business.” Appellant tells us that the only way every section of the statute may be given full force and effect is by adding to a provision dealing with services performed about the premises of the employer and “elsewhere in places where their employer's business requires their performance,” the limiting words, “within the state.” We shall presently attempt to show that for the purposes of the present controversy it is not essential that every provision of the act shall have effect. Be that as it may, we have found no argument that satisfies us that we have the right to add such a limitation.

[5] Appellant cites cases which proceed on the reasoning that the courts may not construe such an act as this to have extraterritorial operation, unless...

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